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 Background. Counselling and psychotherapy services are under pressure to evidence 
clinical effectiveness. However, many of the outcome measures in use are based on the ‘disease 
model’: a paradigm that is at odds with several key psychotherapy approaches, including the 
humanistic approach. This has led to calls for psychometrically sound outcome measures that 
emphasise growth and well-being. One such measure is the Authenticity Scale (AS), based on the 
Rogerian concept of congruence. Authenticity is a core construct within humanistic psychology 
and the person-centred model of psychotherapy, and the measure has been developed specifically 
for use as an outcome tool for counselling and psychotherapy. Despite this, no research to date has 
assessed the validity of the AS in this way. 
 Aims. The aim of this thesis is to investigate the psychometric properties of the AS, and 
how it functions as an outcome measure, specifically looking at its reliability, validity, 
acceptability, and sensitivity to change in a clinical sample.  
 Methods. The thesis consists of two studies. Study 1 is a systematic review of the literature 
regarding the AS in general populations, collating psychometric data from 60 publications into a 
narrative synthesis and meta-analysis. In Study 2, a total of 67 clients receiving psychotherapy 
completed the AS and the CORE-10 periodically over the course of their therapy. Sensitivity to 
change was assessed using pre- and post-therapy comparisons, and multilevel modelling. 
Results. In Study 1, the AS showed excellent psychometric properties in the majority of 
samples, confirming its potential as a psychotherapy outcome measure. In Study 2, the AS was 
internally reliable in the clinical sample, and showed convergent validity with the CORE-10 
measure of psychological distress. Multilevel modelling indicated that the AS was sensitive to 
change, with participants’ scores increasing significantly over the course of therapy. These 
 3 
findings indicate that the AS may be a psychometrically valid and reliable outcome measure for 
use in the psychological therapies.  
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Structure of the thesis  
In this counselling psychology thesis I evaluate how a psychometric measure of 
authenticity, the Authenticity Scale (AS; Wood, Linley, Maltby, Baliousis, & Joseph, 2008) based 
in humanistic and positive psychology, functions as an outcome measure for psychotherapy. It is 
split into two studies, the first a systematic review of the literature pertaining to the AS, and the 
second, an exploration of the AS as an outcome measure, analysing AS data from clients receiving 
psychotherapy.  
In the first chapter, I provide a rationale for using the AS as an outcome measure, laying 
the theoretical foundation for the empirical work in the thesis, before listing my overall aims. 
Chapter 2 covers Study 1, a systematic review of the AS literature, including a narrative synthesis 
of its concurrent validity, and a meta-analysis of its psychometric properties. I conclude that the 
evidence suggests the AS is likely to be sufficiently psychometrically sound to be used as an 
outcome measure, and note that, despite this, no publications to date have used it in such a capacity. 
This gap in the literature is one Study 2 starts to fill.  
Chapters 4 and 5 cover Study 2, exploring how the AS functions as an outcome measure 
in a help-seeking population. In chapter 4 I cover the methods of Study 2. I begin by delineating 
my epistemological position, providing a fundamental backdrop and context for the study. I go on 
to present the aims of the study, followed by its design and procedure, and finally introducing the 
analyses I will use to address my aims. Chapter 5 is the results chapter for Study 2, where I briefly, 
and in statistical terms, list all my findings.   
In chapter 6, the discussion chapter, I bring the two studies together, discussing how the 
findings of the thesis as a whole have addressed my aims, and its implications for counselling 
psychology and future research. In chapter 7, I briefly summarise the thesis, and end by writing 
reflexively about my journey conducting this research. 
 11 
Chapter 1. Background 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The curious paradox is that when I accept myself just as I am, then I can change.  




In this first chapter, I aim to provide a background and rationale for the thesis, delineating 
how it fits with, and builds upon, the wider body of literature and previous research. I first give a 
personal rationale for why I choose to do this particular research. I then provide a background for 
it, beginning by reviewing the broad field of outcome measurement in counselling psychology and 
its history, before moving on to the relatively recent positive psychology movement and its 
emphasis on using well-being focused outcome measures rather than ones that measure levels of 
distress. I continue by introducing some well-being measures that have sprung out of this positive 
psychology movement, before focusing on authenticity as a construct, and ways it has been 
conceptualised and measured. Finally, I introduce the Authenticity Scale (Wood et al., 2008), the 
topic of this thesis, reviewing its conceptualisation and background, and its potential use as an 
outcome measure in counselling psychology. I end this first chapter by introducing my two overall 
aims for the thesis, which are addressed in the subsequent chapters.  
 
1.2. Personal rationale 
 The rationale behind my wishing to conduct this research and write this thesis are rooted 
in my own journey of, as Carl Rogers (1961a) might say, becoming a person. In my teenage years, 
I was lucky enough to have a group of friends around me with whom I felt safe enough to express 
what I was experiencing, which pivotally included the parts of me that I was convinced disqualified 
 12 
me from the love and affection that I sought. I remember vividly the fear of letting people see those 
part of me I had worked hard to cover up and hide, and the deep sense of acceptance that followed 
being seen. I experienced first hand the power of authenticity, and the freedom of simply being 
me, unashamedly. Though I did not know there was such a profession, I trace my desire to be a 
counselling psychologist back to these moments: I wished to help people experience the freedom 
of authenticity that I had, and subsequently found myself frequently in conversations with people 
saying to me: ‘I've never told anyone this, but...’. On the wall in my bedroom, I hung Cicero's 
famous quote: ‘Esse quam videri’ (1923, p. 205), ‘To be, rather than to appear’.  
 My adolescent years left me convinced that authenticity was pivotal to my happiness, and 
when I later started my training, I was excited to find the importance of authenticity echoed by 
many psychologists and psychotherapists over the last century. I was particularly captivated by 
Carl Rogers and the person-centred approach, with Rogers seeming to hold authenticity, or 
congruence, as the key to optimal functioning and well-being. When I came across the Authenticity 
Scale (AS) in a textbook on the person-centred approach, the idea for this thesis began to take 
shape. I was using a distress-focused outcome measure with my own clients, yet practicing the 
person-centred model, and it did not quite sit right with me. I reasoned that if I must measure 
outcomes by quantifying experiences, then I should at least be asking questions consistent with 
the model I am practicing. The AS seemed the ideal measure for this, and so I was surprised when 
I was unable to find any research investigating its use as an outcome measure. After one of his 
lectures, I decided to voice my thoughts with Professor Mick Cooper, whom I greatly admired and 
knew was interested in outcome research. That brief conversation further convinced me to pursue 
these ideas, and I was thrilled when Mick later agreed to be my supervisor for this project. 
 Thus, I have conducted this research utterly convinced that authenticity is one of the pivotal 
keys to well-being, and that the AS could be a valuable outcome measure for counselling 
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psychology. Though this belief has motivated me when the work has been heavy or uninspiring, I 
am aware that it has also left me biased, hoping to find that my research confirms my belief in the 
importance of authenticity, and the usefulness of the AS. I have had to bear in mind that I view 
my research through these lenses, and my supervisors have been invaluable in helping me 
recognise when my biases have impacted my research decisions. On reflection, I believe I have 
completed this research with the conviction that whether it confirms my original beliefs or not, 
this is not just a thesis to get me across the finish line of qualification, but that it can greatly benefit 
the field of counselling psychology. 
 
1.3. Background 
1.3.1. The move to outcome monitoring 
 In 1952, as psychotherapy was rapidly growing to meet demands in the aftermath of World 
War II, Hans Eysenck published a study claiming that though about two thirds of ‘neurotics’ 
substantially improved after two years of psychotherapy, a similar proportion not receiving therapy 
improved at the same rate. Up to this point, the emphasis in psychotherapy research had largely 
been on the components and process of therapy, but the Eysenck (1952) study led to a new focus 
on outcome research, seeking to establish firmly the effectiveness of psychotherapy. This new 
emphasis provided a major impetus for the use of outcome measures, providing empirical and 
quantitative data by which psychological therapies could be evaluated  (Hill & Corbett, 1993). As 
a result, there has been a steadily growing body of evidence attesting to the effectiveness of 
psychotherapy as a whole, as well as individual therapies and interventions (e.g. Cooper, 2008; 
Lambert, 2013, Lambert & Vermeersch, 2002; Leichsenring & Rabung, 2008; Smith, Glass, & 
Miller, 1980).  
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 The past two decades have seen outcome monitoring gain further momentum, as 
psychological services have come under increasing pressure to demonstrate clinical effectiveness 
as well as cost containment, both in the private and public sectors (Corrie, 2010). From this climate 
of evaluation and justification, evidence-based practice (Department of Health, 1996, 1997; 
Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group, 1992) has emerged as a framework guiding the 
delivery of psychological services, placing evidence in a key position within the field of 
counselling psychology (BPS, 2017; HCPC, 2015). This has further increased the demand for 
empirical research on the effectiveness of psychological therapies, and by extension increased the 
pressure to use standardised outcome measures to assess interventions (Tarescavage & Ben-
Porath, 2014).  
 Building on this evidence-based practice framework, the concept of routine outcome 
monitoring (ROM) has developed, essentially the regular measurement of client variables, such as 
symptom severity or well-being, over the course of therapy (Boswell, Kraus, Miller, & Lambert, 
2015; Carlier, Meuldijk, Van Vliet, Van Fenema, & Van Der Wee, 2012; Carlier & van Eeden, 
2017, Wampold, 2015). ROM was first suggested by Howard, Moras, Brill, Martinovich, and Lutz 
(1996), and takes outcome measurement a step further: rather than just implementing a measure 
pre- and post therapy, it involves monitoring a client’s progress over the course of therapy as well, 
typically completing measures sessionally. In addition to monitoring client progress, a lot of 
research has also looked at the effects of feeding this information back to the therapist, or to both 
the therapist and client, often termed ROM with feedback (Wampold, 2015). ROM has gained 
momentum over the past fifteen years (Boswell et al., 2015), and in the UK, ROM with feedback 
was included as a component in the Improving Access to Psychological Therapies initiative (IAPT; 
Clark, Layard, Smithies, Richards, Suckling, & Wright, 2009), whilst in the US, the APA 
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Presidential Task Force on Evidence-Based Practice (2006) included it is a vital element of 
evidence-based practice. 
 
1.3.2. Why monitor outcomes? 
 More than two decades ago, the American psychologist Paul Clement (1994) argued all 
therapists should be asked ‘Are you any good?’ (p.173). He monitored the progress of every client 
he had seen since he began practicing in 1966, 26 years of quantitative data, and held that all 
therapists have an ethical obligation to use empirical data to direct their practice and answer the 
question ‘with whom do I achieve the best therapeutic outcomes?’. 
 Twenty-five years on from Clement (1994), outcome monitoring has become a central and 
contentious topic in counselling psychology (see Boswell et al., 2015). There is a growing body 
of evidence suggesting there to be important clinical benefits to outcome monitoring, particularly 
concerning ROM with feedback (e.g. Gondek, Edbrooke-Childs, Fink, Deighton, & Wolpert, 
2016, Lambert & Shimokawa, 2011; Wampold, 2015), though there are also studies that have 
failed to find positive effects (e.g. de Jong, van Sluis, Nugter, Heiser, & Spinhoven, 2012; Rise, 
Eriksen, Grimstad, & Steinsbekk, 2016). A recent meta-analysis (Lambert, Whipple, & 
Kleinstäuber, 2018) reviewed 24 studies looking at the effect of feedback from outcome measures 
on treatment effectiveness, and found that in two-thirds of the studies, ROM-assisted 
psychotherapy had better outcomes than therapy-as-usual conducted by the same clinicians, with 
effect sizes ranging from small to moderate. ROM with feedback was found to be most beneficial 
for not-on-track patients.  
 In addition to the clinical benefits of outcome monitoring, standardised outcome 
measurement allows for the collection and collation of outcome data, and is thus the cornerstone 
of the growing body of practice-based evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of psychological 
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therapies (Barkham, Hardy, & Mellor-Clark, 2010). As well as enabling quantitative psychological 
research, furthering our understanding of the complex nature of psychotherapy and change 
processes (Erbes et al., 2004), the present climate of high accountability (BPS, 2017; HCPC, 2015) 
means that evidencing treatment effectiveness is important to both services and individual 
practitioners, and is often key to procuring funding and support, both in the public and private 
sectors (Corrie, 2010; Ogles, Lambert, & Fields, 2002). 
 
1.3.3. Challenges of outcome monitoring 
 Despite the benefits to employing outcome measures in clinical practice (i.e. Knaup, 
Koesters, Schoefer, Becker, Puschner, 2009; Lambert, et al., 2018), studies have repeatedly found 
there is an significant research-practice gap, with a large proportion of practitioners not monitoring 
outcomes (Bickman et al., 2000; Boswell et al., 2015; Hatfield & Ogles, 2004, 2007; Ionita & 
Fitzpatrick, 2014; Phelps, Eisman, & Kohout, 1998; Zimmerman & McGlinchey, 2008). Fifteen 
years ago, Hatfield and Ogles (2004, 2007) surveyed psychologists in the US (N = 994) and found 
that 63% of respondents did not gather any outcome data. Zimmerman and McGlinchey (2008) 
found similar results for American psychiatrists (N = 314), with over 60% rarely or never 
implementing outcome measures, whilst in a more recent survey of Canadian psychologists (N = 
1668), only 12.1% of respondents used outcome measures (Ionita & Fitzpatrick, 2014). Hatfield 
and Ogles (2007) found that practical issues, such as the added burden on clients and therapists, 
time constraints, and financial cost, were the most commonly cited reasons for psychologists not 
using outcome measures. Another issue commonly raised was around the utility of outcome 
measurement, with psychologists not believing it to be relevant or helpful to practice. Further to 
this, insight-oriented psychologists were less likely to use outcome measurement than cognitive or 
behavioural therapists, and the authors concluded this may be due to these practitioners believing 
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that the aims of treatment cannot be easily measured in the form of overt constructs such as 
symptoms or behaviours. Though perhaps outdated, these findings highlight some of the 
limitations with outcome measurement as seen by practitioners: the added administrative burden, 
as well as the philosophical issues around using overt constructs to quantify a clients’ progress or 
well-being (Boswell et al., 2015; Hatfield & Ogles, 2004, 2007). Addressing the latter issue, 
Hatfield and Ogles (2007) highlight the need for outcome measures that are more philosophically 
aligned to specific psychotherapeutic orientations.  
 The above studies were conducted in the US and Canada, and may not be applicable to the 
UK. However, to date there is very limited research on the use of outcome measures in the UK. 
The most recent study was conducted by Landy et al. (2013), who surveyed clinicians across three 
mental health trusts in London and their IAPT services (N = 136). Contrary to the North American 
studies, they found that 91% of their respondents used outcome measures in their practice. 
However, their sample is both relatively small and homogenous, and thus the generalisability of 
the survey is questionable. Interestingly, Landy et al. (2013) found that therapist attitudes towards 
ROM varied greatly depending on modality, with CBT practitioners more favourably inclined than 
psychodynamic psychotherapists, echoing the findings of Hatfield and Ogles (2007). 
  
1.3.4. Popular outcome measures 
 Though there is no recent record of how many different outcome measures are in use, in 
their survey of American psychologists, Hatfield and Ogles (2004) found that there were more 
than 200 different standardised measures used by the 324 respondents who routinely measured 
outcomes. They also found that a few measures were employed by a large percentage of 
respondents, such as the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & 
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Erbaugh, 1961) and the Global Assessment Scale (GAS; Endicott, Spitzer, Fleiss, & Cohen, 1976) 
(45.3% and 23.0% respectively).  
 There have been no recent studies surveying the use of outcome measures in the UK, but 
different organisations, such as IAPT (NHS Digitial, 2016) and the Royal College of Psychiatrists 
(RCPsych; Apostolou, Ward, & Yakeley, 2016) have recommendations for which measures to use. 
From these recommendations I have chosen three examples that I will briefly review, before 
contrasting them with two measures that have emerged from positive psychology. The Patient 
Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9; Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 2001) and Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder scale (GAD-7; Spitzer, Kroenke, Williams, & Löwe, 2006) are the default measures for 
assessing depression and anxiety in IAPT (NHS Digitial, 2016), and the Clinical Outcomes in 
Routine Evaluation outcome measure (CORE-OM; Evans et al., 2000) is recommended by the 
RCPsych and also used by Child and Young People's IAPT (CYP-IAPT; Wolpert, Jacob, 
Napoleone, Whale, Calderon, & Edbrooke-Childs, 2016). 
 
1.3.4.1. The PHQ-9 and the GAD-7  
The PHQ-9 and GAD-7 are among the most used scales that aim to measure depression 
and anxiety, respectively (Kroenke et al., 2016). In a sample of 6000, the PHQ-9 had internal 
reliability (alpha) between .86 and .89 (Kroenke et al., 2001), and the GAD-7 had a reported alpha 
of .92 in a sample of 2740 patients (Kroenke, Spitzer, Williams, & Löwe, 2010). A systematic 
review of the literature (Kroenke et al., 2010) identified 561 publications reporting data on the 
PHQ (PHQ-9, PHQ-8, PHQ-2, PHQ-15) and GAD-7 scales, also reporting they had been 
translated into more than 80 languages, and included in many clinical practice guidelines 
worldwide. In the UK they have been widely employed in the NHS, and in IAPT (NHS Digital, 
2016). These measures are short (9 and 7 items, respectively), unifocal and condition-specific, 
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purely assessing direct symptoms of anxiety and depression as defined by the DSM-IV (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994). It is worth noting that both these measures are owned by the drug 
company Pfizer Incorporated. 
The PHQ-9 and the GAD-7 both exemplify the illness-focused, medical view of 
psychological distress. This paradigm, often termed the medical model or disease model (Joseph 
& Murphy, 2013), pathologises certain human experiences, such as anxiety or depression, 
conceptualising them as illnesses, and psychotherapy as a medical treatment that will cure them 
(Wampold & Imel, 2015). Outcome measures in this paradigm aim to measure the extent to which 
a client is suffering, and the extent to which treatment has alleviated that suffering. Mainstream 
psychology has traditionally aligned itself with this model, and thus its emphasis has largely been 
on illness and dysfunction, and the aim of psychological intervention has been the reduction of 
distress, or the ‘curing’ of illness (Joseph & Murphy, 2013; Joseph & Wood, 2010). As a result, 
outcome measurement has largely been focused on disorder and pathology, measuring the extent 
to which a client is suffering, and the extent to which treatment has alleviated that suffering. 
 
1.3.4.2. CORE-OM/CORE-10  
The CORE-OM (Evans et al., 2000) is another measure that is widely used by both private 
and public sector psychological services in the UK (Barkham et al., 2013; ‘CORE Users’, n.d.). 
However, it diverges from the PHQ-9 and GAD-7 in that it is pantheoretical, aiming to neither 
align itself with the medicalised view of psychological distress, nor a positive psychology view 
discussed in later sections. The CORE-OM was developed to meet the need for a short and non-
proprietary measure, that could be used widely by both clinicians and researchers, regardless of 
therapeutic modality, and that was sensitive to both high and low distress intensity (Barkham et 
al., 1998; Evans et al., 2002). Being a generic measure of psychological distress, not specific to 
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any condition or disorder, CORE has a much wider focus than the PHQ-9 (Kroenke et al., 2001) 
and the GAD-7 (Spitzer et al., 2006). The CORE-OM is a 34-item measure, with items split into 
four subscales, subjective well-being (4 items), symptoms (12 items measuring symptoms of 
anxiety, depression, psychical and trauma), functioning (12 items measuring general functioning, 
and close relationships and social relationships) and risk (6 items measuring risk to self and others). 
Several studies have explored its validity, and Evans et al. (2002) reported coefficient alphas of 
.94 in large clinical (n = 713) and non-clinical (n = 1009) samples. A psychometrically comparable 
shorter version, the CORE-10 (Barkham, et al., 2013), has since been developed, pulling 10 
representative items from the original 34. Barkham and colleagues (2013) found it correlated at 
.94 with the CORE-OM in a clinical sample and at .92 in a non-clinical, and reported internal 
reliability of .90.  
  
1.3.5. Positive psychology and humanistic psychology 
 The past two decades have seen the emergence and growing momentum of the positive 
psychology perspective, placing emphasis on positive functioning, rather than psychological 
distress and the alleviation of suffering (Seligman, 1999; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). 
Positive psychology emerged as a response to the strong emphasis on the understanding and 
treating of mental illness within psychology (Waterman, 2013). In Seligman's (1999) Presidential 
Address to the APA he argued that since World War II, psychology has largely focused on 
‘repairing damage within a disease model of human functioning. Such almost exclusive attention 
to pathology neglects the flourishing individual and the thriving community’, going on to say that 
'When we became solely a healing profession, we forgot our larger mission: that of making the 
lives of all people better' (p. 2). 
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 However, Joseph and Murphy (2013) hold the view that because modern positive 
psychology is grounded in mainstream psychology, it too has largely held to a disease model as 
its paradigm. Joseph and Linley (2006) explain that positive psychology follows a continuum 
model of human functioning, seeing positive and negative experience as opposite ends of this 
continuum, and thus interventions that decrease negative experience also increase positive 
experience, and vice versa. Thus, though positive psychology attempts to shift the emphasis to 
positive functioning, they argue that it still pathologises the negative end of the human experience 
spectrum. Joseph and Murphy (2013) argue that because of this, positive psychology ‘on the one 
hand implicitly condones the pathologization of human experience that on the other it was created 
in response to’ (p. 34).  
 Positive psychology builds upon humanistic psychology, and the work of Carl Rogers and 
Abraham Maslow (Seligman, Steen, Park & Peterson, 2005). Indeed, humanistic psychology is a 
positive psychology, in the sense that it too is primarily concerned with optimal functioning and 
potentiality (Schneider, 2011). Put briefly, humanistic psychology is based on the key construct of 
the actualising tendency, an innate, biological motivation moving us towards growth and 
autonomy (Rogers, 1963). When social-environmental conditions are optimal, the actualising 
tendency drives us towards the ideal of being fully functioning, according to Rogers (1963). 
However, when conditions are less than optimal, this tendency gets skewed and the individual self-
actualises in ways consistent with what they believe their social environment expects from them. 
Thus, humanistic psychology understands suboptimal human functioning as thwarted human 
potential, rather than as illness, disorder or pathology (Joseph & Murphy, 2013). It is unsurprising, 
then, that both Rogers and Maslow were sharp critics of the disease model as applied to 
psychology, believing psychology would then serve to help people on the one hand, whilst 
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alienating and damaging them at the same time, by pathologising parts of their experience (Joseph 
& Linley, 2006).  
 Whilst Joseph and Linley (2006) advocate positive psychology going further in 
disentangling itself from the disease model, its emergence has brought about a renewed impetus 
to promote psychological research and practice that focuses on positive functioning (Kilbourne et 
al., 2018). Along with this, there has been a call for outcome measures consistent with, and rooted 
in, not just positive psychology, but humanistic psychology, discarding the disease model 
paradigm, and instead focusing on growth and potentiality (Joseph & Murphy, 2013, Joseph & 
Wood, 2010; Patterson & Joseph, 2006; 2007). 
 
1.3.6. Well-being measures 
 Patterson and Joseph (2006; 2007) argue that there have been limited options for services 
and practitioners wishing to monitor outcomes, but who adhere to approaches that do not align 
themselves with the disorder-focused or medicalised views of human suffering (Patterson & 
Joseph, 2006; 2007). However, in the wake of the positive psychology movement, several outcome 
measures that emphasise well-being and optimal functioning have been developed. Below I briefly 
discuss two of these, the Warwick-Edinburgh Mental Well-being Scale (WEMWBS; Tennant et 
al., 2007) and the Strathclyde Inventory (SI; Freire, 2007), using them as examples of positive 
psychology and humanistic psychology measures, respectively. 
 
1.3.6.1. The WEMWBS  
The WEMWBS (Tennant et al., 2007) has been widely employed in the UK (Fat, Scholes, 
Boniface, Mindell, & Stewart-Brown, 2017), and is the only well-being measure included in the 
national health surveys for England and Scotland (NatCen for Social Research, 2018). Population 
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norms for the WEMWBS have also been published for France, Spain, Italy and Northern Ireland, 
and it has been translated into 11 languages (Fat, et al., 2017; Warwick Medical School, 2018). It 
is a measure that focuses on mental well-being rather than distress and pathology. Prior to the 
WEMWBS, several widely used scales focused on psychological well-being, such as the Positive 
and Negative Affects Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), focusing on affective-
emotional facets of well-being, the Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, 
& Griffin, 1985) aiming to measure cognitive-evaluative aspects, and the Scale of Psychological 
Well-being (SPWB; Ryff, 1989; Ryff & Keyes, 1995), concentrating on eudaemonic well-being 
and psychological functioning. The WEMWBS (Tennant et al., 2007) builds on all of the above, 
aiming to cover a broader conception of mental well-being by measuring affective-emotional and 
cognitive-evaluative dimensions, as well as psychological functioning. Whereas the scales listed 
above all included both positively and negatively worded items, the WEMWBS is purely focused 
on the positive, and is short enough (14 items) to be used as an outcome measure (Tennant et al., 
2007). It generally has excellent psychometric properties, and had good internal reliability (alpha) 
in both student (α = .89, n = 348) and population samples (α = .91, n = 1749; Tennant et al., 2007). 
 
1.3.6.2. The Strathclyde Inventory (SI) 
The SI (Freire, 2007) is another scale that aims to measure positive functioning rather than 
distress or pathology. Patterson and Joseph (2006) argued that there is a need for outcome 
measures that are rooted in psychotherapeutic theory, and unlike the WEMWBS (Tennant et al., 
2007), the SI (Freire, 2007) meets this call, fitting into the narrower category of humanistic 
measures rather than just a positive psychology measure. It is based on person-centred theory and 
Carl Rogers' (1961a) description of ‘the fully functioning person’ (p. 183), and was developed to 
be a measure that is consistent with the concept of outcome in humanistic therapies. On a 5-point 
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Likert scale, ranging from 0 (‘never’) to 4 (‘all or most of the time’), t asks respondents to rate 
how often each of the 16 statements have been true for them over the past month. Of the 16 items, 
seven are reverse coded. The following are example items: ‘I have experienced very satisfying 
personal relationships’ (item 5), ‘I have found myself “on guard” when relating to others’ (item 9) 
and ‘I have hidden some elements of myself behind a mask’ (item 13) (Freire, Elliott, & Rodgers, 
2012). Since its initial development, it has been revised several times (e.g. Freire, 2007; Freire et 
al., 2012; Stephen & Elliott, 2017), with the latest version reporting an internal reliability of .91 
in a sample of 405 clients receiving person-centred therapy. Its use as an outcome measure is 
currently being further researched.  
 
1.3.7. Authenticity 
 The emergence of the field of positive psychology has brought an interest in research 
looking at authenticity, a central construct within this framework (e.g. Joseph & Wood, 2010; 
Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). Prior to this however, authenticity had been conceptualised 
by many different psychological and philosophical perspectives.  
 In Ancient Greece, Aristotle held that self-realisation comes by discovering one’s soul, and 
that this is fundamental to living authentically, which in turn lends purpose to life (Hutchinson, 
1995). Since then, notable philosophers such as Descartes, Hume, Kierkegaard, Heidegger and 
Sartre have all discussed authenticity at length (Bond, Strauss & Wickham, 2018; Kernis & 
Goldman, 2006; Markus & Nurius, 1986). Sartre (1944) wrote of authenticity as consisting in 
having a ‘true and lucid consciousness of the situation’ (p. 65), seeing things as they are, and 
accepting them along with the concomitant emotions and responsibilities that come from such a 
true consciousness.  
 25 
 Heidegger (1962) wrote about how we tend to drift away from our uniquely individual   
experience of being in the world, into simply being a part of 'the they', forgetting ourselves and 
instead being absorbed into the collective. The immediacy of our experience of being becomes 
averaged out into the common world of existence around us, and our unique individuality is 
surrendered to the commonly defined expectations and styles of living in our surroundings 
(Sherman, 2009). Heidegger stated that in a world of inauthenticity ‘everyone is the other, and no 
one is himself [sic]’ (Heidegger, 1996, p. 120). He held that authenticity is the reclaiming of 
ourselves from enmeshment with 'the they', a shift in attention and engagement to glimpse our 
unique and individual experiences of being (Sherman, 2009).  
 Building on the these philosophical perspectives, the past century has seen many different 
schools of psychology explore authenticity, such as social (e.g. Deci, 1980; Kernis & Goldman, 
2006; Lopez & Rice, 2006), clinical (e.g. Ehlers, Maercker, & Boos, 2000), evolutionary (e.g. 
Sedikides & Skowronski, 1997), psychodynamic (e.g. Horney, 1951; Winnicott, 1965), 
developmental (e.g. Harter, Marold, Whitesell, & Cobbs, 1996), existential (e.g. May, 1981), 
humanistic (e.g. Rogers, 1961a; Maslow, 1968), and finally, positive (e.g. Sheldon, 2004, Ryff & 
Singer, 2008). Despite the numerous different conceptualisations of the construct, there are some 
common denominators, such as the extent to which one’s emotions, cognitions and behaviours 
reflect a core-, organismic- or true self, and a non-defensiveness to one’s experiences and to 
evaluative information (e.g. Deci, 1980; Kernis & Goldman, 2006; Rogers, 1959; Winnicott, 1965; 
for reviews, see Harter, 2002; Sheldon, 2004).  
  
1.3.7.1. State and trait authenticity 
One key point of contention regarding the authenticity construct is whether it is best 
understood as a trait or as a state. The state-trait debate has been frequently discussed in the 
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personality psychology literature (i.e. Funder, 1991; Nezlek, 2007), with a trait held to be a 
person’s base-rate propensity towards a set of affects, cognitions or behaviours, whereas a state is 
considered the actual affects, cognitions or behaviours in a specific situation (Endler, Parker, 
Bagby, & Cox, 1991). Authenticity has historically been conceptualised within the trait 
framework, and indeed the vast majority of the literature has explored it in this way (i.e. Kernis & 
Goldman, 2006; Rogers, 1959; Wood et al., 2008), holding it to be a stable characteristic. Within 
this framework, any change in authenticity would typically be gradual over time, or facilitated by 
psychological intervention. Empirical research based on this perspective might ask participants to 
report to what degree they generally feel, think and act in accordance with set criteria supposedly 
indicative of authenticity (i.e. Goldman & Kernis, 2002; Wood et al. 2008).  
 However, recent years have seen a growing interest in situationism, the view that 
experienced authenticity changes from situation to situation, which aligns with the broader state 
view (i.e. Lenton, Slabu, Sedikides, & Power, 2013). For example, Fleeson and Wilt (2010) found 
that authenticity seemed to vary more within than between people in their studies, with participants 
reporting to feel more authentic in certain situations, regardless of their reported levels of trait 
authenticity. Similarly, Lenton, Bruder, Slabu, and Sedikides (2013) found that people were eager 
to seek out experiences of authenticity and to avoid experiences of inauthenticity, regardless of 
their levels of trait authenticity. Feeling authentic or inauthentic did not seem to be default states, 
but rather temporary experiential phenomena and they concluded that state and trait authenticity 
are qualitatively separate. Importantly, these findings (Fleeson & Wilt, 2010; Lenton et al., 2013) 
do not suggest a state view of authenticity is more appropriate than a trait view, nor that the two 
are mutually exclusive, but rather that state and trait authenticity are two distinct phenomena. 
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1.3.8. Authenticity in person-centred psychology 
 Within the different schools of psychotherapy, authenticity is a much discussed construct, 
usually seen as a stable trait that can be increased through psychological intervention. Indeed, 
several prominent models see authenticity as a key concept, fundamental to understanding human 
distress and well-being, including psychodynamic (e.g. Horney, 1951; Kohut, 1971; Winnicott, 
1965), existential (e.g. May, 1981; Yalom, 1980), gestalt (Perls, 1969) and humanistic models (e.g. 
Rogers, 1959). The person-centred approach within humanistic psychology, in particular, holds 
authenticity as pivotal, seeing increased authenticity, which Rogers (1959) termed congruence, to 
be the central outcome and aim of psychotherapy, intrinsically linked to subjective and 
psychological well-being (Rogers, 1959). Despite its centrality in his psychological theories, 
Rogers did not introduce one, clear and succinct definition of congruence. Instead, he used several 
terms interchangeably with congruent, such as ‘real’, ‘genuine’, ‘whole’, ‘integrated’ and 
‘transparent’ (e.g. Rogers, 1951, 1957, 1959, 1980). However, it is clear from his writings that he 
saw congruence as the key outcome of successful psychotherapy, clearly delineated in his 
aetiological theories.  
 Rogerian (1959) theory holds that incongruence is the aetiological root of all 
psychopathology. Incongruence stems from there being a mismatch between a person’s 
organismic experience (i.e. the unfiltered experiencing of the person), and what the self-concept 
(i.e. the way the person sees themselves), is allowing into awareness (Cooper, 2013). When 
awareness does not accurately match the real, or unfiltered experience, filtering out those 
experiences that do not match the self-concept, the person is in a state of incongruence. It follows 
then, that congruence is a mirroring between the full range of the individual's experiences, and the 
experiences they are symbolising in awareness (Wyatt, 2001). Rogers (1980) wrote that 
congruence is a close matching, ‘'between what is being experienced at a gut level, what is present 
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in awareness, and what is expressed' (p. 116). He also described nine characteristic directions of 
development the client experiences through the process of therapy when these conditions are met 
(Rogers, 1959). Every one of these listed directions are based on congruence: e.g. ‘6. He [sic] 
experiences fully, in awareness, feelings which have in the past been denied to awareness, or 
distorted in awareness’ (1959, p. 216). He also listed fifteen personality and behavioural outcomes 
of psychotherapy. The first of these, upon which the others are built, is: ‘1. The client is more 
congruent, more open to his [sic] experience, less defensive’ (1959, p. 218). From this it is clear 
that Rogers (1959) saw the aim of person-centred psychotherapy as the increase of congruence, 
which in turn will reduce psychopathology and bring about positive personality and behavioural 
change.  
Barrett-Lennard (1998) reviewed Rogers's writings, aiming to provide a succinct and 
clearly boundaried definition of congruence. His definition follows Rogers's (1959, 1980) work 
closely, in addition to being based on substantial debate among person-centred practitioners, 
resulting in a definition with wide consensus in the person-centred field (Wood et al., 2008; Wyatt, 
2001). His definition is a tripartite model, with congruence being:  'consistency between the three 
levels of (A) a person’s primary experience, (B) their symbolised awareness, and (C) their outward 
behaviour and communication' (Barrett-Lennard, 1998, p. 82; see figure 1).  
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1.3.9. Measuring authenticity  
Despite the importance placed on authenticity within many psychological and 
psychotherapeutic perspectives, there has been a relative lack of empirical research looking at this 
construct (Knoll, Meyer, Kroemer, & Schröder-Abé, 2015). This is in part due to there being few 
psychometrically adequate measures of authenticity available (Knoll et al., 2015). Sheldon (2004), 
as well as Peterson and Seligman (2004), argues that authenticity is problematic to operationalise 
via direct self-report, as one might be unwilling to admit to inauthenticity, one might not be aware 
of being authentic, and asking participants how authentic or inauthentic they are might simply be 
too sophisticated a question for some to reflect on. Harter (2002), on the other hand, suggests this 
relative lack of measures simply reflects the lack of consensus regarding the boundaries and 
A: Primary experience 
Actual physiological states/
emotions/deep level 
B: Symbolised awareness  
Conscious awareness of 
physiological states/emotions/
cognitions
C: Outward behaviour 
and communication 
Figure 1. Tripartite model of congruence  
(Barrett-Lennard, 1998) 
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content of the construct, with so many different perspectives conceptualising authenticity in 
different ways. Regardless of the underlying reasons, authenticity has been relatively under-
researched despite it historically being of great interest to many human sciences, and central in 
several models of psychotherapy (Harter, 2002; Knoll et al., 2015; Sheldon, 2004).  
I conducted a thorough search of the psychology literature with the aim of identifying all 
available psychometric measures of individual authenticity. I began by searching ISI Web of 
Knowledge for any psychology or social sciences articles with ‘authenticity’, ‘congruence’ or ‘true 
or false self’ in their titles, and ‘measure’ or ‘scale’, and ‘validity’ or ‘reliability’ in their topic, 
using the relevant Boolean operating terms. I assessed the titles of each of the 126 publications 
yielded, as well as reviews of the authenticity literature. I identified six reviews of the 
psychological authenticity literature (Harter, 2002; Knoll et al., 2015; Mengers, 2014; Peterson & 
Seligman, 2004; Sheldon, 2004; White, 2011), and reasoned that together, these would cover any 
measures of authenticity available before 2015, as that as the most recent review. The literature 
search identified five measures of authenticity, and these were also covered in the reviews. 
Below I briefly discuss the measures of authenticity available, each with different foci and 
based on a different ways of conceptualising and operationalising authenticity. I then move on to 
discussing the Authenticity Scale (Wood et al., 2008), the focus of this thesis. 
 
1.3.9.1. The Experienced Authenticity Measure (EAM)  
The EAM (Sheldon, Ryan, Rawsthorne, & Ilardi, 1997) was developed to test how the 
authenticity construct relates to Big-Five personality traits (Costa & McCrae, 1985) within 
different social contexts, thus conceptualising authenticity as a contextual state rather than a trait. 
It consists of five items, and participants were asked to answer these for five different social roles. 
In their sample, reported coefficient alphas ranged from .72 (employee role) to .82 (child role) 
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depending on the social role. Sheldon et al. (1997) found that cross-role variability EAM scores 
predicted cross-role variability on the Big-Five traits across all social roles, with higher scores on 
the EAM predicting higher scores on agreeableness, extraversion, conscientiousness and openness 
to experience, and lower scores on neuroticism. They concluded that authenticity, as 
operationalised by their scale, is closely linked to well-being. 
 
1.3.9.2. The Authenticity in Relationships Scale (AIRS) 
Similarly to the EAM (Sheldon et al., 1997), the AIRS (Lopez & Rice, 2006) is based on 
a social-contextualist view of authenticity, seeing it not as a stable and invariable trait, but as 
varying with relationships. This view is consistent with previous research, suggesting authentic 
behaviour to be more frequent in emotionally significant relationships, such as relationships with 
family and romantic partners, as opposed to those with acquaintances (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998). 
The AIRS consists of 24 items, split into two subscales that correlate moderately (r=.47, N=480): 
‘unacceptability of deception’ (UOD; 13 items) and ‘intimate risk taking’ (IRT; 11 items). Lopez 
and Rice (2006) reported coefficient alphas of .87 and .86, and test-retest stability of .70 and .76, 
respectively. For both the UOD and IRT subscales, significant positive correlations were reported 
with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (r=.25, .26; Rosenberg, 1965), and negative correlations 
with a measure of depression (r=-.37, -.25; CES-D; Radloff, 1977). 
 
1.3.9.3. The Perception of False Self Scale (POFS) 
The PFOS (Weir & Jose, 2010) was developed specifically to be used with adolescents 
(aged 11-16), measuring the extent to which they perceive themselves as false or inauthentic, and 
the discrepancy between their public and private selves. It consists of 16 items on a single factor, 
and the authors reported internal reliability of .88 (N = 195; Weir & Jose, 2010). Weir and Jose 
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(2010) do not specify if they view false self-perceptions as a trait or state, but found that they 
remained relatively stable over the 10-week test-retest period (r = .84). The POFS was also found 
to correlate at about r =.65 with measures of depressive (The Children’s Depression Inventory, 
Kovacs, 1985) and anxious symptoms (The Revised Children’s Manifest Anxiety Scale, Reynolds 
& Richmond, 1997). 
 
1.3.9.4. The Authenticity Inventory (AI) 
Kernis and Goldman (2006) subscribe to a trait view of authenticity, as opposed to the 
authors of both the EAM (Sheldon et al., 1997) and the AIRS (Lopez & Rice, 2006), holding it to 
be a stable disposition rather than varying with context or relationships. They defined authenticity 
as ‘the unobstructed operation of one’s true‐ or core‐self in one’s daily enterprise’ (p. 294). 
Building on this definition, as well as a thorough examination of the psychological literature 
relating to authenticity, they construct multicomponent view of authenticity, as opposed to viewing 
it as a unitary process. They developed the AI to measure four interrelated, but distinct, 
components: awareness (12-items), unbiased processing (10 items), behavioural (11 items), and 
relational orientation (12 items) (Goldman & Kernis, 2004). Awareness refers to a comprehensive 
awareness of yourself: the knowledge of, and trust in, your motives, emotions, desires, and 
cognitions. Unbiased processing is the absence of denial or distortion of deep experiences and 
emotions, an openness to evaluative information, and acceptance of your strengths and 
weaknesses. Behavioural refers to acting in accordance with your values, beliefs and needs, rather 
than merely trying to meet external expectations; and relational orientation is the drive to openness 
and honesty in close relationships, allowing those close to you to see the authentic and real you 
(Kernis & Goldman, 2006). The final Authenticity Inventory (AI-3; Goldman & Kernis, 2004) has 
45 items, and the authors reported a coefficient alpha of .90 for the full scale, with scale alphas 
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ranging from .64 (unbiased processing) to .80 (behavioural) for the four subscales. They also 
reported 4-week test-retest reliability of .87 for the total scale (Kernis & Goldman, 2006). Higher 
scores on the AI-3 were related to higher scores on measures of self-actualisation tendencies (Jones 
& Crandall, 1986; r=.61), mindfulness (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003; r=.49) and lower scores 
of psychological distress (Cohen, Kamarack, & Mermelstein, 1983; r=.30). However, some later 
research has failed to replicate the factor structure of the AI-3, with a study finding that several 
items did not load onto any one factor, casting doubt on the validity of the measure (White, 2011).  
 Recently, work has been done to develop a shorter and more psychometrically sound 
version of the AI-3, the Kernis-Goldman Authenticity Inventory - short form (KGAI-SF; Bond, et 
al., 2018). Thirteen of the original 45 items were removed, being judged semantically ambiguous 
or redundant, and confirmatory factor analysis revealed that a further 12 items were unreliable or 
psychometrically redundant. The final KGAI-SF consists of 20 items, and Bond et al., (2018) 
reported internal reliability of .87 (N = 1252) for the full scale. 
 
1.3.10. The Authenticity Scale 
 The above measures all approach the conceptualisation of authenticity from different 
directions. However, none of them are based in psychotherapeutic theory, nor were they developed 
as potential outcome measures. The Authenticity Scale (AS; Wood et al., 2008) on the other hand, 
was developed specifically to meet the need for a short outcome measure for counselling 
psychology practice and research, grounded in psychotherapeutic theory.  
Whereas the AI was developed out of a broad reading of the literature on authenticity, 
pulling together its four factors from a variety of different perspectives, the AS is a measure based 
on theory, with items developed specifically to operationalise the person-centred construct, 
congruence (Wood et al., 2008). The overlap with the SI (Freire, 2007) however, is much larger 
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than with the AI, or with any of the other authenticity measures, though the SI does measure a 
broader construct than the AS, as it is based on Rogers’ (1959) descriptions of the fully functioning 
person. The fully functioning person is what Rogers believed the client would be closer to after 
successful therapy, and increased congruence was thought to be the driving factor in this process. 
Thus, the AS and SI set out to measure related, yet distinct constructs: the SI measures how closely 
the person fits with how Rogers’ believed a client would be after successful therapy, whereas the 
AS aims to measure the antecedent of this, the causal factor in become fully functioning.  
 Specifically, Wood et al. (2008) based the AS on Barrett-Lennard's (1998) tripartite model 
of congruence, derived from Rogers’s works (1959, 1961a, 1961b) (see figure 1). They defined 
authenticity as consistency between the three levels of the tripartite model (Barrett-Lennard, 1998), 
with self-alienation (1) consistency between primary experience (A) and symbolised awareness 
(B), and authentic living (2) consistency between symbolised awareness (B) and outward 
behaviour and communication (C) (see figure 2). These two facets of authenticity are also present 
in the work of Schmid (2001, 2005), where he refers to self-alienation as ‘openness to oneself’ (p. 
216) and authentic living as ‘transparency’ (p. 216), and in the work of Lietaer (1993). 
 In addition to self-alienation and authentic living, Wood et al. (2008) added a third process 
to their model: accepting external influences (3). This aspect of authenticity is the extent to which 
the person introjects the views of others, and believes he or she must conform to their expectations 
and demands (Wood et al., 2008). Rogers (1959, 1961a, 1961b) described the fully functioning, 
congruent person, as having an internal locus of evaluation, that is, self-directivity and moving 
away from needing to please others and meet their expectations (Bohart, 2013). He also included 
this in his list of psychotherapy outcomes in personality and behaviour, holding that this was 
intrinsically tied to congruence and a key outcome of psychotherapy (Rogers, 1959). Figure 2 
illustrates the model of authenticity upon which Wood et al. (2008) based the AS.  
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1.3.10.1. The Authenticity Scale as an outcome measure  
As Rogerian theory sees congruence as the ultimate aim of psychotherapy (Rogers, 1959), 
Joseph and Murphy (2013) suggested that using a measure of congruence, such as the AS, would 
be an appropriate way in which to evaluate therapy. The AS was developed with this aim, as well 
to help explore the link between authenticity and well-being (Wood et al., 2008), aiming to provide 
counselling psychology and the psychotherapy community with a well-being orientated measure 
that was conceptually based in psychotherapeutic theory, thus evaluating therapy on its own 
premises. It was limited to 12 items specifically to make it easier to implement in counselling 
Figure 2. The conceptual basis for the Authenticity 
Scale (Wood et al., 2008) 
A: Actual physiological 
states/emotions/deep 
level cognitions
B: Conscious awareness 
of physiological states/
emotions/cognitions
C: Behaviour and 
emotional expression
3: Accepting external 
influence









settings (Wood et al., 2008) and, indeed, White (2011) concluded, after examining the use of the 
AS in a North American sample, that it could be particularly beneficial as a measure in the field 
of counselling psychology because of its length and robust psychometric properties. Though it is 
based on person-centred theory and humanistic psychology, Wood et al. (2008) held it to be an 
appropriate outcome measure for psychotherapeutic approaches beyond just humanistic ones, as 
several of the most prominent models highlight authenticity as a key therapeutic outcome (i.e. 
Horney, 1951; Kohut, 1971; May, 1981; Winnicott, 1965, Yalom, 1980), and their 
conceptualisations of authenticity overlap. 
 
1.3.10.2. The psychometric properties of the Authenticity Scale  
The 12 items of the AS make up three subscales corresponding to the three processes of 
the conceptualisation of authenticity adopted by Wood et al. (2008): authentic living (AL), self-
alienation (SA), and accepting external influences (AEI). High scores on AL are indicative of high 
authenticity, whereas the SA and AEI are reverse scored, with high scores on these two indicative 
of low authenticity. The factor structure was first confirmed by exploratory factor analysis (EFA) 
on the initial item pool, before multigroup confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted on 
the final items, providing clear support for the three-factor model, and the three subscales were all 
moderately intercorrelated in three separate samples (n = 180, 158, 210). These correlations were 
as expected by the authors, and provided further support for the factor structure of the AS, 
suggesting the subscales were interrelated, but measured distinct and separate constructs (Wood 
et al., 2008). The authors reported coefficient alphas of .70 - .82 for AL, .82 - .84 for SA, and .77 
- .84 for AEI. They also reported four-week test-retest reliabilities at r = .78, .79 and .81 for the 
subscales, respectively (Wood et al., 2008). 
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 Socially desirable responding did not appear to be an issue for the AS, with low and non-
significant correlations with the two subscales of the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding 
scale (Paulhus, 1984) for both the full AS and each of the three subscales (Wood et al., 2008). 
Since its development, the AS has been used in numerous studies, and has generally been found 
to have excellent psychometric properties. I will explore these in chapter 2. 
 
1.4. Conclusion  
 In this chapter I have reviewed the development of outcome monitoring in counselling 
psychology, beginning with the Eysenck study (1952) and continuing to the recent focus on 
evidence-based practice and the current climate of high accountability for psychological therapies 
(BPS, 2017; Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group, 1992; HCPC, 2015; Tarescavage & Ben-
Porath, 2014). After reviewing a selection of commonly used outcome measures, I discussed the 
emergence of the positive psychology perspective, and the accompanying call for outcome 
measures that measure well-being and optimal functioning rather than illness, dysfunction and 
suffering (Levitt et al., 2005; Patterson & Joseph, 2006). Authenticity is intricately interlinked 
with well-being, a key construct not only within positive psychology but also within several major 
models of psychotherapy, such as psychodynamic, existential and humanistic (May, 1981; Rogers, 
1959; Winnciott, 1965). Authenticity has been conceptualised and operationalised in several 
different ways, but the Authenticity Scale (Wood et al., 2008) is the only measure specifically 
developed to be an outcome measure for psychotherapy. Based on the person-centred definition 
of congruence (Barrett-Lennard, 1998) the AS is a measure consistent with psychotherapeutic 
theory, thus measuring the effectiveness of therapy on its own premises. Below I outline the aims 
of this thesis, building on the rationale provided in this chapter. 
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1.5. A priori aims 
 This thesis has two overall aims, addressed over two studies: 
i. Investigate the psychometric properties of the AS. This includes looking at its internal 
reliability, and its concurrent, construct and factorial validity. 
ii. Investigate how the AS functions as an outcome measure. This includes looking at its 
acceptability, in the form of its Therapy Questionnaire Helpfulness Survey (TQHS; Di 
Malta, Pauli & Cooper, unpublished) scores, and completion rates, its score distributions, 



















Chapter 2. Systematic review of the psychometric properties of the 




 As noted in chapter 1, the Authenticity Scale (AS; Wood et al., 2008) was developed as a 
positive psychology measure, one not based on illness ideology measuring the extent of suffering, 
but rather well-being and healthy functioning. It aims to measure authenticity, based primarily on 
the construct ‘congruence’ from the field of person-centred psychology as defined by Barrett-
Lennard (1998; Rogers, 1959). Ten years after its development, no publication has systematically 
reviewed the literature pertaining to the Authenticity Scale, despite a high level of interest in 
authenticity as a construct (e.g. Harter, 2002; Robinson, Lopez, Ramos, & Nartova-Bochaver, 
2012), and a considerable number of studies employing the AS in various ways. The present review 
aims to investigate the psychometric properties of the AS, collating data from all publications that 
have applied it in some way, as well as to investigate whether it has been used as an outcome 
measure for psychotherapy, or in clinical populations. The review is based on a systematic 
literature search and consists of two parts, (a) a narrative synthesis of the AS literature, exploring 
the concurrent validity of the AS, and whether it has been employed as an outcome measure, or 
with clinical populations, and (b) a meta-analysis of coefficient alphas, as well as of mean AS 








2.2.1. Aims of the systematic review and research questions 
 This systematic review aims to address the first aim of the thesis. Thus, its overall aim is 
to investigate the psychometric properties of the AS in the published literature. This aim is split 
into four subsidiary aims:  
1. Explore the concurrent validity of the AS in the literature. This involves summarising 
what relevant measures the AS has been correlated with in the literature, and the nature of 
these correlations. 
2. Explore the internal reliability of the AS in the literature. This involves meta-analysing 
coefficient alphas for AS scores, and for its subscales. 
3. Explore construct validity of the AS in the literature. This involves meta-analysing the 
subscale intercorrelation coefficients between the AS and its subscales, and considering 
them in light of their coefficient alphas. 
4. Explore the mean AS scores in the literature. This involves meta-analysing the mean 
AS scores, and those of its subscales.  
Finally, the second aim of the thesis was to investigate how the AS functions as an outcome 
measure. Thus, I included a fifth aim for the systematic review: 
5. Explore the use of the AS as an outcome measure, and with clinical samples. This 
involved specifically reviewing the psychometrics of the AS from any studies that had used 
it with clinical samples or as an outcome measure. 
These five aims for Study 1 will be addressed by the following research questions: 
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1. Does the AS correlate in expected ways with other psychometric measures? 
2. How internally reliable is the AS in the samples from published studies, and how much 
between-study variability is there in reliability coefficients? 
3. Do the subscales of the AS inter-correlate in expected ways in published studies? 
4. What are the mean AS scores in the samples from published studies, and how much 
between-study variability is there in mean scores? 
5. Has the AS been used as an outcome measure, or with clinical samples, and if so, what 
were its psychometric properties in these studies? 
2.2.2. Methods of the systematic review 
 To address the above aims, I decided to split this systematic review in two parts. To explore 
the concurrent validity of the AS, I opted for a narrative synthesis, as I expected there to be 
relatively little overlap across publications in what measures the AS had been correlated with. 
Thus, collating correlation coefficients seemed inappropriate, whereas a narrative synthesis would 
allow me to group measures together and thoroughly discuss the convergent and divergent validity 
of the AS. Finally, I also planned to address the fifth aim narratively, allowing me an in-depth 
exploration of any studies that had applied the AS as an outcome measure, or with clinical samples.  
 I also reasoned the majority of studies would report coefficient alphas and mean scores of 
the AS, as well as its subscale intercorrelations, and thus it seemed natural to address aims two, 




2.2.2.1. Registration of the systematic review 
This systematic review is registered in the International Prospective Register of Systematic 
Reviews (PROSPERO; www.crd.york.ac.uk), with registration number: CRD42018116038. 
Where relevant, it follows the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-
analyses guidelines (PRIMSA; Moher et al., 2009), a 27 item checklist and flow diagram for 
researchers conducting meta-analyses and systematic literature reviews. Though several of the 
points are not relevant for a thesis, such as a specific abstract, I registered this review with 
PROSPERO as I intend to rewrite it for a potential publication. 
 
2.2.2.2. Eligibility criteria 
The systematic literature search aimed to identify every publication that included data on 
the reliability or validity of the AS, as well as AS scores. Thus, the eligibility criteria for inclusion 
was simply that the publication reported AS data, and searches were not refined in any way (e.g. 
by field, topic, publication type etc). I decided that translations of the AS would be eligible, as 
these are still aiming to measure the same constructs, though the psychometric properties may be 
different. I also decided that adaptations of the AS that had either reworded items, removed items, 
or added items, would not be eligible, as this would mean the measure was no longer the 
Authenticity Scale as intended (Wood et al., 2008).   
 
2.2.2.3. Data sources and search strategy 
 All electronic information databases from two comprehensive research platforms were 
searched to identify relevant publications. These were ISI Web of Knowledge (Web of Science 
Core Collection, BIOSIS Citation Index, Chinese Science Citation Database, SciELO Citation 
Index) and EBSCOhost (PsychARTICLES, Academic Search Premier, PsychINFO, Business 
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Source Premier, Education Research Complete, SPORTDiscuss, PsychBOOKS, Communication 
& Mass Media Complete, ERIC). The most recent search of the ISI Web of Knowledge and 
EBSCOhost databases was on October 31st, 2018.  
As the aim of the search was to identify any research with AS data, I reasoned that the 
common denominator for all relevant publications would be the citing of Wood et al. (2008). In 
ISI Web of Knowledge it was possible to specifically search for articles citing Wood et al. (2008). 
This was not possible with EBSCOhost, but I reasoned that all relevant publications would include 
the title of the AS paper in their reference list, and thus I searched ‘all text’ for ‘The Authentic 
Personality: A Theoretical and Empirical Conceptualization and the Development of the 
Authenticity Scale’ (Wood et al., 2008). All results were downloaded into the Mendeley Desktop 
software (Version 1.19.2; Mendeley Ltd, 2018) to be assessed for eligibility. 
 
2.2.2.4. Study selection 
 The search strategy yielded 272 publications, 208 from ISI Web of Knowledge databases, 
and 64 from EBSCOhost databases. Of these, 30 were duplicates, leaving 242 publications for 
review.  
 I reasoned that just screening articles by abstract would not be sufficient to determine 
whether they contained data on the AS, so I assessed all 242 publications for eligibility, which 
meant searching the full-text versions of each publication for empirical AS data. Through this 
process, 157 studies were excluded because they did not report any AS data, and a further 23 were 
excluded for having changed the AS in some way, leaving 62 publications relevant to this study. 
After reviewing these, I excluded a further two for reusing samples from previous publications. 




2.2.3. Methods of the narrative synthesis  
The aim of the narrative synthesis was to explore the concurrent validity of the AS, as well 
as its use as an outcome measure and in clinical samples. 
 
2.2.3.1. Construct validity 
As a latent construct, such as authenticity, cannot be directly observed, a psychometric 
scale aims to operationalise the construct, attempting to make it measurable through a series of 
items. The measure’s validity is how successfully it operationalises the construct, essentially 
whether the variance in the measure’s items is caused by the construct it aims to measure 
(DeVellis, 2012). There is of course, no way to fully ascertain whether a measure has successfully 
operationalised the construct it seeks to measure, and thus, validity cannot actually be established. 
Records identified through database searching 
(ISI Web of Science)  
(n = 208)
Records identified through database searching 
(EbscoHost)  
(n = 64)
Records after duplicates removed 
(n = 242)
Publications excluded for not containing any 
quantitative data on the AS (n = 157)
Studies included in the systematic review 
(n = 60)
Excluded adaptations of the AS that change the 
content of the measure (n = 23)
Excluded publications reusing samples previously 
published (n = 2)
Full-text articles assessed for eligibility 
(n = 242)
Figure 3. Flow diagram detailing the different phases of the literature search (Mohler et al., 
2009). 
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It follows that there is no single statistical test of validity, but rather it is assessed in different ways 
that together build a case for the measure's validity.  
Generally, construct validity refers to how well the scale measures what it purports to 
measure, based on scientific analyses and reasoning (Markus & Lin, 2010). Concurrent validity is 
one aspect of construct validity and refers to whether measure’s scores correlate in expected ways 
with another measure’s, administered at the same time. If they do, it supports the notion that the 
measure is tapping the construct it aims to measure, thereby providing validity (Vogt, 2005). 
Concurrent validity in turn, is often split into convergent and divergent validity. 
To explore the concurrent validity of the AS in Study 1, I reviewed all 60 publications 
found by the systematic literature search, and identified the ones that reported correlations between 
the AS and another measure. As there were too many measures to discuss each one, I grouped 
them by the constructs they aimed to measure, and discussed how the AS relates to the groups of 
measure most represented in the AS literature, focusing on the ones whether the conceptual links 
to authenticity are clearest, such as well-being, emotional distress, and other measures of 
authenticity.  
 
2.2.4. Methods of the meta-analysis  
The aim of the meta-analysis was to provide a statistical summary of the internal reliability, 
subscale intercorrelations, and means, of the AS, from the 60 identified studies. Thus, data was 
collated into three main parts, (1) an exploration of reliability generalisation (Vacha-Haase, 1998), 
that is, a meta-analysis of Cronbach’s alpha coefficients; (2) a meta-analysis of subscale 
intercorrelations; and (3) a meta-analysis of estimated mean scores.  
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2.2.4.1. Data analysis 
A key obstacle I faced with the meta-analytic part of this study, was that the statistical 
software I was familiar with was not able to perform the meta-analyses I wished to conduct. After 
discussions with my supervisory team, we decided the ‘R’ software (Version 3.5.2; R Core Team, 
2018) with the Metafor package (Viechtbauer, 2010) would be most appropriate and powerful for 
this analysis. However, I was not sufficiently familiar with the ‘R’ software to perform the analyses 
I wanted, nor did I have the time needed to become proficient. Thus, after I had conducted the 
systematic literature search, decided upon the analyses I wished to conduct, and compiled all the 
data in a format appropriate for ‘R’, the actual analysis was carried out by Professor Chris Evans 
in consultation with myself, the main author. Importantly, I understand all the analyses and 
statistics we have used, and I take responsibility for the analysis. Moreover, I have interpreted the 
output from ‘R’, and written the entirety of this chapter alone, as well as the thesis. 
In the following sections, I briefly outline and explain the statistical methods used. 
 
2.2.4.2. Random-effects model 
A meta-analysis essentially combines the effects from several studies into one, estimated 
combined effect. However, as the precision of the studies varies, such collation needs to assign 
more weight to the more precise studies, that is, the studies with smaller standard error (SE). The 
way in which such weighting is assigned, and the combined effect calculated, depends on whether 
a fixed-effects model, or a random-effects model is used (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & 
Rothstein, 2010). A fixed-effects model essentially assumes that there is one true effect which is 
the same for every included study, and thus the combined effect is an estimate of this true effect, 
and the larger the sample, the greater the precision of this estimate. A random-effects model on the 
other hand, assumes that the between-studies heterogeneity in effects is due to real differences 
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between the studies and not just sampling variability (Riley, Higgins, & Deeks, 2011). Thus, the 
aim is not to estimate one true effect, but rather to calculate the mean of a distribution of effects. 
Moreover, as each study provides information about the effect in a different population, it is 
important that even an imprecise study, with large SE, contributes to the combined estimate 
(Borenstein et al., 2011).  
 
2.2.4.3. Calculating the combined effect under a random-effects model 
Under a fixed effects model, each study is simply weighted by the inverse of its within-
study variance, and then each effect is combined to estimate the true effect. The weighting of each 
study under a random-effects model is also calculated by the inverse of its variance, but because 
the effect varies between studies, the variance in this model includes both the within-study variance 
and the between-study variance (Borenstein et al., 2011). Thus, there is both within-study, and 
between-study sampling error to take into account when assigning weights to the studies, which 
means precision of the weighted combined effect depends both on the sample size of each included 
study, as well as the number of included studies (Borenstein et al., 2011).  
This meta-analysis aimed to combine the coefficient alphas, means and intercorrelations of 
the AS. These properties are not true population effects. For example, it would be unreasonable to 
expect there to be one true AS score for humanity as a whole, and that each sample is a more or 
less precise estimate of this true score. Thus, I expected the psychometrics of the AS to vary 
systematically between-studies, likely relating to variables such as culture, age, language and 
specific populations, and it followed that it was appropriate to use a random-effects model, which 
was chosen a priori.  
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2.2.4.4. Heterogeneity  
As discussed above, I expected a large degree of between-study heterogeneity in this meta-
analysis. This heterogeneity was assessed in two ways: using (a) the Cochran's Q-test (1954) and 
(b) the I² statistic (Higgins & Thompson, 2002). 
Cochran’s Q-test (1954) is a chi-squared test, and the classical measure of between-study 
heterogeneity used in meta-analyses. It assesses whether the observed differences in effects being 
investigated are compatible with chance alone, by essentially looking at the differences between 
the observed effect from each study, and the overall combined effect, weighting each study by its 
inverse variance as discussed above (Huedo-Medina et al., 2006). As I expected the coefficient 
alphas, means and correlation coefficients to vary considerably between studies, I expected the 
Cochran’s Q-test to be significant, indicating significant between-study heterogeneity. 
One weakness with Cochran’s Q-test however, is that it does not give the magnitude of 
heterogeneity, just whether heterogeneity is present or not (Huedo-Medina et al., 2006).  The I² 
statistic (Higgins & Thompson, 2002) on the other hand, quantifies the degree of heterogeneity 
between studies, calculating the percentage of the total variability that is due to between-study 
heterogeneity (Huedo-Medina et al., 2006). Thus, if I² = 0%, it means there was no between-study 




The reliability of a measure is ‘the proportion of variance attributable to the true score of 
the latent variable’ (DeVellis, 2012, p.27). In other words, a reliable measure is one with relatively 
little random error embedded in the scores. The most widely used index of reliability is coefficient 
𝛼 (alpha; Cronbach, 1951), a coefficient ranging from 0 to 1 assessing the internal consistency of 
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a measure (Streiner, 2003). It assesses the internal consistency of the items, that is, the extent to 
which they covary. If the items covary highly, it is likely they are all tapping into some shared 
issue, measuring the same latent variable. For coefficient alpha, there are cutoff values available 
meant to help the reader quickly assess the reliability of the measure (e.g. Nunally & Bernstein, 
1994). For example, Crutzen and Knutsche (2013) use ⍺ ≥ .9 as 'excellent', ⍺ ≥ .8 as good, ⍺ ≥ .7 
as acceptable, and ⍺ ≥ .6 as questionable. However, despite this being convenient, Crutzen and 
Peters (2017) hold that what is considered acceptable coefficient alpha levels is a matter of 
professional judgment, and indeed a question of pragmatic judgement, as the required coefficient 
alpha level depends on what the measure is intended for.  
 It is important to note that reliability is a function of a measure’s scores, not of the measure 
itself, and is therefore a property of the sample. Thus, a measure itself is not reliable or unreliable, 
but rather reliability needs to be assessed for every sample, though two similar samples will likely 
yield similar coefficient alpha scores on a measure (Streiner, 2003). 
 In this study, coefficient alphas for the AS were collected from all publications reporting 
them, and combined in a reliability generalisation.  
 
2.2.4.6. Construct validity  
The AS has a clearly defined design model: it is made up of three distinct scales, that are 
correlated but oblique, and that together form the whole (Wood et al., 2008). Thus, another way 
to assess its construct validity is to examine whether data from the publications included in this 
meta-analysis is congruent with this design model. I did this by looking at the intercorrelations of 
the three subscales, AL, AEI and SA. Based on the design model of the AS, I expected them to 
correlate moderately with each other, at around r = .3, and to correlate highly with the full scale, 
at around r = .7. Importantly, such correlation coefficients on their own would only attest to these 
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scales being interrelated, not distinct. If however, they also had high coefficient alphas, it would 
attest to each measuring something distinct. Thus, if the subscale intercorrelations are to support 
the construct validity of the AS, they must be considered in light of their coefficient alphas.  
In this study, correlation coefficients for the subscale intercorrelations with each other and 
the overall AS were collected from all publications reporting them, and combined. 
 
2.2.4.7. Publication bias  
Publication bias refers to the association between a study’s findings and the probability 
that it will be published (Sterne & Harbord, 2004). The funnel plot is a common way to graphically 
assess for publication bias in meta-analyses, with study effect on the x-axis, in this case coefficient 
alpha or AS score means, and an inverse estimate of study size or precision on the y-axis, in this 
case SE. Studies with larger samples will have greater precision (lower SE) and will gather high 
around the combined effect estimate, whilst smaller studies with less precision will scatter lower 
on the plot. Due to random error we can expect this scatter to be on either side of the overall 
estimate (Egger, Davey Smith, Schneider, & Minder, 1997). If, however, there is a publication 
bias, that is, some studies with low coefficient alphas or means may have remained unpublished, 
this would lead to an asymmetrical funnel plot, missing studies to the left of the overall estimate. 
This, in turn, would lead to an overestimation of the overall coefficient alpha or mean (Egger et 
al., 1997).  
One way in which to statistically assess for publication bias is testing for funnel plot 
asymmetry (Egger et al., 1997), and the Begg-Mazumdar correlation test (1994) is one of the ways 
in which to do this, though Egger et al. (1997) make it clear that a visual inspection of the plot is 
also important. The Begg-Mazumdar test (1994) is a Kendall rank correlation between the values 
on the x-axis, in this case coefficient alpha or AS means, and their SE. In the absence of publication 
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bias, the funnel plot is typically symmetrical and the correlation should be 0 (Egger et al., 1997). 
A positive correlation however, indicates the plot is asymmetrical with more published studies 
with higher estimates than the combined estimate (to the right of the funnel plot), whereas a 
negative correlation indicates asymmetry with more published studies with lower estimates than 
the overall estimate (to the left of the plot). It follows that a positive correlation is more likely do 
indicate true publication bias than a negative one.   
Funnel plots for both the reliability generalisation and the meta-analysis of means were 
used to detect potential publication bias, and I used the Begg-Mazumdar correlation test 
(Viechtbauer, 2010) to test for funnel plot asymmetry.   
 
2.2.4.8. Percentage of maximum possible (POMP) scores 
To assess how close to the maximum possible score the AS and its subscales were, I 
calculated POMP scores. POMP is a standardisation method for scores, giving a percentage of 
how the raw score compares to the upper and lower limits of the scale. Cohen, Cohen, Aiken, and 
West (1999) argue that standardising scores into POMP scores is useful in that it put scores into 
an easily understandable metric, conveying immediate meaning to the reader, and allowing easy 
comparison between scales using different scoring systems. For example, the AS has a maximum 
score of 84, whereas each of its subscales have maximum scores of 28, which can make it 
confusing when trying to interpret scores. By converting scores to POMP however, an AS score 
of 67 and a score of 18 on the AL subscale, POMP scores of 83% and 58% respectively, can be 
more easily understood and interpreted.  
POMP is calculated by subtracting the minimum score from the raw score, dividing by the 




2.2.4.9. Dealing with erroneous data 
In several cases there were clear and obvious issues with the reported data. I encountered 
two instances where two papers reported identical means and standard deviations (SD), and upon 
contacting the first authors, I found that they had reused datasets from previous papers. I removed 
the duplicate datasets from the meta-analysis. 
 In two instances, studies presented mean scores for both the full AS and its subscales, but 
the subscale scores did not add up to the full AS score. I emailed the first authors of both studies 
for clarification. I got a response from one author, who had used an alternative method for adding 
up the subscales, which allowed me to correct the issue. Seven studies in all had either misreported 
means, or added means together erroneously, reducing the power of the meta-analysis and 
potentially inflating the between-samples heterogeneity. I corrected those cases where possible, or 
removed them from the analysis. In consultation with my supervisor, Professor Chris Evans, I 
removed two further studies I suspected had wrongly added together raw scores, though because 
one only reported coefficient alpha, and the other only reported an overall AS mean, it was 
impossible to fully ascertain what had been done.  
 
2.3. Results 
2.3.1. Description of the studies and samples 
The systematic review collated data from 85 samples across 60 studies, with sample sizes 
ranging from n = 11 to n = 1005. The average sample size was n = 267, and the combined sample 
size was N = 23,043. The weighted mean age of participants across all samples was 26.3 years 
with ages ranging from 15 to 90. Table 1 gives an overview of all the publications included in this 
systematic review, with sample sizes, sample descriptions, country the study took place in, as well 
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as an overview of the psychometric data relevant to this study. Thirty-two of the 60 studies used 
student samples, which was the largest between-samples common-denominator. I classified 14 of 
the 28 as opportunity samples, as these were highly heterogenous, and difficult to describe 
succinctly. Participants in these studies were typically recruited by flyers, advertisements, or on 
websites.  
Of the publications included, 53 reported coefficient alphas, 40 reported mean scores, 22 
reported subscale intercorrelations, and 37 reported correlations between the AS and other 




Table 1  
 
 
Overview of all publications included in the systematic review   
     
Included data  




𝛼 Means Intercorrelations Concurrent 
validity 
 
Akfırat et al (2016) 317 University students Turkey 
 
✓ ✓ - -  
Akin & Akin (2014a) 329 Undergraduates Turkey 
 
- ✓ ✓ -  
Akin & Akin (2014b) 382 Undergraduates Turkey 
 
- ✓ ✓ -  
Akin & Akin (2014c) 366 Undergraduates Turkey 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  






✓ ✓ - -  




✓ ✓ - ✓  
Boyraz et al. (2014) 232 Students US 
 
✓ ✓ - ✓  
Casale et al. (2018) 274 Undergraduates Italy 
 
- ✓ ✓ -  





✓ ✓ - -  
Counted & Moustafa 
(2017) 
100 Christian adolescents South 
Africa 
 
✓ ✓ - ✓  
Datu & Reyes (2015) 375 Undergraduates The 
Philippines 
 
✓ ✓ - ✓  




✓ ✓ - ✓  




✓ - - -  
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Di Fabio & Kenny 
(2016) 
184 Students Italy 
 
✓ - - -  
Di Fabio & Palazzeschi 
(2015) 




✓ ✓ - ✓  
Gil-Or et al. (2015) 258 Undergraduates US 
 
✓ ✓ - ✓  
Goldner (2016) 200 Psychotherapists Israel 
 
✓ ✓ - ✓  
Grégoire et al. (2014) 625 Students France 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
Grijak (2017) 706 University students Serbia 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
Guèvremont & 
Grohmann (2016) 




✓ - - -  
Güngör et al. (2014) 335 University students Japan, 
Turkey 
 
✓ - - -  
Keng (2017) 23 Student counsellors Singapore 
 
✓ - - -  
Kifer & Heller (2013) 351 Opportunity samples n/a 
 
✓ - - -  




✓ - - -  
Lenton et al. (2016) 354 Students Scotland 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ -  
Liang (2017) 90 Professionals China 
 
✓ ✓ - -  
Litman et al. (2016) 1005 Opportunity samples UK 
 
✓ ✓ - -  
Lopez et al. (2015) 100 Undergraduates US 
 
✓ - ✓ ✓  
Maltby et al. (2012) 1286 Opportunity samples UK 
 
✓ - - -  
McCormick et al (2015) 102 Undergraduates US 
 
✓ ✓ - ✓  
Pillow et al (2017) 629 Undergraduates US 
 
✓ ✓ - ✓  




✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
Pinto et al. (2012) 62 Students UK 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
Poncy et al. (2018) 191 Students US 
 
✓ - - -  




- ✓ ✓ ✓  




✓ - - ✓  
Robinson et al. (2013) 628 Opportunity samples Russia, 
US, UK 
 
✓ ✓ - ✓  




✓ - - -  





✓ - - -  
Robinson et al. (2017) 963 Opportunity samples UK 
 
✓ - - -  
Rollero (2016) 235 Undergraduates Italy 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
Sariçam (2015) 347 Undergraduates Turkey 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
Satici, Kayfis et al. 
(2013) 
303 Undergraduates Turkey 
 
- ✓ ✓ -  
Satici, Uysal et al. 
(2013) 
294 Undergraduates Turkey 
 
- ✓ - -  




✓ ✓ - -  




✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
Shamsi et al. (2012) 304 Students Iran 
 
✓ - - -  
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2.3.2. Results of the narrative synthesis 
2.3.2.1. Concurrent validity 
The narrative synthesis aimed to summarise the concurrent validity of the AS, based on 26 
publications reporting AS correlations with other psychometric measures. Publications that used a 
translation of the AS, but did not report internal reliability (coefficient alpha) for their sample, 
were not included, as there was no way to ensure the translation was adequate.  
I combined the measures most frequently correlated with the AS into four groups: (a) well-
being, with seven different measures represented; (b) emotional distress, with seven different 
measures; (c) personality, with four different measures; and (d) authenticity, with three measures 
of authenticity or closely related constructs. I focused on these four groups as they are all highly 
relevant to the model the AS is based on, and were expected to help elucidate its concurrent 
validity. Table 2. Shows the measures most frequently correlated with the AS in the literature.  






✓ ✓ - -  
Stevens (2017 116 Undergraduates US 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
Tekin & Satici (2014) 284 Undergraduates Turkey 
 
- ✓ ✓ -  
Thomaes et al. (2017) 155 Adolescents UK 
 
✓ - - -  
Touré-Tillery & Light 
(2018) 




✓ - - -  
Vainio & Daukantaite 
(2016) 





✓ - - -  




✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  




✓ - ✓ ✓  
Wang (2015) 505 Undergraduates China 
 
✓ ✓ - -  




✓ - - -  
White & Tracey (2011) 537 Undergraduates US 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ -  




✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
Zhang et al. (2018) 459 University students China 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ -  
Note: N = sample size across all samples; 𝛼 = coefficient alpha; Means = AS means and/or subscale means; intercorrelations = correlations between the AS 
and its subscales; Concurrent validity = measures correlated with the AS 




   
Psychometric measures correlated most frequently with the AS 
Measure Construct Measure 
citation  
Number of publications  
Satisfaction with life scale 
(SWLS) 
 
Diener et al. (1985) 7 
Positive and negative affect 
scale (PANAS) 
Frequency of negative and 
positive emotions 
Watson et al. (1988) 5 
Experiences in close 
relationships scale (ECR) 
Anxious and avoidant 
attachment styles 
Brennan et al. (1998) 5 
Big five inventory (BFI) Big-5 personality traits John & Srivastava (1999) 5 
Meaning in life questionnaire 
(MLQ) 
 
Steger et al. (2006) 3 
Depression anxiety stress 
scales (DASS-21) 
 
Lovibond & Lovibond (1995) 2 
Scales of psychological well-
being (PWB) 
Various measures of 
psychological well-being 
Ryff (1989) 2 
Rosenberg self-esteem scale 
(RSE) 
 
Rosenberg (1965) 2 
 
2.3.2.2. The AS as an outcome measure and with clinical samples 
Out of the 85 samples across 60 publications with AS data, no samples were from clinical 













2.3.3. Results of the meta-analysis 
2.3.3.1. Internal reliability (coefficient alpha)  
 Authenticity Scale. Coefficient alphas for full AS scores were identified for 30 samples (n 
= 8823), with an estimated overall alpha of .84 (SE = 0.010) 95% CI [.82, .86]. There was  
significant heterogeneity between studies reporting alphas for the AS, Cochran’s Q test: 𝜒² (29) = 




Study ID Estimated alpha [95% CI] 
Figure 4. Forest plot of estimated coefficient alphas for the AS. 
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Figure 5 shows a funnel plot of alphas for the AS against the inverse standard error. The 
Begg-Mazumdar correlation test of funnel plot asymmetry was significant (Kendall’s tau b = -.56, 
p < .001). 
 
Subscales. For the AL subscale, alphas from 41 samples were analysed, with an estimated 
overall alpha of .77 (SE = 0.011) 95% CI [.75, .79]. There was a significant heterogeneity between 
studies reporting alphas for AL, Cochran’s Q test: 𝜒² (40) = 510.16, p < .001; I² = 91.5%. The 
Begg-Mazumdar correlation test of funnel plot asymmetry was significant (Kendall’s tau b = -.29, 
p = .008). 
For the AEI subscale, alphas from 32 samples were analysed, with an estimated overall 
alpha of .81 (SE = 0.009) 95% CI [.80, .83]. There was significant heterogeneity between studies 
Figure 5. Funnel plot of estimated coefficient alphas for the AS against standard 
error. 
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reporting alphas for AEI, Cochran’s Q test: X² (31) = 288.92, p < .001; I² = 89.2%. The Begg-
Mazumdar correlation test of funnel plot asymmetry was significant (Kendall’s tau b = -.27, p = 
.03). 
 For the SA subscale, alphas from 33 samples were analysed, with an estimated overall 
alpha of .82 (SE = 0.013; 95% CI = .80, .85). There was significant heterogeneity between studies 
reporting alphas for SA, Cochran’s Q test: X² (32) = 677.38, p < .001; I² = 96.2%. The Begg-
Mazumdar correlation test of funnel plot asymmetry was significant (Kendall’s tau b = -.35, p = 
.004). See Appendix N for forest and funnel plots of coefficient alphas for each subscale.  
 
Table 3  
Estimated combined Cronbach’s alphas for the AS and subscales  
 Scale k Cronbach’s alpha SE 95% CI  
     Lower Upper  
 Authenticity Scale 28 .84 0.010 .82 .86  
  Authentic Living 41 .77 0.011 .75 .79  
  Accepting External Influences 32 .81 0.009 .80 .83  
  Self-Alienation 33 .82 0.013 .80 .85  
k: number of publications reporting Cronbach’s Alpha for each scale.  
 
2.3.3.2. Scale intercorrelations  
 Authenticity Scale. Correlations between the full AS and its subscales were reported in 
four samples, with a combined n = 1,997 (see figure 6). The overall estimated correlation 
coefficients showed high correlations between the AS and all its subscales: with the AL, r(1995) 
= .64 (p < .001, 95% CI = .33, .94), with the AEI, r(1995) = -.82 (p < .001, 95% CI = -.87, -.78), 
and with the SA, r(1995) = -.81 (p < .001, 95% CI = -.86, -.77). There was significant 
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heterogeneity between the correlation coefficients for the correlations between the AS and all 
subscales, Cochran’s Q test: X² (3) = 23.51 - 333.79, p < .001; I² = 87.1 - 99.5%. 
 
 Subscales. Intercorrelations between the AS subscales were reported in 26 samples, with 
a combined n = 5,675 (see figure 7 and table 4). The overall estimated correlation coefficient 
between the AL and the AEI subscales was r(5,673) = -.34 (p < .001, 95% CI = -.39, -.29), and 
between the AL and the the SA subscale, r(5,673) = -.36 (p < .001, 95% CI = -.41, -.32). The 
overall estimated correlation coefficient between the AEI and the SA subscales was r(5,673) = .44  
 




Table 4  
Matrix of the estimated overall intercorrelations for the AS and its subscales 
 Scale n  1 2 3 4  
1 Authenticity Scale 1997  - .64 -.82 -.81  
2  Authentic Living 5675   - -.34 -.36  
3  Accepting External Influences 5675    - .44  
4  Self-Alienation 5675     -  
n = 1997 for correlation coefficients between the AS and its subscales, and n =  5675 for subscale intercorrelations  
All correlations significant at p < .001.  
 
Figure 7. Forest plots of estimated correlation coefficient between the AS subscales.   
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(p < .001, 95% CI = .40, .47). There was significant heterogeneity between the correlation 
coefficients for each of the correlations, Cochran’s Q test: X² (25) = 67.96 - 120.61, p < .001; I² = 
63.2 - 77.6%. 
 
2.3.3.3. Mean scores  
Three studies were excluded from the analysis of means scores because they changed the 
Likert scoring scale of the AS, from 1-7 to 1-6 or 1-5. A further eight were excluded for reporting 
erroneous mean data (see section 2.4.2.4).   
 
Figure 8. Forest plot of estimated AS means. 
Study ID Estimated mean [95% CI] 
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Mean Authenticity Scale scores. Mean AS scores from 14 samples were included in the 
analysis (n = 4821). The overall estimated mean was 4.83 (SE = 0.15, 95% CI = 4.53, 5.13) (see 
figure 8), and the POMP score was 63.8%. 
There was significant heterogeneity in mean AS scores across studies, Cochran’s Q test: 
X² (13) = 3554.51, p < .001; I² = 99.3%. Figure 9 shows a funnel plot of estimated means for the 
AS against the inverse standard error. The Begg-Mazumdar correlation test of funnel plot 
asymmetry was non-significant, indicating the absence of publication bias (Kendall’s tau b = -.11, 
p = .58). 
 
Figure 9. Funnel plot of estimated AS mean scores against standard error. 
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Mean subscale scores. Mean AL scores from 42 samples were analysed. The overall 
estimated mean was 5.60 (SE = 0.05, 95% CI = 5.50, 5.70). The POMP for the AL was 76.7%. 
There was significant heterogeneity in mean AL scores across studies, Cochran’s Q test: X² (41) = 
1176.45, p < .001; I² = 96.1%.  
Mean AEI scores from 38 samples were analysed. The overall estimated mean was 3.47 
(SE = 0.06, 95% CI = 3.35, 3.59). The POMP for the AEI was 41.2%. There was significant 
heterogeneity in mean AEI scores across studies, Cochran’s Q test: X² (37) = 661.19, p < .001; I² 
= 95.0%.  
Mean SA scores from 40 samples were analysed. The overall estimated mean was 2.86 (SE 
= 0.06, 95% CI = 2.74, 2.99). The POMP for the SA was 31.0%. There was significant 
heterogeneity in mean AS scores across studies, Cochran’s Q test: X² (39) = 893.35, p < .001; I² = 
95.3%. See Appendix O for forest and funnel plots of mean scores for each subscale. 
 
Table 5 
Matrix of the estimated overall means for the AS and its subscales 
  
 Scale k Mean 95 % CI SE POMP 
    Lower Upper   
 Authenticity Scale 14 4.83 4.53 5.13 0.15 63.8% 
  Authentic Living 42 5.60 5.50 5.70 0.05 76.7% 
  Accepting External Influences 38 3.47 3.35 3.59 0.06 41.2% 
  Self-Alienation 40 2.86 2.74 2.99 0.06 31.0% 







2.4.1. Narrative synthesis discussion 
2.4.1.1. Concurrent validity 
 Because of limited space, I grouped the concurrent validity measures by what construct 
they aim to measure. The two largest groups of measures operationalised aspects of well-being 
and emotional distress. I address these two first, moving on to the authenticity-related measures, 
and finally the personality measures. I have included tables for each group giving an overview of 
the correlations, as there was insufficient space to discuss each one. 
 
2.4.1.2. The AS and measures of well-being 
 The measure most frequently correlated with the AS in the literature is the Satisfaction 
with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener et al., 1985), a measure of the evaluative side of subjective well-
being, with 5-items developed to measure global cognitive judgement of one’s own satisfaction 
with life. As the AS is based in positive psychology and was itself developed to measure well-
being, one would expect significant positive correlations with the SWLS (Wood et al., 2008). 
Indeed, Wood and colleagues (2008) found the SWLS shared small to moderate positive 
correlations with the AL subscale in three discrete samples at around r = .20, and moderate 
negative correlations with the SA. Interestingly, the AEI only correlated significantly in one of the 
three samples (r = -.35), suggesting it may be less clearly related to the SWLS. Three other studies 
(Grégoire, Baron, Ménard, & Lachance, 2014; Proctor et al. 2015, Sariçam, 2015) reported similar 
correlation coefficients, around r = .25 for the AL, r = -.20 for the AEI, and r = -.50 for the SA. 
For the overall AS, correlation with SWLS was found to be moderate around r = .35 in three 
studies (Boyraz et al., 2014; Boyraz & Kuhl, 2015; Di Fabio & Palazzeschi, 2015).  
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Wood et al. (2008) also found all three subscales correlated significantly with the RSE 
(Rosenberg, 1965), a 10-item measure of global self-esteem, with correlations particularly strong 
for SA (coefficients ranged from r = -.45 to -.59), whilst correlations were small to moderate for 
the AL and AEI.  
Finally, in three studies the correlations between the positive affect subscales of the 
PANAS (Watson et al., 1988) and the subscales of the AS were all small to moderate and 
significant, positive with the AL, and negative with the SA and AEI (Grégoire et al., 2014; Grijak, 
2017; Wood et al., 2008). Thus, as would be expected from a well-being measure such as the AS, 
it seems people who score higher on AL, and lower on SA and AEI tend to score higher on 
measures of satisfaction with life, self-esteem, and positive affect. Table 6 gives an overview of 
the correlations between the AS and other well-being measures.  
 
2.4.1.3. The AS predicts scores on the SWLS  
Moving beyond cross-sectional designs, Boyraz et al. (2014) conducted a longitudinal 
study to examine whether scores on the AS predicted later life satisfaction, measured by the SWLS. 
In their study, participants completed the AS and SWLS twice, the second time on average 46.2 
days (SD = 7.39) after the first. They found that AS scores at baseline significantly predicted life 
satisfaction at time 2 (β = .37, p < .001), even after controlling for temporal stability. In contrast, 
initial scores on the SWLS did not significantly predict AS scores at time 2 (β = .-.06, p > .05). 
Several studies have already found scores on the AS to be significantly correlated with various 
measures of well-being (see table 6), but the Boyraz et al. (2014) study takes this a step further, 
finding that the relationship was unidirectional, suggesting that when you become more authentic, 
your satisfaction with life increases as well. Though, it is important to note that 46 days is not a 
large prediction interval, this study does appear to be consistent with much of the 
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psychotherapeutic literature discussed in Chapter 1 and the design model of the AS (e.g. Kohut, 
1971; May, 1981; Perls, 1969; Rogers, 1959; Winnicott, 1965).  
 
Table 6      
The AS and measures of well-being      
 Study Correlates  Correlation coefficients (r)  n  
  Well-being measures  Full AS AL AEI SA    
 Boyraz & Kuhl (2015)   Life satisfaction  .40**     619  
 Grégoire et al. (2014 Life satisfaction   .23** -.21** -.42**  188  
 Proctor et al. (2016) Life satisfaction   .27** -.18** -.52**  329  
 Wood et al. (2008) Life satisfaction   .22** -.35** -.34**  180  
  Life satisfaction   .22** -.13 ns -.50**  158  
 Robinson et al. (2013) WEMWBS  .47***     240  
 Grijak (2017a) Self-esteem   .32* -.08 ns -.18**  206  
 Wood et al. (2008) Self-esteem   .23** -.27** -.45**  213  
  Positive affect   .23** -.23** -.21**  180  
 Grijak (2017a) Positive affect   .25** -.13* -.29**  206  
 Grégoire et al. (2014) Positive affect   .21** -.18* -.32**  188  
 Lopez et al. (2015) Presence of meaning in life   .30*** -.28** -.44***  158  
 Vess et al. (2016) Presence of meaning in life   .27** -.10 ns -.52**  93  
 Wood et al. (2008) Gratitude   .37** -.15 ns -.35**  119  
 Stevens (2017) Emotional intelligence   .45** -.13 ns -.42**  116  
 Pillow et al. (2017)  Psychological well-being  .55*     629  
 Wood et al. (2008) Self-acceptance   .28** -.41** -.39**  180  
  Purpose in life   .08 ns -.22** -.15*  180  
  Positive relationships   .18* -.27** -.23**  180  
  Personal growth   .25** -.30** -.28**  180  
Note: Life satisfaction = Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS; Diener et al., 1985); WEMWBS = Warwick-Edinburgh Mental Well-Being 
Scale (Tennant et al., 2007); Self-Esteem = Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem Scale (1965); Positive Affect = PANAS (Watson et al., 1988); 
Presence of meaning in life: Meaning in life questionnaire (MLQ; Steger et al., 2006); Gratitude = The Gratitude Questionnaire-6 
(McCullough et al., 2002); Emotional intelligence = Self-report emotional intelligence test (SREIT; Salovey & Mayer, 1990); 
Psychological well-being subscale, Self-acceptance subscale, Purpose in Life subscale, Positive relations with others 
subscale, Personal growth subscale = Ryff’s Scales of Psychological Well-being (1989). 




2.4.1.4. The AS and measures of emotional distress  
Considering the conceptual underpinnings of the AS discussed in chapter 1, it would also 
be expected to correlate significantly with the opposite end of the well-being spectrum, with 
measures of emotional distress. According to person-centred theory (Rogers, 1959), this should be 
particularly true for the SA subscale. Table 7 gives an overview of emotional distress measures 
correlated with the AS.  
Two studies (Boyraz & Kuhl, 2015; Boyraz, Waits, & Felix, 2014) investigated how the 
AS relates to the DASS-21 (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995), a 21-item measure with three subscales 
measuring depression, anxiety and stress, finding significant large correlations of around -.50 with 
the full AS.  
 Wood et al. (2008) reported correlations between the AS subscales and two measures of 
anxiety (the Tension subscale of the Profile of Mood States; McNair, Lorr, & Droppleman, 1971) 
and stress (The Perceived Stress Scale; Cohen & Williamson, 1988). SA shared moderate to large 
positive correlations with both measures, the AEI shared moderate positive correlations with both 
measures, whilst the AL only correlated with stress at about r = -.20.  
 Stevens (2017) investigated how the Toronto alexithymia scale (TAS; Bagby, Parker, & 
Taylor, 1994) relates to the AS. He described alexithymia as ‘a deficiency in understanding, 
processing and describing emotions’ (Stevens, 2017, p.393) and found it correlated with SA at r = 
.61, but not with either the AL or AEI. This is unsurprising and further supports the construct 
validity of the AS, as the SA aims to measure the extent of disconnection between awareness and 
what is happening at a deep level inside, whereas the AL and AEI do not directly relate to affective 
functioning (Wood et al., 2008).   
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 Thus, the AS is clearly related to measures of emotional distress, as expected, and it is the 
SA that generally seems most strongly related to most of the measures, which fits with its 
conceptual underpinnings (Roger, 1959).  
 
Table 7      
The AS and measures of emotional distress      
 Study Correlates  Correlation coefficients (r)  n  
  Emotional distress measures  Full AS AL AEI SA    
 Boyraz & Kuhl (2015)   Depression, anxiety, stress  -.55**     619  
 Boyraz et al. (2014) Depression, anxiety, stress  -.49**     232  
 Grégoire et al. (2014 Negative affect   -.15* .33** .41**  188  
 Grijak (2017) Negative affect   -.10 ns .03 ns .25**  206  
 Wood et al. (2008) Negative affect   -.07 ns .20** .21**  180  
  Stress   -.20** .26** .47**  158  
  Anxiety   -.18 ns .20* .39**  104  
 Pinto et al. (2012) Aggressive behaviour   -.33* -.11 ns -.01 ns  62  
  Trait anger   -.04 ns .10 ns .30*  62  
 Stevens (2017) Alexithymia   -.18 ns .15 ns -.61**  116  
  Avoidant attachment style   -.07 ns -.01 ns .41**  116  
 Goldner (2016) Avoidant attachment style  -.27*** -.33*** .13 ns .19**  200  
 Lopez et al. (2015) Avoidant attachment style   -.26* .23* .24*  100  
  Anxious attachment style   -.34*** .47*** .57***  100  
 Stevens (2017) Anxious attachment style   -.06 ns -.29** -.29**  116  
 Goldner (2016) Anxious attachment style  -.33*** -.23** .34*** .21**  200  
Note: Aggressive behaviour = Point subtraction aggressive paradigm (PSAP; Cherek, 1981); Alexithymia: Toronto alexithymia scale 
(TAS; Bagby et al., 1994); Anxiety = Self-Rating Anxiety Scale (SAS; Zung, 1971); Anxious and avoidant attachment style: 
Experiences in close relationships (ECR; Brennan et al., 1998); Depression, Anxiety, Stress = Depression, Anxiety, Stress Scales-21 
(DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995); Negative Affect = PANAS (Watson et al., 1988); Stress = The Perceived Stress Scale (Cohen 
& Williamson, 1988); Trait anger:  anger facet IPIP NEO-PI R (Goldberg et al., 2006). 
*p ≤ .05      **p ≤ .01      ***p ≤ .001      ns = non-significant 
 
 
2.4.1.5. The AS and other measures of authenticity  
 An important part of exploring the concurrent validity of the AS is looking at how it relates 
to other measures of authenticity. One such measure is the AI-3 (Kernis & Goldman, 2006; see 
section 1.3.9.4), which is one of the measures most closely related to the AS, as it also aims to 
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measures trait authenticity. Unsurprisingly, all four subscales of the AI-3 shared moderate to large 
correlations with all three subscales of the AS in expected directions, apart from two that were 
non-significant: AL to Unbiased processing and AEI to Relational orientation. The second of these 
makes conceptual sense: being relationally orientated would not necessary be strongly related to 
how much an individual is influenced by others. It is however, surprising that Unbiased processing 
did not correlate with the AL. The subscales that seem to overlap the most conceptually are 
Awareness and the SA, and Behavioural and the AL, and indeed, both these correlations were 
large.  
 I also included two other measures in this group, the organismic valuing scale (Govindji & 
Linley, 2007) and the self-concept clarity scale (SCCS; Campbell, Trapnell, Heine, Katz, Lavallee, 
& Lehman, 1996), both of which are very closely linked to the person-centred definition of 
authenticity (Barrett-Lennard, 1998). As expected, both of these shared moderate to large 
correlations with the AS subscales (see table 8).  
 
Table 8        
The AS and measures of authenticity        
Study Correlates  Correlation coefficients (r)  n 
 Measures of authenticity  Full AS AL AEI SA   
Stevens (2017) AI-3: Awareness   .39** -.31** -.62**  116 
 AI-3: Unbiased processing   .06 ns -.32** -.39**  116 
 AI-3: Behavioural    .65** -.51** -.42**  116 
 AI-3: Relational orientation   .40** -.15 ns -.45**  116 
Proctor et al. (2015) Organismic valuing    .51** -.28** -.64**  329 
Vess et al. (2016) Self-concept clarity   .22* -.30** -.68**  93 
Note: AI-3 subscales = Authenticity Inventory-3 (Kernis & Goldman, 2006); Organismic Valuing: Organismic valuing scale (Govindji & 
Linley, 2007); Self-concept clarity = Self-concept clarity scale (SCCS; Campbell et al., 1996). 
*p ≤ .05      **p ≤ .01      ***p ≤ .001      ns = non-significant 
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2.4.1.6. The AS and measures of personality  
 In Chapter 1 I addressed the debate in the literature regarding the state and trait views of 
authenticity (e.g. Lenton, Bruder, et al., 2013). The AS is firmly grounded in the trait view, seeing 
it as a relatively stable, base-rate propensity towards behaviour and cognition that is in accordance 
with a ‘true self’, though by no means unchangeable (Wood et al., 2008). Because of this, Wood 
and colleagues (2008) were interested in how it relates to other stable traits, such as measures of 
personality. They investigated how the AS relates to the Big Five Inventory (BFI; John & 
Srivastava, 1999), a measure of personality traits using the five-factor model of personality 
(McCrae & John, 1992). They were particularly interested in what proportion of the variance in 
AS scores could be explained by BFI scores, as high amounts of variance explained by the BFI 
might imply the AS is simply measuring a combination of other personality traits (Wood et al., 
2008). They expected measures of personality to only relate moderately to the AS, thus supporting 
its concurrent validity. Consistent with their hypothesis, regression analysis showed that the BFI 
accounted for a small, but significant portion of the variance in AS scores, between 11% and 13% 
for each of the AS subscales. In developing the French translation of the AS, Grégoire et al. (2014) 
found that Big-five traits significantly explained for 26% of the variance in both AEI and SA 
scores, but none of the variance in AL scores. Both studies concluded that the AS is meaningfully 
related to, but distinct from, the Big-five traits, and that more authentic people tend to be more 
extraverted, agreeable, conscientious, open and less neurotic (see table 9). 
 Pinto, Maltby and Wood (2011) further investigated the concurrent validity of the AS by 
exploring its relationship with Gray’s (1982) behavioural inhibition/activation systems, measured 
by the behavioral inhibition and activation scales (BIS/BAS; Carver & White, 1994), and 
Cloninger’s psychobiological model (Cloninger, Svrakic, & Przybeck, 1993). The latter was 
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developed to help predict vulnerability to mental disorders, particularly personality disorders 
(Cloninger, et al., 1993) and was measured by items on the international personality item pool 
(TCI-IPIP, Goldberg et al., 2006).  
The BIS subscale showed a small negative correlation with the full AS (r = -.24, p < .001), 
and similarly correlations with all three of its subscales, whereas BAS did not correlate 
significantly with any of these. Regression analysis showed that only the BIS subscale ‘Anxiety’ 
significantly predicted AS scores, accounting for 5.7% of the variance (Pinto et al., 2011). Of the 
dimensions in Cloninger’s biopsychological model, Pinto et al. (2011) found that harm-avoidance, 
reward-dependence, self-directedness, persistence and self-transience all weakly predicted AS 
scores, but together only accounted for 18% of the variance. 
 Thus, it seems that though measures of all three personality models discussed above were 
related to the AS, except for the BAS, none of the measures accounted for a large degree of the 
variance in AS scores, indicating the AS does not simply measure a combination of personality 
traits (Wood et al., 2008).  
 
Table 9     
The AS and measures of personality     
 Study Correlate  Correlation coefficients (r)  n 
     Full AS AL AEI SA   
  Big Five        
 Wood et al. (2008) Extraversion   .11 ns -.33** -.29**  94 
  Agreeableness   .27** -.07 ns -.24*  94 
  Conscientiousness   .17 ns -.16 ns -.28**  94 
  Neuroticism   -.23* .19 ns .25*  94 
  Openness to experience   .21* .10 ns -.04 ns  94 
 Grégoire et al. (2014) Extraversion   .05 ns -.18* -.36**  188 
  Agreeableness   .27** -.07 ns -.24*  188 
  Conscientiousness   .34** -.34** -.29**  188 
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  Neuroticism   -.13 ns .50** .50**  188 
  Openness to experience   .06 ns .13 ns -.26**  188 
          
  BIS/BAS  Full AS AL AEI SA   
 Pinto et al. (2011) Behavioural inhibition (BIS)  -.24*** -.20*** .23*** .20***  554 
  Behavioural activation (BAS)  .04 ns -.01 ns -.08 ns -.03 ns  554 
          
  TCI-IPIP  Full AS AL AEI SA   
 Pinto et al. (2011) Novelty-seeking  .05 ns .03 ns -.05 ns -.05 ns  554 
  Harm-avoidance  -.22*** -.17*** .19*** .21***  554 
  Reward-dependence  .26*** .29*** -.17*** -.21***  554 
  Persistence  .11*** .12*** -.08 ns -.09*  554 
  Self-directedness  .17*** .15*** -.14*** -.15***  554 
  Cooperativeness  -.02 ns -.03 ns .00 ns .04 ns  554 
  Self-transcendence  .21*** .23*** -.16*** -.15***  554 
Note: Big Five: Big Five Inventory (John & Srivastava, 1999); BIS/BAS: Behavioural Inhibition/Activation scales (Carver & 
White, 1994); TCI-IPIP: Cloninger’s temperament and character items from the international personality item pool 
(Goldberg et al., 2006). 
*p ≤ .05      **p ≤ .01      ***p ≤ .001      ns = non-significant 
 
2.4.1.7. The AS with clinical samples  
Despite the systematic literature search identifying 60 studies that reported quantitative 
data on the AS, it failed to find any studies that have used the AS as an outcome measure for 
psychotherapy to date. Furthermore, I found that none of the identified publications have used it 
with clinical samples.  
 
2.4.2. Meta-analysis discussion  
 The meta-analysis aimed to summarise the psychometric properties of the AS and its 
subscales, collating data from all relevant studies. Data from 60 publications was synthesised, with 
a combined sample size of 23,043.  
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2.4.2.1. Reliability generalisation  
Vacha-Haase (1998) advocated meta-analysing reliability values, terming it reliability 
generalisation. This involves exploring the properties of coefficient alphas for a specific measure 
across studies, looking at typical coefficient alpha values, and pivotally the variability of these 
values, along with the sources of this variability (Vacha-Haase, 1998). As reliability is a property 
of the scores of a particular sample, rather than a property of the measure itself, reliability 
generalisation uses a random-effects model, as discussed earlier, and the exploration of variance 
in coefficient alphas is a pivotal element along with calculating an overall estimate (Bonett, 2010; 
Bornstein et al., 2010).   
 In this meta-analysis, coefficient alphas from all available studies were synthesised in a 
reliability generalisation, calculating overall estimated coefficient alphas for both the AS and its 
subscales, with 95% confidence intervals (CI). Although, results from the majority of papers were 
analysable, it is important to note that 7 out of the 60 (11.7%) studies that reported scores for the 
AS or its subscales did not report coefficient alpha for their samples, but instead reported internal 
reliability from a different study (with a different sample), or made no reference to reliability at 
all. As has been repeated numerous times in the psychometric literature (e.g. DeVellis, 2012, 
Vacha-Haase, 1998), there is no reason not to report internal reliability of any multi-item scale for 
the reported sample, and citing other reliability values is no substitute for this. 
 
 Variance in the combined coefficient alphas. As expected, the between-study variance in 
reported coefficient alphas for AS scores was very high, with Cochran’s Q test significant and the 
I² statistic showing 93.2% variance. For the subscales, the I² statistic ranged from 88.7% to 96.1%. 
Though this degree of heterogeneity is unsurprising, considering the vastly different samples 
included in the meta-analysis, it is important and interesting, essentially indicating that the overall 
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coefficient alpha estimates of 𝛼 = .84 (95% CI [.82, .86]) for the AS cannot be generalised beyond 
this study. Similar degrees of heterogeneity were found for the combined coefficient alphas of the 
three subscales, which were estimated at between 𝛼 = .77 and 𝛼 = .82.  In an attempt to make sense 
of this considerable heterogeneity, I tried categorising samples, but no clear pattern emerged that 
might account for the variance.   
The heterogeneity in AS coefficient alphas can be explored by inspecting the forest plot 
(see figure 4). At the lower end, five of the studies had upper 95% confidence limits (CL) that fell 
below the estimated aggregate of 𝛼 = .84. The plot suggests the two lowest of these were outliers, 
with coefficient alphas considerably lower than the next lowest value. Indeed, coefficient alphas 
from the third lowest to the highest ranged by .12, from 𝛼 = .77 to .89, whereas the range from the 
third lowest to the lowest alone was .12, from 𝛼 = .77 to .65. At the other end of the plot, 10 studies 
had lower 95% CLs above the overall aggregate. In general, the studies with higher coefficient 
alphas had narrower 95% CIs than the studies with lower values.  
Taken together, there is nothing in this reliability generalisation indicating the internal 
reliability of AS scores in other populations will not be good enough to make the measure useable. 
However, the high levels of variability found here serves to underline the unquestionable 
importance of estimating and reporting internal reliability for every sample.  
  
 Publication bias. The Begg-mazumdar correlation test was significant for the coefficient 
alphas for AS scores, indicating the potential presence of publication bias. However, the 
correlation was negative, which indicates the asymmetry was to the left of the funnel plot. This is 
clear when inspecting the plot, showing the asymmetry does not stem from too many high 
coefficient alphas published, but rather two alphas considerably lower than the mean. In this case 
then, the asymmetry of the funnel plot does not seem to indicate publication bias. 
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2.4.2.2. Scale intercorrelations  
The estimated overall correlation coefficients between the subscales and the overall scale 
were all high, ranging from .64 to .82. However, it is important to note that assuming 
approximately equal variance across items, 33% of the variance of the total score is shared with 
each subscale, which inflates these correlations markedly. The directions of these correlations were 
all as expected, with the full AS scale and the AL subscale positively worded (high scores 
indicating high authenticity) and the AEI and SA subscales negatively worded.  
The estimated intercorrelation coefficients between the subscales were all moderate, 
ranging from .34 to .44. Though the directions of the reported correlations were all as expected, 
three of the AL to AEI coefficients had 95% CIs that crossed 0, and so did two of the AL to SA 
coefficients. Taken together with the high combined coefficient alpha values of the subscales, these 
findings provisionally support the structure of the design model reported by Wood et al. (2008), 
namely that the three subscales were developed to measure three discrete constructs that together 
form the humanistic definition of authenticity (Barrett-Lennard, 1998; Rogers, 1959).   
 One correlation coefficient between the AS and the AL subscale was a clear outlier, 
reported at r = .18 (Grijak, 2017a). This correlation was observed in the Serbian translation of the 
scale rather than the English version, but translation seems unlikely to be the cause of the 
discrepancy, particularly as the other two subscales correlated to the expected degrees with the full 
scale and with AL. This correlation coefficient is so at odds with coefficients from the other 
samples reviewed that it seems likely to be artefactual, particularly considering the reported mean 
scores for all the subscales and the full scale in the study were similar to the estimated overall 
mean scores in this meta-analysis. The author of the study has been contacted for clarification, but 
has not responded. 
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2.4.2.3. Mean scores and distributions  
The estimated overall mean for the AS was 4.83, which is 63.4% of the maximum score, 
7, showing that the estimated mean AS score was close to the middle of the scoring scale. This is 
ideal, suggesting the absence of any floor or ceiling effects for AS scores, though SDs would also 
be needed to confirm this. If floor and ceiling effects are present, which would likely manifest as 
POMP scores close to 90% or 10%, it indicates that only a part of the scoring scale has been used, 
which in turn means there is relatively little variance in scores. As correlation is a function of 
variance, the presence of floor or ceiling effects would reduce the power of any correlational tests, 
limiting the usefulness of a measure (Cramer & Howitt, 2004).  
 Considering the three subscales separately, their POMP scores diverged considerably from 
the overall scale. Most markedly, the AL subscale had a mean score of 5.60, which is a POMP of 
76.7%. The AEI had an estimated mean score of 3.47 and a POMP of 41.2%, which is fairly close 
to the middle of the scoring scale, whilst the SA estimated mean score of 2.86 is a POMP of 31.0%. 
This shows that respondents tend to rate themselves considerably higher on the AL than on the 
AEI and SA, particularly the SA. One possible reason for this is social desirability. The AL is the 
only positively worded subscale, with items such as: “I live in accordance with my values and 
believes” (item 12, Wood et al., 2008), and it is reasonable to expect that respondents would wish 
to score higher on such an item than on the SA subscale with items such as: “I feel as if I don’t 
know myself very well.” (item 7, Wood et al., 2008). The AEI subscale seems to be worded more 
neutrally than the AL and SA, with items such as: “Other people influence me greatly.” (item 6, 
Wood et al., 2008), which might account for why its scores were fairly close to the middle of the 
scoring scale.  
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 However, Wood and colleagues (2008) did investigate whether the AS was affected by 
social desirability when developing it, by including the Balanced Inventory of Desirable 
Responding (BIDR; Paulhus, 1984) as a discriminant validity measure. They found the 
correlations to be very small and non-significant for both the overall scale and each of the 
subscales, and thus concluded the AS is not meaningfully affected by socially desirable 
responding. It is worth noting that the mean scores of the sample (n = 180) with which Wood et 
al. (2008) performed the correlation with the BDRI differed from the estimated means in this meta-
analysis, particularly the scores on the AL subscale, which had a POMP of 64.7% in the Wood et 
al. (2008) sample, 12% lower than the POMP in this meta-analysis. Thus it is possible the AL 
subscale would have been found to be significantly affected by socially desirable responding if 
examined in a different sample.  
 Another important point that needs considering, is the effect of including both negatively 
and positively worded subscales in the AS. Whereas this might help mitigate against acquiescent 
response bias, Roszkowski and Soven (2010) suggest it may introduce artefacts, with some 
research showing that the direction of the wording of items and scales affects score distributions 
(e.g. Barnette, 1996; Van Dam, Hobkirk, Danoff-Burg, & Earleywine, 2012), and that including 
both positively and negatively worded subscales may lower, rather than raise, the measure’s 
validity. It may be argued then that either wording all AS items in the same direction, or including 
both positive and negative items in each subscale, would make the AS more psychometrically 
sound.  
 
 Variance. As with the coefficient alphas, there was a very high degree of variance in mean 
AS scores across samples (I² = 99.3%). Indeed, the means in the separate samples ranged from 
3.62 (POMP of 43.7%) to 5.56 (POMP of 76.0%). As discussed earlier, this level of heterogeneity 
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is not surprising, considering I am combining mean scores from a psychometric measure expected 
to vary between individuals and samples. Regardless, I tried categorising samples to find the 
source of this variability, but no clear pattern emerged. Most samples were from the US or the UK, 
but their scores did not differ systematically from samples from other countries. No samples could 
be logically expected to have lower AS scores, and though one sample was of psychotherapists 
whom one might expect to have high scores, their mean scores were close to the subscale means. 
 Part of the variance is likely due to the confusion regarding how to report the negatively 
worded subscales AEI and SA. In their original paper, Wood et al. (2008) reported the means of 
the SA and AEI prior to recoding them, and thus high scores on the these two subscales indicted 
low authenticity. However, as none of the papers in this meta-analysis clarify whether they are 
reporting recoded means or not, it is only possible to tell what is reported in the very few 
publications that report both the total AS score and the subscale scores. It is likely that the majority 
have done as advocated by Wood et al. (2008) in the original paper, but I identified three papers 
that reported the recoded means for the AEI and SA, and there are likely more. Regardless, the 
large degree of heterogeneity between samples means that the overall estimated means cannot be 
generalised to any other samples. 
 
 Publication bias. In contrast to the funnel plot for AS score coefficient alphas, the Begg-
Mazumdar test for plot asymmetry was non-significant (p = .26), indicating the absence of 
publication bias. However, it should be noted that publications adding together raw scores, or 
reporting recoded AEI and SA scores as if they were recoded, will mitigate against the test 
detecting a publications bias. Regardless, considering the samples reporting means (k = 15) and 
coefficient alphas (k = 29) are largely overlapping, and neither coefficient alphas or means have a 
clear cutoff point that might dissuade researchers from publishing, such as the significant/non-
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significant p-value, it seems reasonable to conclude that there was no publication bias concerning 
AS means, coefficient alphas, or correlation coefficients. 
 
2.4.2.4. Limitations to the meta-analysis  
A significant limitation of the meta-analysis is the uncertainty around the estimated overall 
means, due to the confusion in the literature around whether to report raw or recoded scores for 
the AEI and SA subscales, and similarly, whether to simply add together the raw subscale scores, 
or to recode them first. I identified three papers that had certainly reported recoded means for AEI 
and SA, two more where the subscale scores did not add up to the reported full AS score, and a 
further three that certainly added the subscales together without recoding AEI and SA, with two 
more I suspect have done the same. Because of these examples of poorly or wrongly reported data, 
I was particularly vigilant reading the papers included in the meta-analysis. In most cases, the 
authors had either reported both full scale and subscale scores, or subscale intercorrelations, 
allowing me to see if the means were recoded or not. Of the publications that had not reported 
either of those things, most had reported coefficient alpha, and as simply adding together the raw 
scores would greatly decrease the alpha value (one study that did this reported 𝛼 = .53), I felt 
reasonably confident these studies had recoded the AEI and SA correctly before adding the 
together.  
 The ideal way to deal with this issue would have been to contact every author to clarify 
what had been done, but that fell beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, I have removed the 
studies that have clearly reported erroneous data, corrected the data where possible, and assumed 
that the remaining publications where there is no way to tell what has been done, have correctly 
added together the subscales.  
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 A second point limitation is that I was not able to trace the considerable between-studies 
variance to any variables, beyond my attempt at categorising the samples. It would have been very 
interesting to test whether age, gender, or country accounted for any of the heterogeneity. 
 
2.5. Conclusion and implications for Study 2 
In this systematic review, I aimed to summarise the psychometric properties of the AS from 
all publications that have reported AS data. I addressed these aims in two general parts: a narrative 
synthesis and a meta-analysis. The narrative synthesis explored the concurrent validity of the AS, 
reviewing correlations between the AS and measures of well-being, emotional distress, 
authenticity, and personality. I found that the vast majority of correlations were consistent with the 
design model of the AS, and its conceptual underpinnings, supporting its validity. The narrative 
synthesis also revealed that no studies to date have used the AS as an outcome measure, and that 
no studies have used it with clinical samples. 
The meta-analysis used a random-effects model to combine AS coefficient alphas, mean 
scores and subscale intercorrelation coefficients. It found that for the vast majority of reported 
samples, the AS showed high internal reliability, intercorrelations consistent with the design model 
of the AS, and mean scores close to the middle of the scoring scale, qualities needed in an outcome 
measure. There was however, a very large degree of between-study heterogeneity. Though this 
was expected considering the effects that were being combined, it is an important point to note 
when generalising from these findings. 
In all, the systematic review found considerable support for the construct validity of the 
AS, and that it had excellent psychometric properties in the vast majority of relevant samples. 
However, as none of the identified studies had used the AS with clinical samples, how the AS 
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would actually function as an outcome measure remains a gap in the literature, one the second 











 In this chapter, I aim to provide an overview of how I have conducted Study 2. I start by 
discussing my epistemological stance, a natural starting point for any research. I then review the 
aims of this thesis, and how Study 2 will address these, before moving on to describe the 
different elements of the research, starting with its design, a description of the participating 
counselling services, therapists and clients, and the research procedure. Finally, I go through 
each of the a priori planned analyses that I will use to answer the research questions, introducing 
each and briefly discussing the implications of the statistical concepts and methods.  
 
3.2. Epistemology 
The perhaps most fundamental questions when conducting research, are those of ontology 
and epistemology. Ontology is the theory of reality. What is the nature of reality, what exists? 
Closely linked is epistemology, the theory of knowledge. How do we know what we know? All 
research and research methodology makes explicit and implicit assumptions regarding these 
questions (Blaikie, 2004). As a researcher, I believe it is important to explicate my position, thus 
making transparent the assumptions that underlie this research.  
 In this thesis, I draw on several different epistemological traditions. I will first discuss 
empiricism, positivism, and realism, which are closely related, and which lay the foundation for 
measurement in psychology as a practice. I then briefly discuss constructivist positions, before 
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moving on to review pragmatism. Finally, I discuss my primary position for this research, 
pragmatism-realism, and why I see it as the most appropriate for measurement in psychology.  
 
3.2.1. Empiricism and positivism  
 Empiricism was represented by philosophers such as Locke and Hume in the 18th century, 
seeing direct observation and sensory experience as the basis of all knowledge (Maul, Wilson, & 
Irribarra, 2013). Closely related is positivism, a term coined by Comte (1974) in the 19th century, 
who held that the current age should be one where we apply knowledge from the natural sciences 
positively to drive progress, both technological and medical, but also societal (Cruickshank, 2012). 
Logical positivism, which emerged in the 1920s, builds on, and is largely overlapping with, 
empiricism, but combined it with recent advances in mathematics and logic (Hammersley, 2011). 
The central doctrine of this epistemology is that all meaningful knowledge is either empirical or 
logical. Thus, knowledge comes solely from employing strict scientific methodology to our 
observations of the world, that is by measuring it, and by using logical reasoning to extrapolate 
from these measurements (Hammersley, 2011). 
 Measurement in psychology has historically based itself in empiricism and positivism 
(Guyon, Kop, Juhel, & Falissard, 2018). The issue however, is that the constructs we seek to 
measure in psychology cannot be directly observed. Thus, in order to measure a latent construct, 
it must first be operationalised by a psychometric measure. For example, depression as a construct 
cannot be empirically observed unless it has first been operationalised, as with the BDI (Beck et 
al., 1961). We might say someone is depressed, but until we list a series of markers and score 
people on those, we cannot say who is depressed and who is not, or how depressed a person is. 
The problem is that, embedded in psychometric measurement scores, is random and systematic 
error (Guyon et al., 2018). Thus a major limitation in holding to logical positivism in psychological 
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measurement is that an unknown proportion of any score will be error, which means we cannot 
know whether we have successfully operationalised the construct (Sijtsma, 2012). 
  
3.2.2. Realism  
 Ontologically, realism shares the view of empiricism and positivism, in that it sees reality 
as objective and independent from the observer experiencing it, but accurately symbolised in our 
perception of it (Boyd, 1983; Payne & Payne, 2004) However, where empiricism and positivism 
hold that observable phenomena make up the totality of reality, realism argues unobservable causal 
laws interact to bring about the change that can be observed (Bhaskar, 1997; Boyd, 1990; Payne 
& Payne, 2004). Realism is thus a post-positivist epistemology, aiming to describe the underlying 
phenomena that predict the observable world (Cruickshank, 2012; Payne & Payne, 2004). 
Moreover, because elements of the real world cannot be observed directly, realism sees scientific 
theories as fallible and only an approximation of reality, and in need of constant revising to better 
describe it (Bhaskar, 1997; Boyd, 1983; Long, 2013; Steinmetz, 1998).  
 At a glance, realism seems a more suited epistemology for psychological measurement and 
this thesis, than positivism. It accounts for the proximal nature of a measure, such as the AS, in 
operationalising authenticity, recognising the inevitability of error being embedded in 
psychometrics. However, realism holds that reality is 'logically independent of any knower' 
(Michell, 2003, p. 17). In other words, reality is mind-independent, and does not depend on our 
awareness of it  (Maul et al., 2013). This makes sense when considering natural phenomena: leaves 
rustling in a forest make sound, regardless of whether or not someone is there to hear it. However, 
the implication for psychological measurement is the constructs must be ontologically objective, 
independent of our awareness of them, in order from them to be measurable. In this, realism does 
not seem compatible with the concept of psychological constructs. Authenticity is not simply an 
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objective, yet unobservable, phenomenon, causing ripples in the observable world. Rather, 
authenticity, and any psychological construct, depends on our definition of it. Thus, a purely realist 




 Occupying the opposite end of the epistemology spectrum to positivist and realist 
paradigms, are constructivist positions. These cover an array of epistemologies, but a common-
denominator is the belief that the world cannot be known directly or objectively. Instead, each 
person mentally constructs the world of experience, and thus knowledge, through their individual 
cognitive processes (Young & Collin, 2004). In other words, whereas realism holds we have 
knowledge of reality, constructivism argues we only have knowledge of a construction of reality, 
a proxy. Within constructivism, there are three general positions. Radical constructivist, such a 
von Glaserfield (1995), hold that there is no external reality, but that reality is constructed in the 
mind of the individual. Moderate constructivists on the other hand, such as Piaget (1969), see the 
individual’s constructions of reality as being built in a systematic relationship with the external 
world. Finally, social constructivists, such as Vygotsky (1978), emphasise the intersubjective, 
believing the individual cognitive processes that construct reality are preceded by, and derived 
from, social relationships (Young & Collin, 2004).   
 From a constructivist epistemology, psychological measurement, and collating 
measurements from a group of people, appears very problematic. Central to the notion of defining 
authenticity, reducing it to a set of markers, measuring how people score on those markers, and 
then combining those measurements, is that there is an objective reality, and thus that one person’s 
AS scores can be meaningfully combined with those of another person. This however, is 
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fundamentally incompatible with the belief that the world is cognitively constructed by each 
individual. 
  
3.2.4. Pragmatism  
 Pragmatism is based on an ontological agnosticism, claiming that the scientific methods 
we use may not be as objective and independent as the positivists or realists might claim (Long, 
2013). As an example, for several centuries scientific development was required to be coherent 
with the Catholic Church, resulting in claims that today seem outlandish (Kuhn, 1962). 
Pragmatism is not necessarily at odds with realism, as long as the realist position in question is not 
too extreme, and holds there may be an objective reality, but our knowledge of reality is shaped 
and organised by social context (Guyon et al., 2018). Thus, it I may be seen as occupying space 
somewhere between realism and social constructivism. Pragmatism covers an array of positions, 
but a common denominator is an orientation towards practice, aiming to interpret each notion 
according to its practical consequences (Maul et al., 2013). James (1907) stated: ‘What difference 
would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true? If no practical 
difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all 
dispute is idle’ (p.14). Pragmatism sees our beliefs and theories about the world as tied to our 
practical and pragmatic engagements in it, rather than how the world actually is (Guyon et al. 
2018). When considering measuring authenticity, a pragmatist might be less concerned with the 
ontology of authenticity, or how the AS operationalises it, but rather whether the AS is a measure 
that can be usefully applied. A psychological measure is generally developed with specific 
purposes in mind, and using it generally leads to actions, decisions and consequences, either for a 
researcher, a clinician, a funding body, or a client (Maul et al., 2013). Indeed, the AS was 
developed to impact counselling psychology research, and to be an outcome measure (Wood et 
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al., 2008). Moreover, I aim for my using it in this thesis to have consequences for whether or not 
it is employed as an outcome measure in the field of counselling psychology. Thus, pragmatism 
seems a natural and important epistemological position for psychological measurement as a whole, 
and for this thesis. 
 
3.2.5. What is a psychological construct? 
 Pivotal to considering the epistemology of measurement in psychology, is a discussion of 
the ontology of the psychological constructs we seek to measure, often termed mental attributes, 
such as anxiety or authenticity.  
 The mental processes that make up mental attributes are formed of complex neural 
networks, a system made up of more than 100 billion neurones that can move through an almost 
infinite number of states (Fingelkurts & Fingelkurts, 2004). To make up mental attributes, these 
networks do not simply combine in additive or linear fashion, but assemble in non-linear dynamics 
that interact in multiplicative ways. In addition to this vastly complex neural system, mental 
processes are also affected by the external environment (Fingelkurts, Fingelkurts, & Neves, 2013). 
Thus, mental attributes clearly correspond to reality, as they are anchored in the 
neurophysiological, and thus physical and chemical, yet it is impossible to simply reduce them 
down to observable and measurable entities. 
 On the other hand, Guyon et al. (2018) hold that 'the reality of a mental attribute resides its 
functional appearance' (p. 4) and is thus 'a characteristic of the person as a social subject' (p. 5). In 
other words, the functional existence of authenticity depends on the presence of its manifestations 
that are observable in some way, socially, psychologically, or biologically. If someone shows no 
manifestation whatsoever of being authentic, then one cannot consider that person to be authentic. 
Thus, psychological attributes do not exist as phenomena independent of human perception or 
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interaction. They correspond to reality, in that they derive from neurophysiological processes in 
the brain, and yet they are also characteristics inferred from the behaviour of the person, and thus 
observer-dependent (Guyon et al., 2018). They are, in other words, intersubjective realities, and 
they both fit into a purely realist epistemology, and yet they do not. 
 
3.2.6. Pragmatism-realism  
 Based on this view of psychological constructs, Guyon and colleagues (2018) argue that 
adding pragmatism to realism, a pragmatism-realism epistemology, is the most coherent for 
psychological measurement, provided the realist position is not an extreme empiricist one that see 
reality as completely independent of human action or thought. Pragmatism-realism holds that our 
understanding of reality comes from our experience of the external world being organised by the 
layers of our conceptual and methodological theories, and our pragmatic concerns (Maul et al., 
2013). Putnam (1999) wrote of this epistemology: 'seeing is always seeing as, and it is the interface 
between the world and the rich fabric of our concepts that jointly determines what we see.' (p. 20). 
This perspective sees psychological measurement as an empirical process seeking to gain 
knowledge about reality, but shaped by our pragmatic concerns. 
Taking authenticity as an example, we can consider authenticity a social reality at this point 
in history, though it may be that in the future, some other concept will emerge and replace it. We 
talk of people being more or less authentic, based on the manifestations of our definition of 
authenticity. Moreover, quantifying and measuring authenticity can be useful, as I discussed in 
chapter 1. It may enable further research, or be useful to counselling psychologists, or to our 
clients, or to our wider community. Thus, from a pragmatism-realism perspective, using the AS to 
measure authenticity is reasonable, justifiable, and important.    
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3.2.7. Conclusion  
In conclusion, I hold to a pragmatist-realist epistemological position in this thesis. This 
view fits with the concept of authenticity as being both a social construction, and yet corresponding 
to objective reality. From this epistemology, my experience and understanding of authenticity is 
organised and prioritised through my beliefs and hypotheses about it, as well as my methodological 
theories on how to approach it, and my pragmatic concerns and aims (Maul et al., 2013). Taken 
together with authenticity being a social reality in our current society, I believe measuring it would 
be useful, which from a pragmatist-realist position, also suggests it would be meaningful to do so. 
 
3.3. Aims, research questions and expected findings 
The overall thesis has two aims, presented in section 1.5. Study 1 addressed the first of 
these aims: investigate the psychometric properties of the AS. Study 2 also addresses this aim, but 
in a clinical sample, which it is the first study to do, as every publication identified in Study 1 used 
non-clinical samples.  
The emphasis in Study 2 was on addressing the second overall aim: investigate how the 
AS functions as an outcome measure.  
 
3.3.1. Research questions 
 In Study 2, the first primary aim is addressed by the following research questions: 
1. How reliable (internally consistent) is the AS in the clinical samples? 
2. How does the AS relate to the CORE-10 at baseline, post-therapy and in change scores in the clinical 
samples (concurrent validity)?  
3. Do the AS subscales intercorrelate as expected (construct validity)? 
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4. Is the factor structure of the AS replicable in the clinical samples (factorial validity)? 
  
 The second primary aim is addressed by the following research questions: 
5. What are the completion rates for the AS? 
6. How do clients rate the helpfulness of the AS on the TQHS, and how does this compare to the TQHS 
scores of the CORE-10? 
7. Are there any floor or ceiling effects present in the AS scores? 
8. How sensitive to change is the AS, and how does this sensitivity compare to that of the CORE-10? 
 
3.3.2. Expected findings 
1. I expect the internal consistencies for the AS and its subscales will be comparable to the 
estimates from the meta-analysis (AS: a = .84, AL: a = .77, AEI: a = .81, SA: a = .82). 
2. I expect the estimated correlation between the AS and the CORE-10 at baseline to be moderate 
and negative, with 95% CIs that clearly show convergent validity for the AS (around r = -.40 for 
the full scale and each of the subscales).  
3. I expect that the estimated correlation between the AS and the CORE-10 will be large post-
therapy, (around r = -.50 for the full scale and each of the subscales), and that change scores on 
the two measures will share a moderate negative correlation (around r = -.30), with 95% CIs that 
exclude there being no relationship. 
4. I expect to find the estimated subscale intercorrelations to indicate the three subscales are three 
related, but distinct, constructs. I also expect the estimated subscale intercorrelations, and the 
subscale correlations with the full AS, will be comparable to those found in the meta-analysis (r = 
.34 - .44 and r = .64 - .82, respectively). 
 92 
5. I expect the AS will be sensitive to change, with AS scores significantly higher post-therapy 
than at baseline. 
 
3.4. Design 
Study 2 investigated the acceptability, reliability, validity and sensitivity to change of a 
pre-existing outcome measure, the Authenticity Scale (Wood et al., 2008), in a clinical sample. It 
followed an observational longitudinal design, having participants complete psychometric 
outcome measures over the course of psychotherapy. 
 The length of the psychotherapy varied, between and within sites. Some participants only 
completed measures at baseline, whilst others completed measures all the way through therapy. 
The longest course of therapy in this study was 37 sessions. As the AS does not measure symptoms 
or occurrences, but rather stable traits that are hypothesised to change as a result of psychological 
intervention, participants did not complete the scale sessionally, but at set intervals. Participants 
also completed the CORE-10 (Barkham et al., 2013), allowing me to compare how the AS 
functioned as an outcome measure in comparison to a measure that is already well established and 
widely used in this capacity ('CORE Users’, n.d.). This data was then submitted to predetermined 




3.5.1. Ethical approval 
 This research project was submitted to the University of Roehampton Ethics Committee 
on August 4th, 2017 under the reference PSYC 17/275, and approved on September 18th, 2017 
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(Appendix D).  A minor amendment to the client and therapist demographics forms was submitted 
on 27.11.17 and approved on 04.12.17 by the University of Roehampton Ethics Officer.  
 
3.5.2. Sample size  
I used G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) to calculate the approximate 
sample size I would need to complete the analyses I had planned. From the literature, I expected 
the AS and the CORE-10 to share a moderate correlation, with r = -.40. G*Power gave a minimum 
of 63 participants to detect this correlation as significant with power 95.2 %, one-tailed testing, 
and criterion alpha of .05. I used this planned correlation to calculate the sample size, rather than 
the t-tests looking at pre-post therapy comparisons in one sample, as these would require less 
statistical power than correlations between two measures. Thus, I aimed to recruit 63 participants. 
However, as more participants would add statistical power to the analyses, I decide to continue 
data collection until a predetermined cutoff point, even if I met the recruitment aim earlier. The 
cutoff point was October 31st 2018, as I estimated that was when I would have to start analysing 
the data in order to complete this project within the timeframe I had set. The freedom to continue 
collecting data was due to this thesis essentially being a pilot study: all the recruited sites had 
agreed to continue collecting data until the July 2019, with the aim of having sufficient data at that 
point to publish the study in a peer-reviewed journal. 
  
3.5.3. Recruitment 
Counselling services were recruited through opportunity sampling. I approached individual 
counselling and psychotherapy services with the study, aiming to indirectly recruit clients. This 
was done via an email sent to services on a database of placement providers for counselling 
psychology and psychotherapy students at the University of Roehampton. The email briefly 
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outlined the rationale and aims of the project (Appendix E). I first prioritised emailing services 
who affiliated themselves with humanistic approaches, as I reasoned these were likely to find the 
project interesting considering the strong Rogerian underpinnings of the AS (Wood et al., 2008). 
Services connected to individuals on the research team were also approached, and the recruitment 
email was also posted on an online forum for person-centred research. There were no inclusion 
criteria pertaining to length of therapy, nor to therapy modality. Counselling services under the 
National Health Service (NHS) were not approach for recruitment, due to the additional 
requirements of submitting for NHS ethical approval.   
 Counselling services that were interested in participation were given the counselling 
service information sheet (Appendix F), and the services who agreed to participate, were given a 
Counselling Service Consent Form (Appendix G) to sign. They then put it to their individual 
therapists whether these wanted to take part or not, giving them the Therapist information sheet 
(Appendix H). In three cases, I attended a meeting with the service’s therapists, explaining the 
project and answering questions. Therapists who agreed to participate signed a Therapist Consent 
Form (Appendix I), and completed a Therapist demographics form (Appendix J).  
 Participating therapists handed their new clients the Client Information Sheet and Client 
Consent Form (Appendices K & L) at the first point of meeting, in most cases an assessment 
session, and briefly introduced the project. Clients were asked to return the consent form signed 
for the first session should they wish to participate.  
 On the first therapy session, participating clients who had signed and returned the Client 
Consent Form were given the Client Demographics Form (Appendix M), and the first set of 
measures: the AS and the CORE-10. All completed forms were handed to the counselling service 
administrator or head to be stored securely in the service offices until I collected them.  
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3.6. Participants 
3.6.1. Counselling services 
 Fifteen services, and two psychotherapists working privately, expressed interest in 
participating in this study. However, 11 of the services, and both individual therapists, withdrew 
their interest at various stages of the process. In most cases, this was due to the workload that 
would be required for participation. For eight of the services, the leadership teams wanted to take 
part, but withdrew their interest when their therapists did not want to. One service about to begin 
data collection withdrew after a change of staff, and three others were initially recruited, but 
stopped responding to emails.  
In the end, four different sites were recruited to collect data for this study. Of these, one 
was a university research clinic from South England (referred to as ‘the Research Clinic’). This 
clinic was set up to offer free counselling to the community, whilst also contributing to research. 
It offers free counselling to adults (18+), and routinely collects outcome and process data, 
primarily involving asking clients to complete various measures when they come for their 
counselling sessions. The majority of the therapists at the clinic are current or recently qualified 
counselling, psychotherapy or counselling psychology postgraduate students. 
 The other three sites that were recruited were all independent counselling services, one in 
London, one in Sussex and one in the Midlands. These sites cover a broad demographic. The 
London site is a charity offering free counselling to anyone under 25 years old, including children. 
Clients over 18 are asked for a sessional donation, but this is not mandatory. The Coventry and 
Sussex sites are both commercial counselling services, though they offer an income-dependent 
sliding fee scale, and thus their clients come from a broad demographic.  
 There were no exclusion criteria for counselling modality or length of therapy, and all four 
sites offered counselling in several different psychotherapeutic approaches, and of various lengths. 
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The only inclusion criteria was being aged 18 years or older. In all cases, participation was 
voluntary, and was not compensated in any way. 
 
3.6.2. Clients 
 Participants for this project were 67 clients receiving counselling or psychotherapy, from 
four different sites. See table 10 for client demographics.  
 Because of differences in demographics forms between sites, only 24 clients out of 67 were 
asked about their highest level of education. Of these, four (6.0%) had completed GCSE level 
secondary school (level 1), two (3.0%) had completed a post-secondary school qualification such 
as A-levels (level 2), seven (10.4%) had completed a vocational qualification (level 3), nine 
(13.4%) had completed an undergraduate degree (level 4), and two (3.0%) had competed a 
postgraduate degree (level 5). 
 Of the 67 participating clients, 18 (26.9%) only completed one Authenticity Scale, 20 
(29.9%) completed two, 19 (28.4%) completed three, and five (7.5%) completed four, two (3.0%) 











Table 10   
Demographics of all clients who completed at least one measurement  
    Total 
(N = 67) 
Research 
Clinic 
(n = 38) 
Sussex 
(n = 21) 
London 
(n = 3) 
Midlands 
(n = 5) 
 Mean age in years (SD)  34.8 (12.1) 33.2 (2.0) 38.9 (2.9) 19.3 (1.3) - 
  Missing  14 (20%) 9 (24%) 0 0 5 (100%) 
 Gender (n, %)       
  Male  16 (24%) 6 (16%) 5 (24%) 1 (33%) 2 (40.0%) 
  Female  47 (70%) 21 (55%) 16 (76%) 2 (67%) 3 (60.0%) 
  Missing  4 (6%) 11 (29%) 0 0 0 
 Ethnic origin       
  White British  39 (58%) 19 (50%) 19 (91%) 1 (33%) - 
  White other  8 (12%) 7 (18%) 0 0 - 
  Asian  3 (5%) 2 (5%) 0 1 (33%) - 
  Black  3 (5%) 3 (8%) 1 (5%) 0 - 
  Carribbean  2 (3%) 0 1 (5%) 1 (33%) - 




 Therapists from the Midlands service (n = 2) did not complete the demographics form, 
whereas therapists from the Clinic (n = 8) completed their service's own demographics form, which 
diverged somewhat from the one from this study.  
 There were 22 participating therapists in all, 16 (73%) female and four male (18%). Their 
mean age was 39.0 years (SD = 12.8), ranging from 24 years to 59. In terms of ethnicity, 17 (77 
%) were White, one was White Asian, and one was Black. Eight were from the Research Clinic, 
nine from the Sussex service, three from the London service and two from the Midlands service. 
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Table 11. shows therapists' professional identities, how long they have been qualified, and their 




    Total 
(N = 22) 
 Mean age in years (SD)  39.0 (12.8) 
  Missing  3 (14%) 
 Currently a trainee  7 (32%) 
 Level of training   
  5 (Diploma etc)  5 (23%) 
  6 (BA/BSc)  2 (9%) 
  7 (MA/MSc, PG Dip etc)  2 (9%) 
  8 (Doctoral degree)  9 (41%) 
  Missing  4 (18%) 
 Years qualified   
  > 2  11 (50%) 
  > 6  4 (18%) 
  > 10  1 (5%) 
  ≤ 10  2 (9%) 
  Missing  4 (18%) 
 Professional identity   
  Counsellor  9 (41%) 
  Psychotherapist   0 
  Counselling Psychologist  9 (41%) 
  Missing  4 (18%) 
 Therapeutic orientation   
  Humanistic  5 (23%) 
  Psychodynamic/analytic  1 (5%) 
  CBT  2 (9%) 
  Transactional analysis  1 (5%) 
  Integrative  5 (23%) 
  Pluralistic  4 (18%) 




3.7.1. The Authenticity Scale (AS) 
 The AS (Wood et al., 2008) is a 12-item self-report measure, aiming to measure trait 
authenticity (Appendix A). Respondents rate how well each item describes them on a 7-point 
Likert scale, ranging from 1 (‘Does not describe me at all’) to 7 (‘Describes me very well’), giving 
a total score between 12 and 84. The measure is made up of three 4-item subscales, authentic living 
(AL; e.g. item 1: ‘I think it is better to be yourself, than to be popular.’), accepting external 
influences (AEI; e.g. item 5: ‘I always feel I need to do what others expect me to do.’), and self-
alienation (SA; e.g. item 2: ‘I don’t know how I really feel inside.’), with high scores on AL 
indicative of high authenticity, and high scores on the other two subscales indicative of low 
authenticity. For total AS scores, the AEI and SA subscales are reverse coded, before all three 
subscales are added together.  
 The copyright for the AS belongs to the American Psychological Association (APA). Upon 
application, I was given permission to reproduce the AS in this thesis (see Appendix B) and to use 
it in the study.  
 
3.7.2. Clinical Outcomes in Routine Evaluation-10 (CORE-10) 
 The CORE-10 (Barkham et al., 2013) is a 10-item self-report measure of general 
psychological distress (Appendix C), a short version of the 34-item CORE-OM (Evans et al., 
2000), with which it correlates at r = .94 (Barkham et al. 2013). It is not condition-specific or 
unifocal, but instead aims to measure common psychological issues, including depression, anxiety 
and trauma (e.g. item 1: ‘I have felt tense, anxious or nervous’, item 8: ’I have felt despairing or 
helpless’, item 10: ‘unwanted images or memories have been distressing me’), as well as levels of 
general and relational functioning (e.g. item 2: ‘I have felt I have someone to turn to for support 
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when needed’, item 4: ‘Talking to people has felt too much for me’). It also includes one item 
measuring risk to oneself (item 6: ‘I have made plans to end my life’). On a 5-point Likert scale 
(0-4), respondents rate how often they have experienced what each item describes over the last 
week, from 'Not at all' to 'Most or all of the time', giving a total score between 0 and 40. Low 
scores are indicative of low psychological distress, and high scores indicate high levels of distress.  
 By including a wide range of items, the CORE-10 aims to capture the impact of an issue, 
such as depression, rather than merely the symptoms. Moreover, the CORE-10 is pantheoretical, 
thus aiming to be a useful standardised outcome measure across a wide range of settings and 
interventions (Barkham et al., 2013). The CORE-10 is psychometrically sound, and Barkham et 
al. (2013) reported an internal reliability (alpha) of .90.  
 
3.7.3. Therapy Questionnaire Helpfulness Survey (TQHS) 
The TQHS (Di Malta et al., unpublished) is a 10-item scale, aiming to measure clients’ 
experiences of using a specific measure. It is thus highly relevant when assessing the acceptability 
of a given measure. Specifically, the TQHS asks respondents to rate on a 5-point Likert scale (1-
5) how much they agree or disagree with a series of statements. These relate to how helpful the 
measure was, how it made the respondent feel, how it affected the therapy, and whether it made 
the respondent think and reflect on themselves. For example, ‘I found this form helpful’ (item 1), 
‘This form made me feel down’ (item 5) and ’Using this form made the therapy better’ (item 8). 
The 10 items give a total score between 10 and 50, with higher scores indicating clients found the 
measure in question helpful, and lower scores indicating they found it unhelpful. The measure the 
TQHS is referring to is specified at the top of the TQHS. 
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As this measure is still under development, it is not publicly available, and not included in 
the appendix1.  
In our study, the TQHS was completed for both the AS (Wood et al., 2008) and the CORE-
10 (Barkham et al., 2013), and had an internal reliability of 𝛼 = .78 for the AS, and 𝛼 = .84 for the 
CORE-10.  
 
3.7.4. Measures completed at each service 
Clients completed the AS and CORE-10 on the first and last sessions, as well as at set 
intervals, varying somewhat depending on what was feasible for the site. For the three independent 
counselling services, the interval was every 6th session (6th, 12th, 18th etc), whereas for the research 
clinic, clients completed the measures on the 4th and 10th sessions. The TQHS was completed on 
the 6th or 10th session, depending on the service. All participants completed the Authenticity Scale 
at least once. Participants from the Midlands service did not complete the TQHS, and participants 
from the Research Clinic did not complete the CORE-10. See table 12 for an overview of how 









1 To view the TQHS, please email Professor Mick Cooper at mick.cooper@roehampton.ac.uk. 
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Table 12  
Breakdown of how many of each measure was completed at each service 
Number of measures completed   Total (N = 67) 
Research 
Clinic  
(n = 38) 
Sussex 
(n = 21) 
Midlands 
(n = 5) 
London 
(n = 3) 
 AS       
  1  18 (27%) 15 (39%) 3 (14%) 0 0 
  2  21 (31%) 10 (26%) 10 (48%) 1 (20%) 0 
  3  19 (28%) 6 (16%) 8 (38%) 2 (40%) 3 (100%) 
  4  5 (8%) 5 (13%) 0 0 0 
  5  2 (3%) 2 (5%) 0 0 0 
  6  2 (3%) 0 0 2 (40.0%) 0 
  Total AS (% of total)  159 (100%) 83 (52%) 47 (30%) 20 (13%) 9 (6%) 
 CORE-10       
  1  5 (7%) - 5 (24%) 0 0 
  2  11 (16%) - 10 (48%) 1 (20%) 0 
  3  10 (15%) - 6 (29%) 1 (20%) 3 (100%) 
  4  1 (1%) - 0 1 (20%) 0 
  Total CORE-10 (% of total)  61 (100%) 0 43 (70%) 9 (15%) 9 (15%) 
         
 TQHS-AS  36 (54%) 20 (53%) 13 (62%) - 3 (100%) 
  Total TQHS-AS (% of total)  36 (100%) 20 (56%) 13 (36%)  3 (8%) 
 TQHS-CORE  16 (24%) - 13 (62%) - 3 (100%) 
  Total TQHS-CORE (% of 
total) 




 All analyses were decided upon a priori, so as to limit researcher bias. Analyses were 
carried out using SPSS (version 25; IBM, 2017). I used a criterion alpha level of .05 for all 
statistical tests. I used Cohen's (1988) benchmarks for the magnitude of correlation coefficients, r. 




3.8.1. Estimation versus null-hypothesis testing 
 Null hypothesis testing (NHST) has traditionally been psychology’s dominant approach to 
quantitative data analysis, but has been subject to cogent criticism, largely for not being 
informative enough (Cumming, Fidler, Kalinowski, Lai, 2012). Thus, the APA Publication 
Manual (2012; 6th edn.) recommends using the alternative paradigm, estimation. This essentially 
means asking the questions ‘how much?’ and ‘to what extent?’ rather the binary ‘is there an 
effect?’, which statistically translates into reporting effect sizes and confidence intervals where 
possible, rather than just probability tests (Cumming et al., 2012). In this study, I report in 
accordance with the estimation paradigm where possible.  
 I used an online calculator (Lowry, 2019) to calculate the CIs for Pearson or Spearman 
correlations, as SPSS does not include this function.    
Where appropriate, I also performed probability tests. These analyses were t-tests, 
correlations, one-way ANOVAs, confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) and multilevel modelling 
(MLM). For the vast majority of the correlational tests I had a clear hypothesis, based on the 
literature, as to the direction of the correlation, and thus most of these were one-tailed. Any two-
tailed correlational tests have been labelled as such in the results sections.  
 
3.8.2. Study-wise multiple-comparisons issue 
 In all I planned 85 comparisons and probability tests in Study 2, using the same dataset. 
This is important to bear in mind when considering the results of these tests, as each probability 
test increases the likelihood of a type I error, that is, of finding a significant result by chance. This 
likelihood is given by: 
 
 
P(at least one significant result)  =  1- P(no significant results) 
      
 104 
Thus, there was a 98.7% study-wise likelihood of finding at least one significant result by 
chance. There are corrections available, for example the Bonferroni adjustment, but considering 
the small sample size, this would give a criterion alpha level so low that it is unlikely any of the 
tests would yield significant results, and all but ensure type II errors. In consultation with my 
supervisors, I decided to raise the issue here rather than apply any corrections to the criterion alpha 
level. 
 
3.8.3. Sample sizes  
Though the design of this research was for each client to complete the AS, CORE-10 and 
the TQHS, not all services were able to include all three measures. Though every client completed 
the AS at least once (N = 67), only 40 % completed the CORE-10 (n = 27), 54 % completed the 
TQHS for the AS (n = 36), and 24 % completed the TQHS for the CORE-10 (n = 16). Thus, sample 
sizes were considerably smaller than N = 67 for many of the analyses, limiting their statistical 
power. If I were basing this thesis on the NHST paradigm, I would have performed post hoc power 
analyses for all tests to explicate the statistical power for each. However, as I have largely based 
it on the estimation paradigm, reporting CIs, I have not done this. I reasoned that the wide CIs, 
coupled with low p-values, convey the power issues sufficiently, as argued by O’Keefe (2007). 
However, where results deviated markedly from my hypotheses, I calculated the observed (or post 
hoc) power for the analyses using G*Power (Faul et al., 2009), based on population effect sizes 
from other studies as advocated by O’Keefe (2007).  
 
3.8.4. Calculating baseline, post-therapy and change scores 
 For analyses that required only one timepoint, such as internal reliability (coefficient 
alpha), confirmatory factor analysis, subscale intercorrelations, and score distributions, I used the 
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baseline measurements, as this gave the most cross-sectional data. Because measurements took 
place at different points in therapy depending on the service and the client, I defined baseline as 
the first recorded measurement for each client. However, according to Baldwin, Berkeljon, Atkins, 
Olsen, and Nielsen (2009), who looked at the dose-effect rate of therapy, change is most rapid 
during the first eight sessions, and decreases as number of sessions increases. Thus, I needed to 
decide a cutoff point for what I considered baseline, that was both early enough in therapy to be 
reasonable in accordance with Baldwin et al. (2009), whilst including as much data as possible. I 
decide on the fifth session, aware that this was partly arbitrary, though informed by Baldwin et al. 
(2009). This cutoff point meant I excluded six cases, leaving n = 61 for the AS and n = 27 for the 
CORE-10.   
 I used the last measurements as post-therapy scores, which I compared to baseline to look 
at change. I used three sessions as a cutoff point, so any cases where there had been less than three 
sessions were excluded from the post-therapy scores, leaving n = 45 for the AS, and n = 20 for the 
CORE-10. This cutoff point was again based on Baldwin et al. (2009), who found that even after 
only three sessions, 35.8 % of clients who started therapy above the clinical cutoff for the Outcome 
Questionnaire-45 (OQ-45; Lambert, Hansen et al., 1996) had experienced reliable and clinically 
significant improvement.  
 I calculated change scores for the AS and CORE-10, subtracting the baseline score from 
the post-therapy score, giving n = 41 for the AS, and n = 20 for the CORE-10. 
 
3.8.5. Effects of client and therapist variables on AS scores 
 I assessed the effects of both participant and therapist demographic variables on AS scores. 
However, I decided these analyses were not sufficiently relevant to the aims of this study to warrant 
inclusion. Thus, they can be seen in Appendix P and Q.   
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I used analysis of variance (ANOVA) for the nominal variables (site, gender, sexuality, 
ethnicity and therapeutic orientation), Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (rho) for the ordinal 
variables (level of education for participants and therapists, and therapist seniority) and Pearson 
product moment correlation coefficient for age, the one ratio level variable.  
 
3.8.6. Acceptability 
 The first step in evaluating an outcome measure is looking at its acceptability, which refers 
to the participants’ experience of completing a measure, essentially whether it is acceptable to 
them. One way to assess this is looking at completion rates, that is, whether participants actually 
complete the measure, or if certain items tend to be omitted. If certain items are omitted repeatedly 
it may point to a problem with that item, such as clients finding it hard to understand or upsetting. 
Completion rates were recorded for both the AS and CORE-10, and compared.  
 I also assessed acceptability by having participants complete the TQHS (Di Malta et al., 
unpublished) for both the AS and CORE-10, which asks participants to rate their experience of the 
measure in question. I converted the TQHS scores to POMP scores so as to convey how the scores 
compared to the maximum possible score, and compared them for the AS and CORE-10. 
 
3.8.7. Reliability 
 I assessed the internal reliability (coefficient alpha) of the full AS, as well as for each of 
the three subscales. The meta-analysis found an overall weighted alpha for the full scale of .83, 
and thus I expected the alpha for the full scale to be high. I also expected the internal consistency 
of each of the three subscales to be high, as the meta-analysis yield overall weighted alphas of .77 
(AL), .81 (AEI) and .82 (SA).  
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 I assessed the internal reliability of the CORE-10. Numerous studies have reported good 
internal reliability for the CORE-10 previously (e.g. Barkham et al., 2013, 𝛼 = .90; O’Reilly, 
Peiper, O’Keeffe, Illback, & Clayton, 2016, 𝛼 = .77), and thus I expected similar alpha values.  
 I assessed the internal reliability of the TQHS for both the AS and CORE-10. No studies 
to date have reported on the reliability of the TQHS, but considering it is unidimensional and the 
items appear to measure a single construct, I expected high coefficient alpha values. 
 
3.8.8. Validity 
Validity refers to whether a scale measures what it aims to measure (DeVellis, 2012; see 
section 2.2.3.1. for a more thorough discussion). Unlike reliability, validity is a property of the 
scale rather than the scores, and thus validity reports for a measure found in the literature can be 
assumed to apply to the present study. As discussed in chapter 1, and assessed in chapter 2, there 
is a large amount of published data demonstrating the validity of the AS. Adding to this literature, 
I assessed the construct validity of the AS by both looking at its concurrent validity and how its 
subscales related to one another. I also assessed its factorial validity. The unique contribution of 
this study however, is that it is the first to assess the validity of the AS in a clinical population 
receiving psychotherapy.  
 
3.8.8.1. Concurrent validity 
By correlating the AS with the CORE-10, for both baseline, post-therapy scores, and 
change scores, I assessed the concurrent validity of the AS in the clinical samples. I expected the 
correlation coefficient to be moderate at baseline, as the CORE-10 is a measure of general 
psychological distress, thus conceptually different from the AS, yet still related (see chapters 1 and 
2 for details). I expected it to be large post-therapy, as I expected CORE-10 scores to decrease and 
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AS scores to increase, thereby strengthening their correlation. I expected change on the AS and 
CORE-10 to be inversely correlated, but only moderately so, as they measure very different 
constructs.  
 
3.8.8.2. Construct validity 
As in Study 1 (see section 2.2.4.6.), I further explored the construct validity of the AS by 
looking at the intercorrelations of the three subscales, AL, AEI and SA, for both baseline and post-
therapy scores, in light of their coefficient alphas. From the design model of the AS, I expected 
them to correlate moderately with each other, and to correlate highly with the full scale. These 
correlations, coupled with high coefficient alphas, would indicate that the data from Study 2 is 
consistent with the design model of the AS, supporting its validity. 
Though this was the first study to use the AS with a clinical sample, I did not expect the 
AS subscales to correlate differently than in non-clinical samples. Thus, I expected correlations  
consistent with the meta-analysis, which found the subscale intercorrelations were all moderate (r 
= .33 - .43), and correlations with the full scale were all large (r = .64 - .82).  
 
3.8.8.3. Factorial validity 
I used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) with the AMOS software (Arbuckle, 2017; 
version 25), to assess how well the three-factor model of the AS accounts for the variance in the 
AS baseline scores. Essentially, CFA is a statistical method for testing hypotheses about how 
different variables covary. Specifically, it allows me to draw a hypothetical model, and test how 
well my data fits this model (Hoyle, 2004). Thus, by drawing the three factor model that the AS is 
based on (Wood et al., 2008), I can test if it is an appropriate model for the data in this study, 
potentially providing validity for the factor structure of the AS in a clinical sample. 
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 Model fit was analysed using the chi-squared test of difference between the expected and 
the observed covariance matrices, the root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA), the 
standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR), and the comparative fit index (CFI), as 
recommended by Hooper, Coughlan, and Mullen (2008). The chi-squared test can be problematic 
in assessing model fit, as it is very sensitive to sample size, and it is therefore recommended to 
also use the SRMR, RMSEA and CFI (Hooper et al., 2008). There are several different 
recommendations for what the cutoffs for these fit indices should be (Hooper et al., 2008). For the 
RAMSEA, MacCallum, Browne, and Sugawara (1996) hold that a value below .08 indicates a 
good fit, wheres Hu and Bentler (1999) argue it should be .06 or below. For the SRMR, values 
below .08 are thought to be acceptable (Hu & Bentler, 1999), and so is a CFI value ︎of .95 or above 
(Hu & Bentler, 1999), though a cutoff of .90 has been used previously (Hooper et al., 2008).  
 As the three-factors of the AS theoretically combine to form one factor, authenticity, I also 
performed a CFA using a one-factor solution, and compared the fit indices of the one-factor and 
three-factor solutions to see which would best fit the clinical data  
However, it is important to note that the statistical power and precision of CFA is sensitive 
to sample size, and Kline (2016) comments that as a general rule, sample sizes smaller than 100 
generate untenable solutions. Marsh and Hau (1999) agree, holding that for a model with four 
indicators per latent factor, such as the model of the AS, a sample size larger than 100 is needed. 
Thus, though I expected the CFA to support the findings of Wood et al. (2008), showing that the 
three-factor model of the AS best fits the data, I was aware CFA might be problematic in this 
study, considering the AS baseline sample only had 61 participants. 
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3.8.9. Response distributions 
3.8.9.1. Gaussian distribution 
I tested whether the CORE-10 and AS baseline, post-therapy and change data had Gaussian 
distributions using the Shapiro-Wilk test (Shapiro & Wilk, 1965), as recommended by (Ghasemi 
& Zahediasl, 2012). This is important as parametric tests, such as t-tests, Pearson correlations, 
ANOVA and regression are all based on the assumption that data has a Gaussian distribution, and 
so if this is not the case, non-parametric tests should be used (Ghasemi & Zahediasl, 2012). 
  
3.8.9.2. Floor and ceiling effects  
The absence of floor and ceiling effects is important for any outcome measure, as any items 
subject to these effects will be limited in their ability to detect change at the upper or lower end of 
the measured construct (Lipsey, 1990; Hessling, Traxel, & Schmidt, 2004). Moreover, the limited 
variance that comes from floor and ceiling effects reduces the statistical power of correlation 
analyses, limiting the scale's usefulness in research (Hessling et al., 2004). 
  I assessed for floor and ceiling effects for both scales as well as for the subscales of the 
AS, looking at response distributions for each item, and using POMP scores to look at the scoring 
distribution of each scale. However, POMP scores alone can only indicate such effects, and need 
to be seen in relation to SDs. As there is no agreed upon methodology for assessing floor and 
ceiling effects, I defined floor and ceiling effects at the scale level as a POMP score of below 10% 
or above 90%, respectively. At the item level, I defined floor and ceiling effects as > 29% of 
respondents using either the lowest or highest response category for an item, as suggested by Dean, 
Walker, and Jenkinson (2018).  
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3.8.10. Sensitivity to change 
3.8.10.1. Estimating sensitivity 
Sensitivity to change is key to any outcome measure, as it refers to the ability of a measure 
to pick up change that the client experiences. However, despite the importance of this 
characteristic, there is no single way in which to establish the sensitivity to change of a measure, 
nor is there consensus in the literature regarding what constitutes a sensitive measure (Husted, 
Cook, Farewell, & Gladman, 2000; Stratford & Riddle, 2005). Stratford and Riddle (2005) 
reviewed the outcome measure literature, specifically looking at methods for assessing measure 
responsiveness, and recommended using a simple paired t-test or repeated measures ANOVA to 
establish whether the means at two timepoints differ significantly. If there is a significant 
difference between baseline and post-therapy scores, it can be concluded the measure is sensitive 
to change (Hutsed et al., 2000). However, t-tests focus solely on the statistical significance of 
change, which is useful, but only to an extent. This is because significance is a function of the 
magnitude of change and the variability of the measure, but also of the sample size, which clearly 
has nothing to do with the sensitivity of a measure (Husted et al., 2000). Moreover, a t-test does 
not say how sensitive a measure is, just whether it is or not. Therefore, it is recommended to also 
report an effect size statistic of the change, a standardised response mean (SRM), given by the 
mean change divided by the SD of the change. Thus, a measure with a large degree of variability 
in change scores will have a large SD of change, and a low SRM (Stratford & Riddle, 2005). A 
higher SRM score indicates greater sensitivity to change.    
 In accordance with Stratford and Riddle (2005), I used a paired-samples t-test to compare 
baseline and post-therapy AS and CORE-10 scores, before calculating the effect size of the change, 
SRM scores. I expected the AS to be sensitive to change, and for its SRM score to be comparable 
to that of the CORE-10.  
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3.8.10.2. Reliable and clinically significant change 
Reliable change (RC) and clinically significant change (CSC) are concepts introduced by 
Jacobson, Follette, and Revenstorf (1984), and differ from other methods of change analyses in 
that they look at individual change rather than group means. Though they are often used to assess 
the quality of an intervention or of a service, it is important to ascertain whether the AS is sensitive 
enough to not only pick up change, but RC and CSC. 
 
 Reliable change (RC). RC refers to whether the change on a given measure is sufficiently 
great that it is unlikely it is simply due to the measurement error (Evans, Margison, & Barkham, 
1998). In other words, if a participant's scores on the AS are higher post-therapy than at baseline, 
is the magnitude of this change beyond the range that could be attributed to the variability of the 
measure itself? Assessing whether participants have achieved reliable change involves calculating 
a reliable change criterion (RCrit), which is a function of the standard deviation of the initial 
measurement, and the coefficient alpha of the measure (see Evans et al. 1998). Traditionally, RCrit 
uses the 95% false positive criterion (Evans et al., 1998). However, as the RCrit is naturally higher 
for measures with greater item breadth, such as the AS, as compared to measures with a tight focus, 
such as the PHQ-9, Barkham et al. (2013) recommend using a 90 % criterion instead. This means 
that if the change on a measure is greater than the calculated RCrit, there is a 90 % likelihood that 
this change was due to actual improvement, rather than the unreliability of the measure (Evans et 
al., 1998).  
I calculated the reliable change criterion (RCrit) for each scale using a 90% criterion, and 
the proportion of participants who showed reliable improvement and deterioration on each 
measure. For the AS, the RCrit was 11.5, and for the CORE-10 it was 6.4. 
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 Clinically significant change (CSC). The second way of considering individual change is 
looking at whether it is clinically significant. CSC refers to whether a client's scores have moved 
from a 'dysfunctional' scoring range to a 'normal' scoring range (Evans et al., 1998). Thus, the 
important consideration is what is a typical score for a 'dysfunctional', or clinical, population, and 
what is a typical score for a 'normal', or non-clinical, population. Once these benchmarks are 
defined, we can calculate the point which clients must move beyond in order to qualify has having 
achieved CSC. Importantly, for change to be clinically significant, it must also be reliable, which 
means RC is a prerequisite for CSC. Jacobson et al. (1984) suggest three different criterions for 
determining whether CSC has taken place. Depending on the data, either of these may be the most 
appropriate. In the case of this study, I expected the distribution of non-clinical and clinical scores 
to overlap, in which case Evans et al. (1998) recommend using 'method C' (Jacobson et al., 1998), 
which takes into account both a normative population score and a clinical population score and 
calculates a cutoff point where the likelihood of being in the non-clinical population is equal to 
being in the clinical population. This cutoff is given by: 
(meanclin × SDnorm) + (meannorm × SDclin) 
 
SDnorm + SDclin 
 
 
 In this study, I used the baseline mean AS score as the clinical population score, and 
selected a study from the meta-analysis for the mean non-clinical population score. I needed a 
study with a large sample of non-clinical participants that reported full AS scores and SDs, not just 
subscale scores. The study that best fit these criteria was Boyraz and Kuhl (2015). Their sample 
consisted of 619 adults recruited from two websites that publish links to psychological studies, 
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with a mean age of 26.9 years (SD = 10.5). The mean item AS score in this sample was 5.12 (SD 
= 1.06) 
 As I did not have access to CORE-10 non-clinical population data, I could not calculate 
the criterion for determining CSC for the CORE-10. Instead, I used 11, the CSC criterion reported 
by Barkham et al. (2013) for the CORE-10. Thus, clients who scored above 11 at baseline and 11 
our below at post-therapy, would have showed CSC on the CORE-10. 
 I calculated the percentage of clients who showed clinically significant improvement and 
deterioration on both the AS and the CORE-10.  
 
3.8.10.3. Comparing the sensitivity of the AS and CORE-10 
I compared the sensitivity to change of the AS and the CORE-10. I reasoned that as the 
CORE-10 is already a widely used outcome measure (see section 1.4.3.2.), it would provide 
support for the AS as an outcome measure if its sensitivity was comparable to that of the CORE-
10.  
To test whether the change differed significantly between the measures, I standardised both 
sets of scores to POMP scores, as the CORE-10 and AS use different scoring scales (0-4 and 1-7 
respectively). I calculated POMP change scores by subtracting baseline POMP scores from post-
therapy POMP scores. Because positive change on the CORE-10 means lower scores, I subtracted 
the CORE-10 POMP change score from 0, making both POMP change scores positive. I then used 
a t-test to examine whether the change POMP scores differed significantly between the measures.  
 
3.8.10.4. Multilevel modelling 
Finally, I examined sensitivity to change using MLM, a statistical method that extends 
conventional regression methods, and is well suited for analysing hierarchical data (Gill & 
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Womack, 2013). It essentially performs a regression analysis on all the data, and gives the slope 
of the model, that is, how much the average participants’ scores change per session, as well as how 
well that linear slope fits the data. The model can be constrained to a fixed linear fit, meaning it 
assumes the relationship between number of sessions and AS scores was the same for all 
participants, or it can allow change to be non-linear, which means it first calculates the linear 
model, before calculating how much each participant deviates from that model. Similarly to CFA, 
the question is then which model best fits the data 
 The strength of MLM over a t-test is that, rather than just comparing averaged pre- and 
post-scores, data can be individualised, that is, the MLM can include every data point for every 
client, regardless of how many sessions each client has had, or if the measurements occurred on 
the same sessions (Tasca & Gallop, 2009). Indeed, the t-test comparing baseline and post-therapy 
scores only uses 67% of the data gathered, limiting the statistical power available. Furthermore, 
MLM avoids the problem of the somewhat arbitrary cutoff points I used to define baseline and 
post-therapy scores, circumventing that source of error completely. MLM is thus well suited for 
psychotherapy research in naturalistic settings such as this, where number of sessions can vary 
greatly between clients.  
 I had planned to perform the MLM in SPSS, but after both my supervisor and I had spent 
a considerable amount of time attempting it, I decided it would be better to perform it with the R 
software, and the nlme add-on package (Pinheiro, DebRoy, Sarkar, & R Core Team, 2018). Thus, 
though I planed the analyses and interpreted the results, the actual MLM analysis was performed 
by my supervisor, Professor Chris Evans, in consultation with myself, the main author, and I take 
responsibility for the analysis.  
 We tested three different models and compared which fit the data best. The first model was 
simply to provide a point of comparison, and assumed that mean AS scores across participants 
 116 
were the same, ignoring session numbers completely. The second model allowed each participant 
to have a different intercept point with the y-axis (session number = 0), and assumed a fixed linear 
model, that is, that every participant shows the same linear relationship between session number 
and AS scores. The third model allowed each participant to have a different relationship between 
session number and AS scores. 
 Model fit was assessed with the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1973) and the 
Schwarz's Bayesian Cirterion (BIC; Schwarz, 1978). Lower values for AIC and BIC indicate that 
more variance is explained, and thus better fit. ANOVA was used to test whether the models 
differed significantly. 








5.1.1. Completion rates 
 In all, 159 AS measures were collected. Of these, four measures had omitted items, though 
never more than one. This gave a completion rate of 99.97% for the AS.  
 In all, 61 CORE-10 measures were completed. Of these, one had an omitted item, giving a 
completion rate of 99.98%.  
 
5.1.2. Therapy Questionnaire Helpfulness Survey (TQHS) scores 
 The AS had a mean TQHS score of 30.8 (SD = 5.7; n = 36), which is a POMP score of 
52%. The CORE-10 had a mean TQHS score of 31.3 (SD = 5.5; n = 14), which is a POMP score 
of 53%. The mean AS and CORE-10 TQHS scores were not significantly different: t(12) = -.91, p 
= .38. The mean difference was -.69, 95% CI [-2.36, 0.97].  
 
5.2. Reliability 
5.2.1. Internal reliability (coefficient alpha) 
 At baseline, the internal reliability of the AS was 𝛼 = .80, 95% CI [.71, .87]. For the AI 
subscale it was: 𝛼 = .81, 95% CI [.71, .88]; for the AEI: 𝛼 = .86, 95% CI [.80, .91]; and for the SA, 
𝛼 = .78, 95% CI [.67, .86]. These coefficient alpha values were all comparable with those found 





Coefficient alphas at baseline and post-therapy compared with the meta-analysis 
 Scale Baseline (a)   Post-therapy (a)  Meta-analysis (a)  
  Est. lCL uCL 
 
Est. lCL uCL 
 
Est. lCL uCL 
 Authenticity scale .80 [.71 .87]  .88 [.83 .93]  .84 [.82 .86] 
  Authentic Living .81 [.71 .88]  .84 [.75 .90]  .77 [.75 .79] 
  Accepting External 
Influences  .86 [.80 .91] 
 
.89 [.83 .93] 
 
.81 [.80 .83] 
  Self-Alienation .78 [.67 .86]  .88 [.82 .93]  .82 [.80 .85] 
Note: Est = estimate; lCL = lower confidence limit; uCL = upper confidence limit.  
At baseline, n = 61. Post-therapy, n = 45. Meta-analysis, n = 8,823.  
 
 At baseline the internal reliability of the CORE-10 was 𝛼 = .86, 95% CI [.76, .93] (n = 27).  
 The TQHS for the AS had an internal reliability of 𝛼 = .78, 95% CI [.65, .87], and for the 
CORE-10, 𝛼 = .84, 95% CI [.68, .94]. 
 
5.3. Validity 
5.3.1. Concurrent validity 
See table 15 for baseline and post-therapy scale correlations. 
 
Baseline. At baseline, the AS and CORE-10 shared a significant, moderate negative 
correlation: r(25) = -.36, p = .032, 95% CI [-.65, .02]. 
 At baseline, the AL subscale did not significantly correlate with the CORE-10, r(25) = -
.01, p = .47, 95% CI [-.39, .37]. The AEI subscale shared a significant, moderate positive 
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correlation with the CORE-10: r(25) = .39, p = .022, 95% CI [.01, .67], and so did the SA subscale: 
r(25) = .34, p = .041, 95% CI [-.05, .64]. 
 At baseline, the AS shared a significant, large positive correlation with its AL subscale: 
r(59) = .65, p < .001, 95% CI [.48, .77], and significant, large negative correlations with its AEI, 
r(59) = -.79, p < .001, 95% CI [-.87, -.67], and SA subscales, r(59) = -.65, p < .001, 95% CI [-.77, 
-.48].  
 
 Post-therapy. At post-therapy, the AS and CORE-10 shared a significant, large negative 
correlation: r(17) = -.73, p < .001, 95% CI [-.89, -.41]. 
 At post-therapy, the AL subscale did not significantly correlate with the CORE-10, r(18) 
= -.35, p = .064, 95% CI [-.69, .11]. The AEI subscale shared a significant, moderate positive 
correlation with the CORE-10: r(18) = .43, p = .028, 95% CI [-.02, .73], and the SA subscale 
shared a large positive correlation: r(17) = .78, p < .001, 95% CI [-.51, .91]. 
 At post-therapy, the AS shared a significant, large positive correlation with its AL subscale: 
r(43) = .72, p < .001, 95% CI [.54, .84], and significant, large negative correlations with its AEI, 
r(43) = -.79, p < .001, 95% CI [-.88, -.65], and SA subscales, r(43) = .83, p < .001, 95% CI [.71, 
.90].  
 
 Change. Correlation analysis revealed that change on the AS and change on the CORE-10 
were non-significantly correlated: r(17) = -.35, p = .070, 95% CI [-.69, .12].  
A post hoc power analysis revealed that a sample size of 49 would be required for a one-
tailed analysis to detect an effect of r = -.35 with power of .80. 
Table 14 shows the correlations between change on all scales. 
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Table 14  
Matrix of intercorrelations of change for all scales  
  Change (post-therapy - baseline) 
Scale n CORE-10 AS AL AEI SA 
CORE-10 20 - -.35 ns -.30 ns .03 ns -.44* 
Authenticity Scale 41  - .45** .74** .88** 
 Authentic Living 43   - -.01 ns .12 ns 
 Accepting External Influences (R) 42    - .53** 
 Self-Alienation (R) 42     - 
Note: AS: Authenticity Scale; AL: Authentic Living subscale; AEI; Accepting External Influences subscale; SA: Self-
Alienation subscale. R: Reverse coded 
 
 
5.3.2. Construct validity (subscale intercorrelations) 
See table 15 for a matrix of the intercorrelations of the subscales. 
 
Baseline. At baseline, the AL subscale did not significantly correlate with the SA subscale: 
r(59) = -.04, p = .39, 95% CI [-.29, .21]. The AL did significantly correlate with the AEI subscale: 
r(59) = -.40, p < .001, 95% CI [-.59, -.17]. The AEI and SA subscales correlated significantly at 
baseline: r(59) = .23, p = .04, 95% CI [-.02, .46]. 
In the meta-analysis, the combined population effect for the correlation between AL and 
SA was: r(5,673) = -.36 (p < .001, 95% CI [-.41, -.32]). As the baseline correlation between the 
AL and SA subscales in Study 2 was non-significant, I calculated the likelihood of finding a 
significant result assuming the observed sample effect was exactly the same as the estimate 
population effect from the meta-analysis. This gave a power of .89. 
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Post-therapy. Post-therapy, the AL subscale correlated significantly with the SA subscale: 
r(44) = -.44, p < .001, 95% CI [-.65, -.17]; and with the AEI subscale: r(44) = -.29, p = .03, 95% 
CI [-.54, 0]. The AEI and SA subscales correlated significantly post-therapy: r(43) = .49, p < .001, 
95% CI [.23, .69]. 
 
Table 15        
Matrix of intercorrelations for the AS, its subscales and the CORE-10    
 Baseline  Post-therapy 
Scale CORE-10 AS AL AEI SA  
CORE
-10 AS AL AEI SA 
CORE-10 - -.36* -.01 ns .39* .34*  - -.73** -.35 ns .43* .78** 
AS  - .65** -.79** -.64**   - .72** -.79** -.83** 
 AL   - -.40** -.04 ns    - -.29* -.44** 
 AEI    - .23*     - .49** 
 SA     -      - 
Note: AS: Authenticity Scale; AL: Authentic Living subscale; AEI; Accepting External Influences subscale; SA: Sel-
Alienation subscale.  
At baseline, n = 61 for the AS and its subscales; n = 27 for the CORE-10. At post-therapy, n = 43 for the AS and its 
subscales; n = 20 for the CORE-10. 
* p < .05  ** p < .001.   ns = non-significant 
 
5.3.3. Factorial validity.  
I performed a CFA with the baseline AS scores, using the maximum likelihood model of 
estimation. I tested a three-factor solution consistent with the theoretical model of the AS, which, 
according to lenient cutoffs (Hooper et al., 2008) provided a reasonable fit for the data: 𝜒²(51) = 
68.83 (p = .049), CFI = .94, RMSEA = .08 (90% CI = .01 - .12), SRMR = .08.  
However, when inspecting the standardised regression weights, it was clear the data did 
not fit a hierarchical model at all, as the regression weight between the AEI and the full AS was -
2.00, an impossibility, and the loading of the AEI error term was 3.99 (see figure 10). This is called 
a Heywood case, and indicates that the converged solution is inadmissible (Kline, 2016). 
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According to Kline (2016), Heywood cases can be due to small sample sizes (N < 100), which, 
considering the sample size in this analysis was 61, is a likely source of the issue. 
 
 
5.4. Response distributions 
5.4.1. Gaussian distribution 
I examined the distribution shape of the AS and CORE-10 baseline, post-therapy, and 
change data. The Shapiro-Wilk test was non-significant at both baseline (S-W = .96, df = 61, p = 
.07) and post-therapy (S-W = .98, df = 45, p = .55), as well as for change scores (S-W = .94, df = 
19, p = .25), indicating the data had a Gaussian distribution. See figures 11 - 13 for histograms of 
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For the CORE-10, the Shapiro-Wilk test was non-significant at both baseline (S-W = .98, 
df = 27, p = .82) and post-therapy (S-W = .94, df = 16, p = .40), as well as for change scores (S-W 
= .96, df = 19, p = .66), indicating the data had a Gaussian distribution. 
 
5.4.2. Floor/ceiling effects  
At baseline, no floor (POMP < 10%) or ceiling (POMP > 90%) effects were present in AS 
scores, nor in any of its subscales. See table 16 for an overview of the AS and its subscales. 
At baseline, the CORE-10 did not exhibit any floor or ceiling effects at the scale level (M 
















AS change scores 
Figure 13. Histogram of AS change scores with Gaussian curve.  
 125 
Table 16  
Means and POMP scores for the AS and its subscales 
  Baseline  Post-therapy 
 Scale n Mean SD POMP %  n Mean SD POMP % 
Authenticity Scale 61 48.80 11.07 51.1 %  45 55.58 12.49 60.5% 




61 14.56 5.43 44.0%  46 16.09 5.60 50.4 % 
 Self-Alienation (R) 61 14.59 5.67 44.1 %  46 19.71 5.64 65.5 % 
Note: R: Reverse coded 
  
No items on the AS at baseline exhibited floor or ceiling effects (see table 17): participants 
used the entire scoring range for each item, except for items 8, 9, and 11, where the lowest score 
was not used.  
Table 17  
Item completeness and response distribution for the AS (Baseline) 
Item Scale n Mean SD POMP % Response category (%) 
      Does not 
describe 
me at all 
2 3 4 5 6 Describes 
me very 
well 
1 AL 67 4.94 1.70 65.7 % 3.0 7.5 9.0 19.4 19.4 17.9 23.9 
2R SA 67 3.85 1.88 47.5 % 11.9 14.9 20.9 14.9 13.4 13.4 10.4 
3R AEI 67 3.49 1.49 41.5 % 10.4 16.4 23.9 22.4 17.9 7.5 1.5 
4R AEI 67 4.31 1.77 55.2 % 6.0 13.4 11.9 22.4 17.9 14.9 13.4 
5R AEI 67 3.43 1.66 40.5 % 9.0 25.4 20.9 25.4 4.5 7.5 7.5 
6R AEI 67 3.48 1.64 41.3 % 11.9 14.9 31.3 16.4 10.4 10.4 4.5 
7R SA 67 3.70 1.83 45.0 % 13.4 19.4 10.4 32.9 13.4 11.9 7.5 
8 AL 67 5.13 1.49 68.8 % 0.0 4.5 9.0 23.9 19.4 17.9 25.4 
9 AL 67 4.79 1.46 63.2 % 0.0 7.5 13.4 19.4 25.4 20.9 13.4 
10R SA 67 3.09 1.87 34.8 % 25.4 22.4 14.9 13.4 7.5 11.9 4.5 
11 AL 67 4.96 1.47 66.0 % 0.0 6.0 10.4 22.4 23.9 17.9 19.4 
12R SA 67 3.82 1.82 47.0 % 10.4 16.4 20.9 14.9 17.9 9.0 10.4 
Note: AS: Authenticity Scale; AL: Authentic Living subscale; AEI; Accepting External Influences subscale; SA: Sel-
Alienation subscale. R: reverse coded 
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5.5. Sensitivity to change 
 
5.5.1. Baseline and post-therapy comparison 
 The AS and its subscales. A paired-samples t-test revealed there was a significant 
difference between mean baseline and post-therapy AS scores, t(40) = 3.95, p < .001, with a mean 
difference of 6.73, 95% CI [3.28, 10.18]. Participant AS scores were significantly higher after 
therapy. 
 Paired-samples t-tests revealed the there was a significant difference between mean 
baseline and post-therapy AEI scores, t(41) = 3.22, p = .003, with a mean difference of -2.21, 95% 
CI [-3.61, -0.82]. There was also a significant difference between mean baseline and post-therapy 
SA scores, t(41) =  4.47, p < .001, with a mean difference of -4.64, 95% CI [-6.74, -2.54]. The 
difference between mean baseline and post-therapy AL scores was non-significant, t(42) =  0.19, 
p = .85, with a mean difference of 0.12, 95% CI [-1.09, 1.33]. Participant scores on the AEI and 
SA subscales were significantly higher after therapy, whilst AL scores did not change significantly.  
  
 The CORE-10. There was a significant difference between mean baseline and post-therapy 
CORE-10 scores, t(19) =  -3.36, p = .003, with a mean difference of -6.15, 95% CI [-9.98, -2.32]. 
Participant CORE-10 scores were significantly lower after therapy.   
 
5.5.2. Effect size of change 
 I calculated change scores by subtracting the baseline scores from the post-therapy scores. 
I calculated SRM scores for the AS, its subscales, and the CORE-10 (see section 3.8.10.1). The 
AS had an SRM of 0.62, the AL, AEI, and SA subscales had SRMs of 0.03, 0.50, and 0.69, 
respectively. The CORE-10 had an SRM of 0.75.  
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 In the 19 clients who had change scores on both the AS and CORE-10, the SRM of the AS 
was 0.73, and 0.77 for the CORE-10.  
  
5.5.3. POMP change scores 
In the 19 clients with change scores on both measures, the mean AS change POMP score 
was 12.8%, and the CORE-10 change POMP score was -16.1%. On average, participants scored 
13% higher on the AS after therapy, and 16% lower on the CORE-10. See Table 18 for an overview 
of mean and POMP change scores for each scale, as well as SRM effect sizes.  
 A t-test revealed the difference between AS change POMP scores and CORE-10 change 
POMP scores was non-significant, t(18) = -.65, p = .53, with a mean difference of -3.3, 95% [-
13.9, 7.3]. 
 
Table 18  
 Descriptive statistics for change on the AS, its subscales and the CORE-10.  
  Change  
 Scale n Mean SD POMP % SRM  
Authenticity Scale 41 6.73 10.92 9.4 % 0.62  
 Authentic Living 43 0.12 3.94 0.5 % 0.03  
 Accepting External Influences (R) 42 2.21 4.45 9.4 % 0.50  
 Self-Alienation (R) 42 4.64 6.67 19.4 % 0.69  
 
n = 19         
Authenticity Scale 19 9.21 12.60 12.8 % 0.73  
CORE-10 19 -6.42 8.32 -16.1 % 0.77  
Note: The two bottom rows of the table only include data from the 19 clients with change scores on both 
the AS and CORE-10. R = reverse coded. 
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5.5.4. Clinically significant change (CSC) and reliable change (RC) 
 I calculated the criterion for CSC using the formula suggests by Jacobsen et al. (method C; 
1984; see section 3.8.10.2). This gave an AS mean item criterion of 4.56, and a scale criterion of 
54.7. Thus, any clients who had an AS score below 54 at baseline, and above 55 at post-therapy 
(or vice versa), and whose change was reliable, would have showed CSC. For the CORE-10, I 
used 11 as the CSC criterion, the same as reported by Barkham et al. (2013).  
 The RCrit for the AS was 11.5, and for the CORE-10 it was 6.4. See Table 19 for an 
overview of how many clients showed RC and CSC on the AS and CORE-10. 
 
Table 19 
Percentage of clients showing RC and CSC on the AS and CORE-10 









Authenticity Scale (n = 41)     
Clinically significant improvement 10 (24%) 2 (5%) 0 (0%) 12 (29%) 
No clinically significant change  2 (5%) 27 (66%) 0 (0%) 29 (71%) 
Clinically significant deterioration 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Total 12 (29%) 29 (71%) 0 (0%) 41 (100%) 
Authenticity Scale (n = 19)     
Clinically significant improvement 6 (32%) 1 (5%) 0 (0%) 7 (37%) 
No clinically significant change  1 (5%) 10 (53%) 0 (0%) 11 (58%) 
Clinically significant deterioration 0 (0%) 1 (5%) 0 (0%) 1 (5%) 
Total 7 (37%) 12 (63%) 0 (0%) 19 (100%) 
CORE-10 (n = 19)     
Clinically significant improvement 9 (45%) 1 (5%) 0 (0%) 10 (50%) 
No clinically significant change  0 (0%) 7 (37%) 0 (0%) 7 (37%) 
Clinically significant deterioration 0 (0%) 1 (5%) 1 (5%) 2 (11%) 
Total 9 (47%) 9 (47%) 1 (5%)  19 (100%) 
Note: The bottom two tables (n = 19) show the percentages of clients, who had both the AS and CORE-10 change 
scores, showing RC and CSC. 
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5.5.5. Multi-level modelling 
 I tested three different models for best fit to the AS data (see table 20). 
Table 20          
Estimates of multilevel models for AS scores against number of sessions.   
       Model fit  
Model  Coefficient  SE t  df p AIC BIC  
Null model       1106.1 1115.0  
 Intercept  51.48 1.28 40.29 80 < .001    
Fixed linear slope        1085.8 1097.7  
 Intercept  48.78 1.41 34.62 79 < .001    
 Slope  0.46 0.089 5.16 79 < .001    
Free linear slope       1088.0 1106.0  
 Intercept  48.53 1.38 35.26 79 < .001    
 Slope  0.52 0.10 5.01 79 < .001    
N = 67 
Observations = 147       
  
ANOVA revealed the AIC for the null model and for the fixed linear model were 
significantly different: F(3, 4) = 22.32, p < .001. The fixed linear slope model fit the data 
significantly better than the null model.  
 The AIC for the fixed linear and the free linear models were not significantly different: 
F(4, 6) = 1.72, p = .42. 
 As the fixed and free linear models explained the same proportion of variance, I used the 
fixed linear model, as it was the most parsimonious. This gave a slope of 0.46, which means on 
average, participant AS scores increased by 0.46 per session.    
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Chapter 6. Discussion 
 
 
 This thesis had two aims, (i) to investigate the psychometric properties of the AS, and to 
(ii) investigate how the AS functions as an outcome measure. I addressed the first of these aims in 
Study 1, assessing the internal reliability and construct validity of the AS, collating data from all 
publications yielded by the systematic literature search. I also found that no study to date has 
explored how the AS functions as an outcome measure, nor used it with a clinical sample. Thus, 
in Study 2 I built on the findings of Study 1, and it was the first to explore the reliability and 
validity of the AS in a clinical sample.  
I addressed the second aim of the thesis, to investigate how the AS functions as an outcome 
measure, in Study 2, exploring the acceptability and sensitivity to change of the AS. In this chapter, 
I bring the two studies together and discuss my findings in terms of the two aims of the thesis. I 
begin by addressing the first aim, discussing the internal reliability and construct validity of the 
AS. I then move on to the second aim, and discuss the acceptability and sensitivity to change of 
the AS, as well as the distribution of its scores. I conclude by giving my recommendations for 
counselling psychologists considering using the AS as an outcome measure in light of my findings, 
before discussing the implications of this thesis for counselling psychology, and potential 
directions for future studies. 
  
6.1. The psychometric properties of the AS 
6.1.1. Internal reliability 
 In Study 1, coefficient alphas for AS scores from 30 separate samples, and 8,823 
participants, were combined, giving a combined weighted estimate of 𝛼 = .84 (95% CI [.82, .86]). 
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This is a promisingly high overall estimate according to conventional interpretations (e.g. Chen & 
Krauss, 2004; Crutzen & Kuntsche, 2013). However, as reliability is a property of the scores of a 
measure, rather than of the measure itself, coefficient alphas cannot be generalised beyond the 
sample from which they were calculated. This was clearly illustrated by the very high between-
sample heterogeneity in coefficient alphas in Study 1. Despite this, in 28 of the 30 samples, the 
reported coefficient alphas were between 𝛼 = .77 and 𝛼 = .89, and thus Study 1 did show that for 
the vast majority of samples in which the internal reliability of the AS has been assessed, 
coefficient alphas have been high.  
In Study 2, AS scores had high internal reliability values: 𝛼 = .80 at baseline, and 𝛼 = .88 
at post-therapy (Crutzen & Kuntsche, 2013). These values are similar to the reported values from 
Study 1, despite the small sample sizes of 61 clients at baseline and 45 at post-therapy. Importantly, 
this study was the first to report AS coefficient alphas for a clinical sample. Though they cannot 
be generalised beyond this study, their comparability to the vast majority of the reported coefficient 
alphas in Study 1 seems to indicate the AS typically has good internal consistency in both clinical 
and non-clinical samples. 
 
6.1.2. Validity 
6.1.2.1. Concurrent validity  
In Study 1, I considered every measure the AS has been correlated with in publications 
yielded by the systematic literature search. As there were too many to report on each one, I focused 
on the measures I expected to relate to the AS based on the literature, and grouped these by type. 
I found the AS shared moderate positive correlations with various measures of well-being, 
operationalising constructs such as life satisfaction, self-esteem, and psychological well-being 
(e.g. SWLS, Diener et al., 1985; RSE, Rosenberg, 1965; WEMWBS; Tennant et al., 2007). 
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Similarly, it shared moderate negative correlations with measures of emotional distress, and 
constructs such as stress, anxiety and depression (e.g. DASS-21, Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995; the 
perceived stress scale, Cohen & Williamson, 1988; SAS, Zung, 1971). These correlations were all 
as expected, consistent with the view of humanistic psychology that increased authenticity 
increases well-being and reduces distress (Rogers, 1959). Thus, I also expected the correlations 
with the CORE-10 in Study 2 to be of similar magnitude to the measures of distress found in Study 
1, and indeed, the AS correlated moderately with the CORE-10 (r = -.36) at baseline, sharing 13% 
variance. This correlation was also important because it is the only one reported from a clinical 
sample, indicating the relationship between authenticity and distress is similar in both clinical and 
non-clinical populations. 
I also found the correlations between the AS and measures of personality consistent with 
the design model of the AS (see section 2.4.1.6.). These were all small to moderate, illustrating 
that the AS is not merely measuring a constellation of personality traits. Finally, the AS also shared 
moderate to large correlations with other measures of authenticity, further supporting its validity. 
In all, the correlations between the AS and other measures from both Study 1 and Study 2 are 
consistent with the conceptual underpinnings of the AS, and support its concurrent validity. 
 Considering the validity of the AS as an outcome measure, the moderate correlation with 
the CORE-10 from Study 2 is reassuring. If the correlation had been too large, it would suggest 
the AS and CORE-10 merely measure opposite ends of a spectrum, with distress on one end and 
well-being on the other. This would draw into question whether the AS can really add anything 
new to outcome measurement in counselling psychology. However, the moderate negative 
correlation indicates the AS and CORE-10 are measuring constructs which, though overlapping, 
are very different and not merely opposites.  
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 6.1.2.2. Construct validity 
I further explored the construct validity of the AS by examining the subscale 
intercorrelations in both Study 1 and Study 2. The design model of the AS suggests the three 
subscales, authentic living, accepting external influence, and self-alienation, are three interrelated 
yet oblique facets of authenticity. This model implies large correlations between each subscale and 
the AS, and moderate intercorrelations between the subscales. Importantly, these correlations can 
only support the validity of the AS if each subscale has good internal reliability on its own, 
indicating that each of the four items in a subscale measure a distinct construct. This was what I 
found in the meta-analysis, where each subscale correlated highly with the AS (r = .64 - .82), and 
intercorrelated moderately, with correlation coefficients ranging from .34 to .44, and estimated 
combined coefficient alphas from of 𝛼 = .77, and 𝛼 = .82. 
 Though Study 2 was conducted with a clinical sample, I expected similar results to those 
of Study 1, as there was no reason to suspect the design model of the AS would be different in 
clinical samples. At baseline, each subscale correlated as expected with the AS, and two of the 
three intercorrelations were as expected. However, the AL and SA correlation was surprisingly 
non-significant, with a very small coefficient of r = -.04, 95% CI [-.29, .21]. The AL and SA being 
unrelated at baseline diverges markedly from both the theoretical design model of the AS, and 
what was found in the meta-analysis, where their estimated combined correlation coefficient was 
r = -.36, 95% CI [-.41, -.32]. I investigated whether this lack of a correlation could be due to low 
statistical power, considering the sample size was 61. Thus, as advocated by O’Keefe (2007), I 
calculated the statistical power of the correlation for a sample size of 61, assuming the population 
effect was the same as the combined correlation coefficient from Study 1, r = -.36. This gave an 
estimated power of .89. Thus, assuming the AL and SA are indeed related in accordance with the 
design model of the AS, the analysis should have had sufficient power to detect the effect.  
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This finding could indicate that the entire factor structure of the AS is problematic. The 
design model of the AS implies the three factors should be distinct, yet correlated. If one is 
orthogonal to another, it questions whether they can be seen as parts of a whole, and thus whether 
they can coherently be added together to get a full-scale score, casting doubt over the validity of 
the AS. However, at post-therapy, all correlations were as expected, with the AL and SA 
correlating significantly at r = -.44 (95% CI [-.65, -.17]).  
One potential explanation of the interesting lack of a correlation between AL and SA at 
baseline, is that it is a reflection of it being a clinical sample, indicating that for people who are 
more distressed, the extent to which they are alienated from themselves and are living authentically 
are unrelated. In other words, someone who is psychologically distressed might be highly self-
alienated, yet still allow what they are feeling and thinking to be reflected in their words and 
behaviour. If this is the case, then the moderate correlation at post-therapy might reflect that 
psychotherapy somehow reconnects these two aspects of authenticity.  
Another point to consider is whether this finding points back to the difference between 
state and trait authenticity, and might indicate that not all the subscales are best understood as 
traits. It may be argued that whereas authentic living (AL) appears reflective of a stable trait, self-
alienation (SA) might better understood as a contextual state. This might account for the lack of a 
correlation at baseline, as distress might cause disruption in the inner experience of authenticity at 
a day-to-day level.  
It is also worth noting that despite the seemingly high power of this analysis, it cannot be 
ruled out that this surprising finding was due to random error this study is vulnerable to due to its 
small sample size (Lavrakas, 2008). Regardless, more research is needed to further explore the 
structure of the as, and  how the AL and SA subscales relate, in larger clinical samples.  
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6.1.2.2. Factorial validity 
 Finally, I explored the construct validity of the AS in Study 2 by looking at its factor 
structure using CFA. The CFA found that the three-factor hierarchical model of the AS,did not fit 
the baseline data, the opposite of the CFA findings reported by Wood et al. (2008), Grégoire et al. 
(2014), and Grijak (2017). Though the fit indices appeared reasonable, the standardised regression 
weight between the AS and the AEI, which can only range from -1 to 1, was -2.00. According to 
Kline (2016), this is a Heywood case, and indicates that the Amos software (Arbuckle, 2017) could 
not calculate a useable solution. According to Kline (2016), Heywood cases can be due to small 
sample sizes (N < 100), which, considering the sample size in this study was 61, is a potential 
source of the issue.  
However, considering the AL and SA were unrelated at baseline, it is not surprising the 
CFA failed to support the tripartite model of the AS. Similarly, though there was insufficient data 
to run a CFA (n = 45) with post-therapy scores, it is likely it would have found the tripartite model 
a good fit for the data had the sample been larger, as the AL to SA correlation was as expected 
post-therapy. Regardless, the factor structure of the AS needs further researching in larger clinical 
samples, to support its validity. If the lack of fit persists in other samples, it would indicate the 
design model of the AS is not appropriate, drawing into question whether it is reasonable to 
consider the three subscales facets of a whole.  
 
6.1.3. Summary of the psychometric properties of the AS from Studies 1 and 2  
Taken together, Studies 1 and 2 both found AS scores had excellent internal reliability in 
both clinical and non-clinical samples. However, though there is nothing in these findings that 
might suggest this will not also be the case for future studies, it is still important that reliability is 
assessed for all samples, illustrated by the very high between-study heterogeneity in Study 1.  
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In terms of construct validity, Study 1 found the AS correlated in expected ways with a 
number of measures of well-being, psychological distress, personality and authenticity, and Study 
2 found the correlation with the CORE-10 was also as expected based on the design model of the 
AS. The subscale intercorrelations in Study 1 further supported the construct validity of the AS, 
but the same correlations in Study 2 did not, as the AL and SA were unrelated at baseline. 
Similarly, the CFA failed to support the three-factor model of the AS. More research is needed to 
explore this relationship in larger clinical samples to determine whether these two problematic 
findings are due to the small sample size, or that the structure of the AS is actually different in 
clinical samples. If these findings are replicated in other clinical samples, it questions the validity 
of the AS.  
In all however, studies 1 and 2 indicate the AS has excellent psychometric properties, 
sufficiently so to be used as an outcome measure. 
 
6.2. The AS as an outcome measure  
The second aim of this thesis, to investigate how the AS functions as an outcome measure 
for psychotherapy, was the novel contribution of this thesis to counselling psychology. According 
to the systematic review, Study 2 is the first to use the AS in such a capacity. Below I discuss the 
psychometric properties most relevant to its use as an outcome measure: its acceptability, and 
pivotally, its sensitivity to change, as well as its score distributions.  
 
6.2.1. Acceptability 
 Arguably the first point of interest in considering an outcome measure is its acceptability, 
whether clients actually complete it, and what they think of it. The systematic review in Study 1 
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revealed that no publications to date have reported on the acceptability of the AS, and thus this 
study is the first to do so.  
I assessed acceptability in Study 2, by looking at how many measures, out of the total 
collected, had omitted items. For the AS, 159 measures were collected in all, and four of those had 
one omitted item. Two of these had omitted item 2: ‘I don’t know how I really feel inside’, whereas 
the other two had omitted item 3: ‘I am strongly influenced by the opinions of others’ and item 4: 
‘I usually do what other people tell me to do’ (Wood et al., 2008) These four omitted items gave 
an overall a completion rate of 99.97%, suggesting clients in general have no issues with 
completing the AS.  
 Completion rates, however, do not say much about the experience of completing a measure, 
which one would typically need qualitative methods to explore, conducting interviews with clients. 
The challenge with that approach is that it is a lengthy process, and it might be difficult to get 
clients to agree to interviews. The TQHS (Di Malta et al., unpublished) allowed me ask about 
clients' experiences of completing the AS in self-report form, and use quantitative methods to 
analyse them. I found that the AS scored right in the middle of the TQHS scoring scale, with a 
POMP score of 52 %. Thus, it appears clients on average neither liked nor disliked the AS. 
Moreover, the TQHS POMP score for the AS was comparable to the 53% score of the CORE-10, 
indicating the acceptability of the two measures is similar. Coupled with the high completion rates, 
these TQHS results indicate the AS is indeed an acceptable measure.   
 
6.2.2. Response distribution 
 I also assessed the response distribution of the AS scores, a concept closely linked to 
sensitivity to change, as the presence of floor or ceiling effects can limit the sensitivity of the 
measure (Lipsey, 1990; Hessling et al., 2004). No such effect was detected when considering the 
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POMP scores of the AS and its subscales. The mean POMP score for the AS at baseline was 50%, 
right in the middle of the scoring scale, which, coupled with the POMP SD of 15.4, suggests clients 
used the entire scoring scale of the AS, on either side of the mean. Equally, no floor or ceiling 
effects were present in the POMP scores of the subscales, though the AL did have a higher POMP 
than the other two, likely due to it being a positively worded scale.  
 Looking at the response distribution of the individual items, none had any clear floor or 
ceiling effects, though three of the items on the AL subscale (items 8, 9 and 11) had no clients use 
the lowest response category. This might be an effect of socially desirable responding, as ticking 
'1' on item 8 meant saying 'I always stand by what I believe in' 'does not describe me at all', with 
items 9 and 11 similar to item 8. Two of the items on the AL subscale also tended towards ceiling 
effects, with 24% of participants picking the highest reposes category for item 1, and 25% for item 
8. Similarly, 25% of participants scored the lowest category on item 10. However, these effects 
should be unproblematic, particularly as the overall measure showed no such effects.    
 
6.2.3. Sensitivity to change 
 Sensitivity to change was the pivotal point of this research and is vital for any outcome 
measure. According to Study 1, coefficient alpha values have been reported for the AS in 30 
different samples, and 26 studies have reported correlations between the AS and other measures. 
Its sensitivity to change however, was unknown prior to this research. I explored the sensitivity of 
the AS in two ways, using both a simple t-test to compare baseline and post-therapy scores, as 
recommended by Stratford and Riddle (2005), and by using MLM, as advocated by Tasca and 
Gallop (2009). The problem with the first method was that I had to limit the data to only baseline 
and post-therapy scores, thus ignoring 33% of the data recorded throughout therapy, and limiting 
the analysis to 41 out of 67 clients. Using MLM however, allowed me to assess sensitivity moving 
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beyond just baseline and post-therapy comparison, and include all data for all clients in the 
analysis, regardless of how many measurements each had completed. 
 The t-test method established that the AS is sensitive to change, showing that AS scores 
increased significantly from baseline to post-therapy. This is a moderate change according to 
suggested benchmarks (Husted et al., 2000), with an SRM change score of 0.62. Pivotally, the 
MLM echoed these findings, showing that clients’ AS scores improved by 0.46 per session on 
average. 
 
6.2.3.1. Clinically significant (CSC) and reliable change (RC) 
Of the 41 clients with change data, only 29 % showed reliable improvement on the AS, 
indicating that for 71% of clients, the change in their AS scores could be due to measurement error 
rather than actual experienced change in authenticity. Similarly to RC, 24% of the 41 client who 
had both baseline and post-therapy scores showed CS improvement on the AS, which means 10 
clients had reliably moved from AS scores typical of a clinical population at baseline, to scores 
typical of a non-clinical population post-therapy. Two other clients had moved from the clinical 
score category to the non-clinical, but this change was not reliable. One client (2 %) moved from 
the non-clinical to the clinical score category, but again this was not reliable deterioration, 
indicating the client did not actually deteriorate by much, but rather started right above the cutoff 
point for CSC, and ended just below it.  
To compare the AS with the CORE-10 in terms of the proportion of clients who showed 
CSC and RC, I examined these properties in the 19 clients who had both AS and CORE-10 change 
scores. In this sample, 37% of clients showed reliable improvement on the AS, whereas 47% 
showed it on the CORE-10. Interestingly, though the proportion of clients showing this on the 
CORE-10 is higher than on the AS, it is not as high as in previous publications reporting on RC 
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for the CORE-10 and the CORE-OM (Barkham et al., 2013; Evans et al., 2002). In fact, Evans et 
al. (2002) reported that 74% of clients in their primary care counselling sample (n = 125) showed 
RC on the CORE-OM. This seems to indicate that the sample in Study 2 did not show as much 
change in general as the sample used by Evans et al. (2002), and that though only 37% showed 
reliable improvement on the AS, this would have been substantially higher in their sample.  
In terms of CSC, 32% showed CS improvement on the AS, versus 45% on the CORE-10, 
which is similar to the counselling sample in Evans et al. (2002). No clients showed CS 
deterioration on either measure.  
It is worth noting that the small sample size in this study may have affected both RC and 
CSC proportions. This is because both RCrit and the CSC criterion are functions of the SD of the 
baseline mean scores, and as the SD is inversely related to sample size, the low percentage of 
clients experiencing RC and CSC may be due to the small sample sizes in this study.    
 
6.2.3.2. Comparing the sensitivity of the AS with that of the CORE-10 
From the above section, it is clear a greater proportion of clients showed reliable and 
clinically significant change on the CORE-10 than on the AS in this sample (n = 19). This might 
reflect that authenticity, as measured on the AS, is a more stable construct which takes relatively 
longer to change than symptoms of psychological distress measured on the CORE-10. Indeed, the 
wording of the two scales differs, with the CORE-10 asking clients how they have felt the past 
week, whereas the AS does not give a timeframe to consider. However, it may also be interpreted 
as the AS simply not being as sensitive to change as the CORE-10. 
That being said, the differences are not as pronounced as they might seem. Four of the five 
clients who showed CSC on the CORE-10, but not on the AS, started above the cutoff, and could 
thus not show CS improvement, and the final client showed reliable improvement, but had a post-
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therapy score just one below the cutoff. Moreover, when comparing baseline and post-therapy 
scores in the same 19, the SRM effect sizes of the change were similar: the AS had an SRM effect 
size of 0.73, whilst the CORE-10 had an SRM of 0.77. Moreover, the standardised change on these 
two measures were not significantly different.  
Taken together, it seems reasonable to conclude that the AS and CORE-10 in this sample 
are sensitive to change at a comparable level. Since the CORE-10 is already an established and 
widely used outcome measure (CORE users, n.d.), this is an important point, and one that speaks 
in favour of the AS also being employed as an outcome measure. However, an important caveat is 
that these analyses were conducted in a very small sample (n = 19), one too small to provide 
conclusive conclusions, and further research is needed to explore these issues. 
 
6.2.3.3. Change scores and construct validity 
 To further assess the construct validity of the AS, I explored how change on the AS related 
to change on the CORE-10. Based on the literature, discussed extensively in chapter 1 and the 
narrative synthesis in Study 1, holding authenticity and psychological distress to be inversely, but 
obliquely related, I hypothesised a moderate negative correlation. In Study 2, the correlation 
between the change scores was r = -.35 (95% CI [-.69, .12]), but only nearing significance (p = 
.070). However, a power analysis found that a sample size of 49 would be needed to detect an 
effect of this magnitude with .80 power, indicating that low power due to the small sample size 
was the likely cause of the non-significant result.  
 I also assessed construct validity by investigating what proportion of change on the AS 
could be attributed to each of the subscales. Interestingly, post-therapy AL scores were no higher 
than at baseline, whereas AEI scores had increased by 9.4% and SA scores by 19.4%. AL had an 
SRM effect size of 0.03, whilst AEI had an SRM of 0.50, and SA of 0.69. It was not clear from 
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the conceptual design model of the AS what to expected from this analysis, and thus I had no clear 
hypothesis. However, these findings do seem congruent with Rogerian theory, and thus the design 
model of the AS, as Rogers (1959) did not see change happening simultaneously on these three 
facets of authenticity, but sequentially. Clients where thought to become less self-alienated (SA) 
through therapy, which had a causal effect on the extent to which they expressed their thoughts 
and feelings (AL), as well as their locus of evaluation, which is the construct the AEI is largely 
based on (Barrett-Lennard, 1998; Wood et al., 2008). This finding then, could reflect that change 
on the SA subscale happens initially, and has a causal effect on AL and AEI change. If this is the 
case, then the lack of any change on the AL might simply be because it happens later, and a follow-
up measurement a while after the conclusion of therapy would be needed to register it.  
It is also worth considering if the issue of whether all the subscales are indeed best 
understood as traits can account for these findings. If SA is more reflective of state authenticity, 
and AL is more reflective of trait authenticity, then it would seem to make sense that change on 
SA would be considerably greater than on AL, as states are less stable than traits.  
 
6.2.4. Summary of how the AS functions as an outcome measure 
 In Study 2, I addressed the second aim of this thesis, assessing how the AS functions as an 
outcome measure. I found the it was acceptable, with very high completion rates and good TQHS 
scores comparable to the CORE-10, indicating clients were fairly neutral about completing it. In 
assessing score distributions, I found the AS was not affected by floor or ceiling effects, and clients 
used the entire scoring scale for the majority of items. Pivotally, I also found the AS is sufficiently 
sensitive to register change clients experience over the course of therapy, with scores significantly 
higher after therapy than before, and clients’ AS scores increasing by 0.46 per session on average. 
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It can be concluded that the sensitivity of the AS is similar to that of the CORE-10, despite more 
clients showing reliable and clinically significant change on the CORE-10.   
 
6.3. Implications for counselling psychology 
 For counselling psychologists, or any other clinicians, considering the AS as an outcome 
measure, this thesis indicates it is sufficiently psychometrically sound, acceptable to clients, and 
sensitive to change, to be used in such a capacity. Considering its conceptual basis in humanistic 
psychology (Wood et al., 2008), it may be of particularly interest to clinicians practicing within 
these models, along with other perspectives that hold authenticity as a key outcome of 
psychotherapy (e.g. Horney, 1951; Kohut, 1971; May, 1981; Perls, 1969; Winnicott, 1965).  
The AS could also be a useful outcome measure for practitioners and services wishing to 
use a well-being focused measure, consistent with positive psychology, instead of or in addition 
to a measure of psychological distress, such as the CORE-10. Indeed, though the AS and CORE-
10 were moderately related, their change scores were largely divergent, suggesting the AS could 
add valuable breadth to outcome measurement. However, it is important to bear in mind the AS 
does not assess risk, and might therefore be more suited to be used in addition to a measure that 
assesses risk. Furthermore, the constructs the AS aims to measure, as well as the wording of the 
items, suggests it does not need to be a sessional measure, but can be used at intervals, as I have 
done in this research (Wood et al., 2008).  
 The AS also seems an ideal measure for researchers interested in exploring how 
authenticity relates to other constructs, or the psychotherapeutic and aetiological theories of 
humanistic psychology (Rogers, 1959).  
Though more research is needed in assessing the AS, it could be useful to health research 
at a governmental level, considering the importance key counselling psychology perspectives have 
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placed on authenticity, along with the strong relationship between the AS and measures of well-
being and psychological distress found in Study 1. It could, for example, add an important mental 
well-being and positive psychology focus to the IAPT national data set (NHS Digitial, 2019), and 
supplement the WEMWBS in the National Health Survey (NatCen for Social Research, 2018). 
Moreover, as mental health issues among children and young people is a growing issue in the UK 
(e.g. Pitchforth, Fahy, Ford, Wolpert, Viner, & Hargreaves, 2018), the AS might be useful in 
exploring and addressing these issues, as the aforementioned counselling psychology perspectives 
see it as pivotal to well-being, and in understanding psychological distress and dysfunction 
(Rogers, 1959; Wood et al., 2008). Research with the AS may thus prove relevant to educational 
and health policy, for example in teaching children and young people the importance of 
authenticity, helping them to be less alienated from what is happening in them at a deep level and 
more able to express their thoughts and feelings to the world around them.  
 
6.4. Limitations 
6.4.1. Sample size 
The major limitation throughout Study 2, which is important to be aware of when 
interpreting its findings, is its small sample size. Though 67 participants were recruited overall, 
for most analyses the number was considerably smaller. This was particularly true for analyses 
involving the CORE-10, as not all sites were able to include it in their protocols. This was a natural 
constraint of this being a practitioner-doctoral thesis, and therefore greatly limited in its scope. 
This meant all services were involved on a volunteer basis, offering of their time, energy and 
resources to contribute. In addition, the nature of doing research with clients receiving 
psychotherapy is that there is a high degree of drop-out compared to other research designs. Indeed, 
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27 % of clients who completed the AS, and 19 % of those who completed the CORE-10, only 
completed one measurement.  
The danger of a small sample size is that it limits statistical power and leaves the study 
more vulnerable to random type II error, that is, failing to find a real effect that is present (Acheson, 
2010; Lavrakas, 2008). Thus, it limits the conclusions that can be drawn from this study, and it is 
best seen as a pilot study, laying the foundation for future and more comprehensive research.  
See section 2.4.2.4. for limitations of Study 1. 
 
6.5. Directions for future research 
 As this is the first study to have used the AS with clinical samples, and the first to have 
started to explore it as an outcome measure for psychotherapy, it has opened up several directions 
for future research. These include further exploration of how the AS functions as an outcome 
measure, and exploring claims made by key counselling psychology perspectives (e.g. Rogers, 
1959, Horney, 1951; May, 1981) regarding how authenticity relates to distress and how it is 
affected by psychotherapy. 
 
6.5.1. The present research as a pilot study 
The present research was designed to be a pilot study, giving an indication of how the AS 
functions as an outcome measure in a small, clinical sample. The natural next step then would be 
to conduct this research again with a similar design, but with a larger dataset, which would allow 
for more confidence in the findings and the subsequent conclusions. This has indeed been the plan 




6.5.2. Exploring how psychotherapy impacts authenticity 
As has been discussed, several key perspectives within counselling psychology hold that 
the aim of psychotherapy is increased authenticity (e.g. Horney, 1951; May, 1981; Kohut, 1971; 
Rogers, 1959; Winnicott, 1965; Yalom, 1980). The conceptual model of the AS and its factor 
structure allows us to explore how psychotherapy impacts each of its three subscales. In Study 2 I 
found that change on the SA was significantly greater than on the other two subscales, which might 
be due to SA change happening first and having a causal effect on AL and AEI, which is consistent 
with humanistic psychological theory (Barrett-Lennard, 1998; Rogers, 1959). It would be very 
interesting for future research to look more in-depth at how psychotherapy impacts each of these 
three constructs, and whether change on the SA does indeed have a causal effect on AL and AEI 
change. This might involve administering the AS a few months after the conclusion of therapy, 
and seeing if the AL and AEI change scores have caught up with those of the SA. 
 
6.5.3. Exploring the relationship between authenticity and distress 
Closely linked to how psychotherapy affects authenticity, is how authenticity relates to 
psychological distress. From the aforementioned perspectives within counselling psychology, the 
link between the two constructs appears to be causal: when an individual becomes more authentic, 
this reduces elements of distress such as anxiety and depression (Rogers, 1959). This research did 
find that distress and authenticity, operationalised by the CORE-10 and AS, were linked, 
correlating moderately at baseline and sharing 13% variance. However, this was merely cross-
sectional, and the design and scope of the project meant it was not possible to probe any causal 
links between the two measures. Boyraz et al. (2014) on the other hand, did find a unidirectional 
causal link between AS scores at baseline and DASS-21 scores (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) six 
weeks later, providing support for the hypothesised causal link between authenticity and distress. 
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However, their study did not involve any intervention: the measures were simply administered at 
baseline and at six weeks. Thus, beyond this thesis, no study has investigated how psychotherapy 
affects the relationship between these two variables.  
  
6.5.4. The AS, CORE-10, and relapse  
Another related direction for future research would be looking at how lasting the effects of 
psychotherapy are, and how well the AS predicts this as compared to a distress or symptom focused 
measure. From counselling psychology perspectives (e.g. Horney, 1951; May, 1981; Rogers, 1959; 
Winnicott, 1965), one might hypothesise that change measured on the AS is relatively stable and 
lasting, and potentially more so than on symptom focused measures. It would have been very 
interesting to see whether clients who experienced change on the AS experienced more lasting 
change than those who only experienced change on the CORE-10, and equally whether change on 








 This thesis sought to meet two primary aims, (i) investigate the psychometric properties of 
the AS, and (ii) investigate how the AS functions as an outcome measure. I addressed these aims 
in two studies. Study 1 was a systematic review of the literature, culminating in a narrative 
synthesis, collating the evidence regarding the concurrent validity of the AS, and a meta-analysis, 
collating the coefficient alphas, means scores and subscale intercorrelation coefficients from all 
relevant studies. The narrative synthesis identified 26 publications that have reported correlations 
between the AS and measures of well-being, distress, personality and authenticity, finding them 
to provide support for the construct validity of the AS. The meta-analysis found that for the vast 
majority of publications, the AS has excellent internal reliability, with an overall estimated 
coefficient alpha of 𝛼 = .84. Furthermore, the estimated subscale intercorrelations provided support 
for the factor structure reported by Wood et al. (2008), and POMP scores indicated there were no 
problematic floor and ceiling effects. AS expected, there was a large degree of variance between 
studies, which means the findings of the meta-analysis cannot be directly generalised to further 
populations, but it is reasonable to conclude Study 1 indicates the AS is sufficiently 
psychometrically sound to function as an outcome measure.  
 The second study aimed to directly explore how the AS functions as an outcome measure 
for counselling psychology, assessing its acceptability and sensitivity to change, as well as its 
construct validity. It had good acceptability, with near perfect completion rates and TQHS scores 
comparable to the CORE-10, close to the middle of the scale, and there appeared to be no 
problematic floor or ceiling effects. Its internal reliability was also sufficient at both baseline (𝛼 = 
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.80) and post-therapy (𝛼 = .88), and correlations with the CORE-10, as well as its subscale 
intercorrelations, supported its validity. Finally, and pivotally, the AS was sensitive to change, 
with clients' scores significantly higher post-therapy than at baseline, and MLM finding clients 
improved by 0.46 points per session on average. Moreover, its sensitivity was found to be 
comparable to that of the CORE-10.  
 However, a major limitation with Study 2 was its small sample size, limiting the 
conclusions that can be drawn from its findings. This may be the reason for the two problematic 
findings, with the AL and SA subscales not correlating at baseline, and the CFA not finding a 
solution, results that question the validity of the AS. Thus, though this study has opened up several 
interesting directions for future research, an important one is to assess the AS as an outcome 
measure in larger clinical samples, providing researchers and practitioners who are considering 
using it in some capacity, further confidence in its properties.  
 
7.2. Reflexivity 
 The process of conducting this research and writing this thesis, and all the different 
elements that have gone with it, has had a great impact on me, and been one of the most significant 
processes of my life. Coming to the end of it now, it is not easy to reflect on and express just how 
I have developed and what I have learnt. The most significant learning has certainly been personal, 
persevering through moments of self-doubt and feeling overwhelmed; liaising with therapists, 
services and academics whilst feeling under-qualified and insecure. Pivotally, I learnt to balance 
zooming out to get a meta-perspective, and zooming in so I could simply focus on the next step, 
rather than the mountain I have yet to climb. Beyond that, this project has of course greatly 
broadened my conceptual, methodological and statistical understanding of counselling psychology 
and the research process.  
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 The perhaps greatest conceptual learning has come from reflecting on, reading about, and 
finally formulating, my epistemological position. This taught me the importance of taking a meta-
perspective in research, of examining the assumptions that underlie every research decision, and 
every word I write. The epistemology was undoubtedly the most challenging part of the writing 
process, particularly as it is an element of this research that has changed considerably over the 
course of the project. At first, I saw epistemology simply as a checklist item to be ticked off, 
without any real impact on the research process. Now however, I believe it to be the most 
fundamental starting point for any research. When I began this project three years ago, I held to a 
positivist view, though much of it was implicit assumption. The notion of measuring authenticity, 
or any mental attributes, seemed little more problematic than measuring the temperature, and I 
believed that as long as I used quantitative methods, my findings would be objective and impartial. 
The research process, and the significant amount of reading that has gone with it, has 
problematised this position for me. I had to consider what authenticity is, whether it has reality, 
and whether it exists separately from its socially observable manifestations. I also started 
considering whether it can be measured usefully, that is, can a person's experiences be 
meaningfully reduced to 12 numbers on a questionnaire? These questions eventually lead me to 
move from a positivist view, to a realism-pragmatism view of psychological measurement. 
 All in all, this process and the past three years has left me feeling grateful to the people 
who have enabled me to complete it, my family and my supervisory team. It has taught me so 
much, and left me with a desire to conduct further research and contribute to the field of 







Acheson, A. (2010). Sample size. In In N. J. Salkind (Ed.) Encyclopedia of research design (pp. 
1300-1301). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc.  
Akaike, H. (1973). Information theory and an extension of the maximum likelihood principle. In 
B. N. Petrov & F. Caski (Eds.), Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on 
Information Theory (pp. 267-281). Budapest: Akademiai Kiado. 
Akın, A. & Dönmezogullari, C. (2010) The validity and reliability of Turkish version of the 
Authenticity Scale. Paper presented at the 2nd International Congress of Educational Research, 
29 April–2 May, Antalya, Turkey. 
American Psychiatric Association (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders 
(4th ed.). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association. 
APA Presidential Task FORCE on Evidence-Based Practice. (2006). Evidence-based practice in 
psychology. American Psychologist, 61(4), 271-285. 
Apostolou, A., Ward, A., Yakeley, J. (2016). Outcome Measures for Psychodynamic 
Psychotherapy Services. Royal College of Psychiatrists. 
Arbuckle, J. L. (2017). Amos, Version 25.0 [Computer software]. Chicago: IBM SPSS. 
Bagby, R. M., Parker, J. D. A., & Taylor, G. J. (1994). The twenty-item Toronto alexithymia scale: 
I. Item selection and cross-validation of the factor structure. Journal of Psychosomatic 
Research, 38, 23–32. 
Baker, T. L., Rapp, A., Meyer, T., & Mullins, R. (2014). The role of brand communications on 
front line service employee beliefs, behaviors, and performance. Journal of the Academy of 
Marketing Science, 42(6), 642-657. 
 152 
Baldwin, S. A., Berkeljon, A., Atkins, D. C., Olsen, J. A., & Nielsen, S. L. (2009). Rates of change 
in naturalistic psychotherapy: Contrasting dose–effect and good-enough level models of 
change. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 77(2), 203. 
Barkham, M., Bewick, B., Mullin, T., Gilbody, S., Connell, J., Cahill, J., Mellor-Clark, J., 
Richards, D., Unsworth, G., & Evans, C. (2013). The CORE-10: A short measure of 
psychological distress for routine use in the psychological therapies. Counselling and 
Psychotherapy Research, 13(1), 3-13.  
Barkham, M., Evans, C., Margison, F., McGrath, G., Mellor-Clark, J., Milne, D., & Connell, J. 
(1998). The rationale for developing and implementing core batteries in service settings and 
psychotherapy outcome research. Journal of Mental Health, 7, 35-47. 
Barkham, M., Hardy, G.E., & Mellor-Clark, J. (Eds.) (2010). Developing and delivering practice-
based evidence: A guide for the psychological therapies. Chichester: Wiley. 
Barnette, J.J. (1996). Responses that may indicate nonattending behaviors in three self- 
administered educational surveys. Research in the Schools, 3(2), 49–59.  
Barrett-Lennard, G. T. (1998). Carl Rogers’ helping system: Journey & substance. London: Sage. 
Beck A.T. (1970). Cognitive therapy: Nature and relation to behavior therapy. Behavior Therapy, 
1, 184–200. 
Beck, A. T., Ward, C. H., Mendelson, M., Mock, J., & Erbaugh, J. (1961). An inventory for 
measuring depression. Archives of General Psychiatry, 4, 561–571. 
Begg, C. B., & Mazumdar, M. (1994). Operating characteristics of a rank correlation test for 
publication bias. Biometrics, 50(4), 1088-1101. 
Bhaskar, R. (1997). On the ontological status of ideas. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 
27(2‐3), 139-147. 
 153 
Bickman, L., Rosof-Williams, J., Salzer, M. S., Summerfelt, W. T., Noser, K., Wilson, S. J., & 
Karver, M. S. (2000). What information do clinicians value for monitoring adolescent client 
progress and outcomes? Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 31, 70–74. 
Blaikie, N. (2004). Epistemology. In M. S. Lewis-Beck, A. Bryman, & T. F. Liao (Eds) The SAGE 
Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods (p. 310). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications Inc. 
Bland, J. M., & Altman, D. G. (1997). Statistics notes: Cronbach's alpha. Bmj, 314, 572. 
Bohart, A. C. (2013). The actualizing person. In M. Cooper, M. O'Hara, P. F. Schmid, & A. C. 
Bohart (Eds.), The handbook of person-centred psychotherapy and counselling (pp. 84-101). 
New York, NY, : Palgrave Macmillan. 
Bohart, A. C., O’Hara, M., & Leitner, L. M. (1998). Empirically violated treatments: 
Disenfranchisement of humanistic and other psychotherapies. Psychotherapy Research, 8, 
141–157.  
Bond, M. J., Strauss, N. E., & Wickham, R. E. (2018). Development and validation of the Kernis-
Goldman authenticity inventory-short form (KGAI-SF). Personality and Individual 
Differences, 134, 1-6. 
Bonett, D. G. (2010). Varying coefficient meta-analytic methods for alpha reliability. 
Psychological Methods, 15(4), 368. 
Borenstein, M., Hedges, L. V., Higgins, J. P. T., & Rothstein, H. (2010). A basic introduction to 
fixed-effect and random-effects models for meta-analysis. Research Synthesis Methods, 1(2), 
97–111. 
Boswell, J.F., Kraus, D.R, Miller, S.D., & Lambert, M.J. (2015). Implementing routine outcome 
monitoring in clinical practice: Benefits, challenges, and solutions. Psychotherapy Research, 
25(1), 6-19.  
 154 
Boyd, R. (1983). On the current status of the issue of scientific realism. Erkenntnis 19, 45‐90.  
Boyd, R. (1990). Realism, conventionality, and 'realism about'. In G. Boolos (Ed.) Meaning and 
Method (pp. 171-196). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Boyraz, G., & Kuhl, M. L. (2015). Self-focused attention, authenticity, and well-being. Personality 
and Individual Differences, 87, 70–75. 
Boyraz, G., Waits, J. B., & Felix, V. A. (2014). Authenticity, Life Satisfaction, and Distress: A 
Longitudinal Analysis. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 61(3), 498–505.  
Brislin, R. W. (1970). Back-translation for cross-cultural research. Journal of Cross-Cultural 
Psychology, 1(3), 185-216. 
British Psychology Society, (2017). BPS practice guidelines (3rd edn.) [Online]. Available from 
https://www.bps.org.uk/sites/bps.org.uk/files/Policy/Policy%20-
%20Files/BPS%20Practice%20Guidelines%20(Third%20Edition).pdf [Accessed: 25 
February 2019]. 
Brennan, K. A., Clark, C. L., & Shaver, P. R. (1998). Self-report measurement of adult attachment. 
In J. A. Simpson & W. S. Rholes (Eds.), Attachment theory and close relationships (pp. 46–
76). New York: Guilford Press.  
Brislin, R.W. (1970). Back-translation for cross-cultural research. Journal of Cross-Cultural 
Psychology, 1(3), 185-216. 
Brown, K. W. & Ryan, R. M. (2003). The benefits of being present: Mindfulness and its role in 
psychological well‐being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 922–948.  
Cai, H., Sedikides, C., & Jiang, L. (2013). Familial self as a potent source of affirmation: Evidence 
from China. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 4(5), 529-537. 
 155 
Campbell, J. D., Trapnell, P. D., Heine, S. J., Katz, I. M., Lavallee, L. F., & Lehman, D. R. (1996). 
Self-concept clarity: Measurement, personality correlates, and cultural boundaries. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 70(1), 141–156.  
Carlier, I. V., Meuldijk, D., Van Vliet, I. M., Van Fenema, E., Van der Wee, N. J., & Zitman, F. 
G. (2012). Routine outcome monitoring and feedback on physical or mental health status: 
evidence and theory. Journal of evaluation in clinical practice, 18(1), 104-110. 
Carlier, I. V. & van Eeden, W. A. (2017). Routine Outcome Monitoring in Mental Health Care 
and Particularly in Addiction Treatment: Evidence-Based Clinical and Research 
Recommendations. Journal of Addiction Research and Therapy, 8(4), 1-7. 
Carver, C. S. & White, T. L. (1994). Behavioral inhibition, behavioral activation, and affective 
responses to impending reward and punishment: The BIS/BAS Scales. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 67, 319–333. 
Clark, D. M., Layard, R., Smithies, R., Richards, D. A., Suckling, R., & Wright, B. (2009). 
Improving access to psychological therapy: Initial evaluation of two UK demonstration sites. 
Behaviour research and therapy, 47(11), 910-920. 
Clement, P. W. (1994). Quantitative evaluation of 26 years of private practice. Professional 
Psychology: Research and Practice, 25(2), 173-176. 
Clift, S., Manship, S., & Stephens, L. (2017). Further evidence that singing fosters mental health 
and wellbeing: the West Kent and Medway project. Mental Health and Social Inclusion, 21(1), 
53-62. 
Cloninger, C., Svrakic, D. M., & Przybeck, T. R. (1993). A psychobiological model of 
temperament and character. Archives of General Psychiatry, 50, 975–990. 
 156 
Chen, P. Y. & Krauss, A. D. (2004). Cronbach's alpha. In M. S. Lewis-Beck, A. Bryman, & T. F. 
Liao (Eds) The SAGE Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods (pp. 586-587). 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc. 
Cherek, D. R. (1981). Effects of smoking different doses of nicotine on human aggressive 
behavior. Psychopharmacology, 75, 339–345. 
Cicero (1923). Laelius on Friendship. In Lealius De Amicitia. (pp. 109-211). Boston: Harvard 
University Press and Loeb Classical Library. Available: 
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cicero/Laelius_de_Amicitia/text*.html 
Cochran, W. G. (1954). The combination of estimates from different experiments. Biometrics, 10, 
101-129. 
Cohen J. (1960). A coefficient of agreement for nominal scales. Educational and Psychological 
Measurement, 20, 37–46. 
Cohen, J. (1988). The effect size index: D. In J. Cohen (Ed.), Statistical power analysis for the 
behavioral sciences (Vol. 2, pp. 284–288). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Cohen, P., Cohen, J., Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1999). The problem of units and the 
circumstance for POMP. Multivariate behavioral research, 34(3), 315-346. 
Cohen, S., Kamarck, T., & Mermelstein, R. (1983). A global measure of perceived stress. Journal 
of Health and Social Behavior, 24, 385–396. 
Cohen, S., & Williamson, G. (1988). Perceived stress in a probability sample of the United States. 
In S. Spacapam & S. Oskamp (Eds.), The social psychology of health (pp. 31–67). Newbury 
Park, CA: Sage. 
 157 
Comte, A. (1974). Aim of the course: General considerations on the nature and importance of 
positive philosophy. In S. Andreski (Ed.) The essential Comte (pp. 19–41). London: Croom 
Helm.  
Cooper, M. (2008). Essential Research Findings in Counselling and Psychotherapy. The Facts are 
Friendly. London: Sage Publishing. 
Cooper, M. (2013). Developmental and personality theory. In M. Cooper, M. O’Hara, P.F. Schmid, 
& A.C. Bohart (Eds.), The handbook of person-centred psychotherapy and counselling (2nd 
edn.). (pp. 118-135). London: Palgrave Macmillan.  
CORE Users. (n.d.). Retrieved October 8, 2018, from 
http://www.coreims.co.uk/About_CORE_Users.html 
Corrie, S. (2010). What is evidence. Handbook of counselling psychology, 44-61. 
Costa, P. T., Jr., & McCrae, R. R. (1985). The NEO Personality Inventory manual. Odessa, Florida: 
Psychological Assessment Resources. 
Cramer, D., & Howitt, D. L. (2004). The Sage dictionary of statistics: a practical resource for 
students in the social sciences. London: Sage. 
Crawford, J. R., & Henry, J. D. (2004). The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS): 
Construct validity, measurement properties and normative data in a large non‐clinical sample. 
British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 43(3), 245-265. 
Cronbach, L. J. (1951). Coefficient alpha and the internal structure of tests. Psychometrika, 16(3), 
297-334. 
Cruickshank, J. (2012). Positioning positivism, critical realism and social constructionism in the 
health sciences: A philosophical orientation. Nursing Inquiry, 19(1), 71-82. 
 158 
Crutzen, R. & Kuntsche, E. (2013). Validation of the four-dimensional structure of drinking 
motives among adults. European Addiction Research, 19, 222–226. 
Crutzen, R., & Peters, G. J. Y. (2017). Scale quality: alpha is an inadequate estimate and factor-
analytic evidence is needed first of all. Health Psychology Review, 11(3), 242-247. 
Cumming, G., Fidler, F., Kalinowski, P., & Lai, J. (2012). The statistical recommendations of the 
American Psychological Association Publication Manual: Effect sizes, confidence intervals, 
and meta-analysis. Australian Journal of Psychology, 64, 138-146. 
de Jong, K., van Sluis, P., Nugter, M. A., Heiser, W. J., & Spinhoven, P. (2012). Understanding 
the differential impact of outcome monitoring: Therapist variables that moderate feedback 
effects in a randomized clinical trial. Psychotherapy Research, 22, 464–474.  
Dean, K., Walker, Z., & Jenkinson, C. (2018). Data quality, floor and ceiling effects, and test–
retest reliability of the Mild Cognitive Impairment Questionnaire. Patient Related Outcome 
Measures, 9, 43-47.  
Deci, E. L. (1980). The psychology of self-determination. Lexington, MA: Heath. 
Department of Health (1996) Research and Development. Towards an evidence-based health 
service. London: HMSO. 
Department of Health (1997) The New NHS: Modern, Dependable. London: HMSO. 
DePaulo, B. M., & Kashy, D. A. (1998). Everyday lies in close and casual relationships. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 63–79.  
DeVellis, R. F. (2012). Scale development: Theory and applications (Vol. 26). Thousand Oaks: 
Sage. 
Di Fabio, A. (2014). Authenticity Scale: Un primo contributo alla validazione della versione 
italiana [Authenticity Scale: A first contribution to validation of the Italian version]. 
Counseling: Giornale Italiano di Ricerca e Applicazioni, 7(2), 231-238. 
 159 
Di Fabio, A. & Gori, A. (2016). Developing a new instrument for assessing acceptance of change. 
Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 1-10. 
Diener, E., Emmons, R.A., Larsen, R.J., & Griffin, S. (1985). The Satisfaction with Life Scale. J 
Personality Assessment, 49(1), 71-75.  
Di Malta, G. S., Pauli, G., & Cooper, M. (2018). The Therapy Questionnaire Helpfulness Survey 
(TQHS). Unpublished manuscript.  
Dolan, P., Peasgood, T., & White, M. (2008). Do we really know what makes us happy? A review 
of the economic literature on the factors associated with subjective well-being. Journal of 
economic psychology, 29(1), 94-122. 
Egger, M., Smith, G. D., Schneider, M., & Minder, C. (1997). Bias in meta-analysis detected by a 
simple, graphical test. Bmj 315, 629-634. 
Eggers, F., O’Dwyer, M., Kraus, S., Vallaster, C., & Güldenberg, S. (2013). The impact of brand 
authenticity on brand trust and SME growth: A CEO perspective. Journal of World Business, 
48(3), 340-348. 
Ehlers, A., Maercker, A., & Boos, A. (2000). Posttraumatic stress disorder following political 
imprisonment: The role of mental defeat, alienation, and perceived permanent change. Journal 
of Abnormal Psychology, 109, 45–55.  
Endicott, J., Spitzer, R. L., Fleiss, J. L., & Cohen, J. (1976). The Global Assessment Scale: A 
procedure for measuring overall severity of psychiatric disturbance. Archives of General 
Psychiatry, 33, 766–771.  
Endler, N. A., Parker, J. D. A., Bagby, R. M., & Cox, B. J. (1991). Multidimensionality and state 
and trait anxiety: Factor structure of the Endler Multidimensional Anxiety Scales. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 919–926.  
 160 
Erbes, C., Polusny, M. A., Billig, J., Mylan, M., McGuire, K., Isenhart, C., & Olson, D. (2004). 
Developing and applying a systematic process for evaluation of clinical outcome assessment 
instruments. Psychological Services, 1(1), 31–39.  
Evans, C., Connell, J., Barkham, M., Margison, F., Mellor-Clark, J., McGrath, G., & Audin, K. 
(2002). Towards a standardised brief outcome measure: Psychometric properties and utility of 
the CORE-OM. British Journal of Psychiatry, 180, 51-60. 
Evans, C., Margison, F., & Barkham, M. (1998). The contribution of reliable and clinically 
significant change methods to evidence-based mental health. Evidence-Based Mental Health, 
1, 70-72. 
Evans, C., Mellor-Clark, J., Margison, F., Barkham, M., Audin, K., Connell, J., & McGrath, G. 
(2000). CORE: Clinical Outcomes in Routine Evaluation. Journal of Mental Health 9(3), 247–
55. 
Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group. (1992). Evidence-based medicine. A new approach to 
teaching the practice of medicine. Jama, 268(17), 2420. 
Eysenck, H. J. (1952). The effects of psychotherapy: an evaluation. Journal of Consulting 
Psychology, 16(5), 319-324. 
Fagg, J., Curtis, S., Stansfeld, S. A., Cattell, V., Tupuola, A. M., & Arephin, M. (2008). Area social 
fragmentation, social support for individuals and psychosocial health in young adults: 
Evidence from a national survey in England. Social science & medicine, 66(2), 242-254. 
Fat, L. N., Scholes, S., Boniface, S., Mindell, J., & Stewart-Brown, S. (2017). Evaluating and 
establishing national norms for mental wellbeing using the short Warwick–Edinburgh mental 
well-being scale (SWEMWBS): findings from the health survey for England. Quality of Life 
Research, 26(5), 1129-1144. 
 161 
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Buchner, A., & Lang, A.-G. (2009). Statistical power analyses using 
G*Power 3.1: Tests for correlation and regression analyses. Behavior Research Methods, 41, 
1149-1160. 
Fischer, R., & Milfont, T. L. (2010). Standardization in psychological research. International 
Journal of Psychological Research, 3(1), 88-96. 
Fisher, W. P. (2003). Mathematics, measurement, metaphor and metaphysics II: Accounting for 
Galileo’s “fateful omission”. Theory & Psychology, 13, 791–828. 
Fleeson, W., & Wilt, J. (2010). The relevance of Big Five trait content in behavior to subjective 
authenticity: Do high levels of within- person behavioral variability undermine or enable 
authenticity achievement? Journal of Personality, 78, 1353–1382.  
Freire, E. (2007). The Strathclyde Inventory: Validation of a person-centred outcome measure. 
Paper presented at BACP Research Conference, Birmingham, UK.  
Freire, E. S., Elliott, R., & Rodgers, B. (2012). The Strathclyde Inventory-Revised (SI-R): 
Developing an outcome measure based on Rogers' theory of therapeutic change. Paper 
presented at 10th Conference for the World Association for Person-Centered and Experiential 
Psychotherapy and Counseling, Antwerp, Belgium. 
Funder, D. C. (1991). Global traits: A neo-Allportian approach to personality. Psychological 
Science, 2, 31–39. 
Ghasemi, A., & Zahediasl, S. (2012). Normality tests for statistical analysis: a guide for non-
statisticians. International journal of endocrinology and metabolism, 10(2), 486-489. 
Gill, J. & Womack, A. J. (2013). The multilevel model framework. In M. A. Scott, J. S. Simonoff, 
& B. D. Mar(Eds.) The Sage Handbook of Multilevel Modeling (pp. 3-18). Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage Publications Inc. 
 162 
Gino, F., Norton, M. I., & Ariely, D. (2010). The Counterfeit Self: The Deceptive Costs of Faking 
It. Psychological Science, 21(5), 712–720. 
Goldberg, L. R., Johnson, J. A., Eber, H. W., Hogan, R., Ashton, M. C., Cloninger, C., & Gough, 
H. G. (2006). The international personality item pool and the future of public-domain 
personality measures. Journal of Research in Personality, 40, 84–96. 
Goldman, B. M., & Kernis, M. H. (2002). The role of authenticity in healthy psychological 
functioning and subjective well-being. Annals of the American Psychotherapy Association, 5, 
18-20.  
Goldman, B. M., & Kernis, M. H. (2004). The development of the authenticity inventory, version 
3. Unpublished data. 
Goldner, L. (2016). Therapists’ self-perception, attachment, and relationship: The role of 
selfobject needs. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 33(4), 535-553- 
Gondek, D., Edbrooke-Childs, J., Fink, E., Deighton, J., & Wolpert, M. (2016). Feedback from 
outcome measures and treatment effectiveness, treatment efficiency, and collaborative 
practice: A systematic review. Administration and Policy in Mental Health and Mental Health 
Services Research, 43(3), 325-343. 
Govindji, R., & Linley, P. A. (2007). Strengths use, self-concordance and well-being: Implication 
for strengths coaching and coaching psychologist. International Coaching Psychology Review, 
2, 143-153. 
Gray, J. A. (1970). The psychophysiological basis of introversion-extraversion. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 8(3), 249-266. 
Gray, J. A. (1982). Précis of the neuropsychology of anxiety: An enquiry into the functions of the 
septo-hippocampal system. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 5, 469–484. 
 163 
Grégoire, S., Baron, L., Ménard, J., & Lachance, L. (2014). The Authenticity Scale: Psychometric 
properties of a French translation and exploration of its relationships with personality and well-
being. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science/Revue Canadienne des Sciences du 
Comportement, 46(3), 346-355. 
Grijak, Đ. (2017a). Psychometric evaluation of the Authenticity Scale on the sample of students 
in Serbia. Psihologija, 50(1), 85-99. 
Grijak, Đ. (2017b). Authenticity as a predictor of mental health. Klinička Psihologija, 10, 23-34. 
Gungor, D., Karasawa, M., Boiger, M., Dincer, D., & Mesquita, B. (2014). Fitting in or Sticking 
Together: The Prevalence and Adaptivity of Conformity, Relatedness, and Autonomy in 
Japan and Turkey. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 45(9), 1374–1389. 
Guyon, H., Kop, J-L., Juhel, J., & Falissard, B. (2018). Measurement, ontology, and epistemology: 
Psychology needs pragmatism-realism. Theory & Psychology, 28(2), 149-171. 
Hammersley, M. (2004). Logical positivism. In M. S. Lewis-Beck, A. Bryman, & T. F. Liao (Eds) 
The SAGE Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods (pp. 586-587). Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage Publications Inc.  
Harter, S. 2002. Authenticity. In C. R. Snyder & S. J. Lopez (Eds.), Handbook of positive 
psychology: 382-394. London: Oxford University Press. 
Harter, S., Marold, D. B., Whitesell, N. R., & Cobbs, G. (1996). A model of the effects of perceived 
parent and peer support on adolescent false self behavior. Child Development, 67, 360–374. 
Hatfield, D.R. & Ogles, B. M. (2004). The use of outcome measures by psychologists in clinical 
practice. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 35(5), 485-491.   
 164 
Hatfield, D.R. & Ogles, B. M. (2007). Why some clinicians use outcome measures and others do 
not. Administration and Policy in Mental Health and Mental Health Services Research, 34, 
283-291. 
Health Care and Professions Council (2015). Standards of proficiency: Practitioner psychologists 
(3rd edn). [Online]. Available from: https://www.hcpc-
uk.org/globalassets/resources/standards/standards-of-proficiency---practitioner-
psychologists.pdf. [Accessed: 25 February 2019].  
Heidegger, M. (1996). Being and Time (7th edn) (J. Stambaugh, Trans.). Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press. 
Hessling, R.M., Traxel, N.M., & Schmidt, T.J. (2004). Ceiling effect. In M. S. Lewis-Beck, A. 
Bryman, & T. F. Liao (Eds) The SAGE Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods (p. 
105). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc. 
Higgins, J. P. T. & Green, S. (Eds.) (2011). Cochrane Handbook for Systematic Reviews of 
Interventions Version 5.1.0 [updated March 2011]. The Cochrane Collaboration, 2011. 
Available from www.handbook.cochrane.org. 
Higgins, J. P. T., & Thompson, S. G. (2002). Quantifying heterogeneity in a meta- analysis. 
Statistics in Medicine, 21, 1539-1558. 
Hill, C. E., & Corbett, M. M. (1993). A perspective on the history of process and outcome 
research in counseling psychology. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 40(1), 3. 
Hofstede, G., Hofstede, G. J., & Minkov, M. (2010). Cultures and organizations: Software of the 
mind, intercultural cooperation and its importance for survival (3rd ed.). New York: McGraw-
Hill Professional. 
 165 
Hooper, D., Coughlan, J., & Mullen, M. (2008). Structural Equation Modelling: Guidelines for 
Determining Model Fit. Electronic Journal of Business Research Methods, 6(1), 53-60. 
Horney, K. (1951). Neurosis and human growth: The struggle toward self-realization. London: 
Routledge. 
Howard, K. I., Moras, K., Brill, P. L., Martinovich, Z., & Lutz, W. (1996). Evaluation of 
psychotherapy. American Psychologist, 51, 1059︎-1064. 
Hoyle, R. H. (2004). Confirmatory factor analysis. In M. S. Lewis-Beck, A. Bryman, & T. F. Liao 
(Eds) The SAGE Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods (pp. 170-175). Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc. 
Hu, L. T., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indices in covariance structure analysis: 
Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural Equation Modeling, 6, 1–55. 
Huedo-Medina, T. Sanchez-Meca, J. Marin-Martinez, F. & Botella, J. (2006). Assessing 
heterogeneity in meta-analysis: Q statistic or I2 index? CHIP Documents, 19. URL: 
http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/chip_docs/19 
Husted, J. A., Cook, R. J., Farewell, V. T., & Gladman, D. D. (2000). Methods for assessing 
responsiveness: a critical review and recommendations. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, 53, 
459-468.  
Hutchinson, D. S. (1995). Ethics. In J. Barnes (Ed.). The Cambridge companion to Aristotle (pp. 
195–232). Cambridge, UK: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge.  
IBM Corp. Released 2017. IBM SPSS Statistics for Macintosh, Version 25.0 [Computer software]. 
Armonk, NY: IBM Corp. 
 166 
Ionita, G., & Fitzpatrick, M. (2014). Bringing science to clinical practice: A Canadian survey of 
psychological practice and usage of progress monitoring measures. Canadian 
Psychology/Psychologie canadienne, 55(3), 187. 
Jacobson, N. S., Follette, W. C., & Revenstorf, D. (1984). Psychotherapy outcome research: 
methods for reporting variability and evaluating clinical significance. Behavior Therapy, 15, 
336-352 
James, W. (1907). Pragmatism: A new name for some old ways of thinking. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
John, O. P., & Srivastava, S. (1999). The Big Five trait taxonomy: History, measurement, and 
theoretical perspectives. In L. A. Pervin & O. P. John (Eds.), Handbook of personality: Theory 
and research (2nd ed., pp. 102–138). New York: Guilford. 
Jones, A., & Crandall, R. (1986). Validation of a short indeof self‐actualization. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 12, 63–73. 
Joseph, S., & Linley, P. A. (2006). Positive psychology versus the medical model. American 
Psychologist, 61, 332-333.  
Joseph, S. & Murphy, D. (2013). Person-Centered Approach, positive psychology, and relational 
helping: Building bridges. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 53(1), 26-51.  
Joseph, S. & Wood, A. (2010). Assessment of positive functioning in clinical psychology: 
Theoretical and practical issues. Clinical Psychology Review, 30, 830-838.  
Kernis, M. H. & Goldman, B. M. (2006). A multicomponent conceptualization of authenticity: 
Theory and research. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 38, 283-357.   
Kilbourne, A. M., Beck, K., Spaeth‐Rublee, B., Ramanuj, P., O'Brien, R. W., Tomoyasu, N., & 
Pincus, H. A. (2018). Measuring and improving the quality of mental health care: a global 
perspective. World psychiatry, 17(1), 30-38. 
 167 
Kirillova, K., Lehto, X. Y., & Cai, L. (2017). Existential Authenticity and Anxiety as Outcomes: 
The Tourist in the Experience Economy. International Journal of Tourism Research, 19(1), 13–
26.  
Kline, R. B. (2016). Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling (4th ed.). New York: 
Guildford Press. 
Knaup, C., Koesters, M., Schoefer, D., Becker, T., & Puschner, B. (2009). Effect of feedback of 
treatment outcome in specialist mental healthcare: meta-analysis. The British Journal of 
Psychiatry, 195(1), 15-22. 
Knoll, M., Meyer, B., Kroemer, N. B., & Schröder-Abé, M. (2015). It takes two to be yourself. 
Journal of Individual Differences, 36, 38-53 
Kohut, H. (1971). The analysis of the self. New York, NY: International Universities Press. 
Kovacs, M. (1985). The children’s depression inventory (CDI). Psychopharmacology, 21, 995–
998.   
Kroenke, K., Spitzer, R.L., & Williams, J.B. (2001). The PHQ-9: validity of a brief depression 
severity measure. Journal of General Internal Medicine, 16, 606-613. 
Kroenke, K., Spitzer, R.L., Williams, J.B., & Löwe, B. (2010). The Patient Health Questionnaire 
somatic, anxiety, and depressive symptom scales: a systematic review. General Hospital 
Psychiatry, 32(4), 345-359. 
Kroenke, K., Wu, J., Yu, Z., Bair, M. J., Kean, J., Stump, T., & Monahan, P. O. (2016). The patient 
health questionnaire anxiety and depression scale (PHQ-ADS): Initial validation in three 
clinical trials. Psychosomatic Medicine, 78(6), 716. 
Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 168 
Lambert, M. J. (1983). Introduction to assessment of psychotherapy outcome: Historical 
perspective and current issues. In M.J. Lambert, E.R. Christensen & S.S. DeJulio (Eds.), The 
Assessment of Psychotherapy Outcome. New York: John Wiley. 
Lambert, M. J. (2013). The efficacy and effectiveness of psychotherapy. In M.J. Lambert (Ed.) 
Bergin and Garfield's Handbook of Psychotherapy and Behavior Change (6th edn., pp.169-
218). New York: Wiley. 
Lambert, M. J., Hansen, N. B., Umphress, V. J., Lunnen, K., Okiishi, J., Burlingame, G. M., 
Huefner, J. C., & Reisinger, C. W. (1996). Administration and scoring manual for the Outcome 
Questionnaire (OQ 45.2). Wilmington, DE: American Professional Credentialing Services.  
Lambert, M. J., & Shimokawa, K. (2011). Collecting client feedback. Psychotherapy, 48(1), 72. 
Lambert, M. J. & Vermeersch, D. A. (2002) Effectiveness of psychotherapy. In M. Hersen, W. 
Sledge (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Psychotherapy,Volume 1. (pp. 709-714). Cambridge, MA, US: 
Academic Press. 
Lambert, M. J., Whipple, J. L., & Kleinstäuber, M. (2018). Collecting and delivering progress 
feedback: A meta-analysis of routine outcome monitoring. Psychotherapy, 55(4), 520. 
Landis, J. R., & Koch, G. G. (1977). The measurement of observer agreement for categorical data. 
33, 159–174. 
Landy, G., Aref-Adib, G., Kim, H-K., Brooke-Williams, F., Parkes, M., Chapman, J., & McKenna, 
C. (2013). The Tyranny of Measurement; Attitudes towards outcome monitoring for 
psychological therapies. Available: https://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/pdf/Aref-
Adib%20Golnar%20%20Sept13%20CALC%20CS.pdf. (05.10.2018). 
Lavrakas, P. J. (2008). Random error. In P. J. Lavrakas (Ed.) Encyclopedia of survey research 
methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc. 
 169 
Leichsenring, F., & Rabung, S. (2008). Effectiveness of long-term psychodynamic psychotherapy: 
A meta-analysis. Jama, 300(13), 1551-1565. 
Lenton, A. P., Bruder, M., Slabu, L., & Sedikides, C. (2013). How Does “Being Real” Feel? The 
Experience of State Authenticity. Journal of Personality, 81(3), 276–289. 
Lenton, A. P., Slabu, L., Sedikides, S., & Power, K. (2013). I feel good, therefore I am real: Testing 
the causal influence of mood on state authenticity. Cognition & Emotion, 27, 1202-1224. 
Leon, S. C., Martinovich, Z., Lutz, W., & Lyons, J. S. (2005). The effect of therapist experience 
on psychotherapy outcomes. Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy: An International Journal 
of Theory & Practice, 12(6), 417-426. 
Levitt, H.M., Stanley, C.M., Frankel, Z., & Raina, K. (2005). An evaluation of outcome measures 
used in humanistic psychotherapy: Using thermometers to weigh oranges. The Humanistic 
Psychologist, 33(2), 113-130. 
Lietaer, G. (1993). Authenticity, congruence and transparency. In D. Brazier (Ed.), Beyond Carl 
Rogers (pp. 17-46). London: Constable and Company. 
Lipsey, M. W. (1990). Design sensitivity: Statistical power for experimental research (Vol. 19). 
London: Sage. 
Long, D. M. (2013). Pragmatism, realism, and psychology: Understanding theory selection 
criteria. Journal of Contextual Behavioral Science, 2, 61-67. 
Lopez, F. G., Ramos, K., Nisenbaum, M., Thind, N., & Ortiz-Rodriguez, T. (2015). Predicting the 
presence and search for life meaning: Test of an attachment theory-driven model. Journal of 
Happiness Studies, 16, 103-116. 
Lopez, F. G., & Rice, K. G. (2006). Preliminary development and validation of a measure of 
relationship authenticity. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 53(3), 362–371.  
 170 
Luborsky, L. (2001). The meaning of empirically supported treatment research for 
psychoanalytic and other long-term therapies. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 11(4), 583–604.  
Lovibond, P. F., & Lovibond, S. H. (1995). The structure of negative emotional states: Comparison 
of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS) with the Beck Depression and Anxiety 
Inventories. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33(3), 335-343. 
Lowry, R. (2019) The confidence interval of rho. Retrieved from http://vassarstats.net/rho.html. 
MacCallum, R.C., Browne, M.W., & Sugawara, H., M. (1996). Power Analysis and 
Determination of Sample Size for Covariance Structure Modeling. Psychological Methods, 
1(2), 130-49. 
Maltby, J., Wood, A. M., Day, L., & Pinto, D. (2012). The position of authenticity within extant 
models of personality. Personality and Individual Differences, 52(3), 269-273. 
Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, 
and motivation. Psychological review, 98(2), 224-253. 
Markus, K. A. & Lin, C. (2010). Construct validity. In N. J. Salkind (Ed.), Encyclopedia of 
Research Design (pp. 230-233). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc. 
Markus, H., & Nurius, P. (1986). Possible selves. American Psychologist, 41, 954–969.  
Marsh, H. W., & Hau, K. T. (1999). Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Strategies for Small Sample 
Sizes. Statistical Strategies for Small Sample Research, 1, 251-284. 
Maslow, A. H. (1968). Toward a psychology of being (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Van Nostrand 
Reinhold.  
Maul, A., Wilson, M., & Irribarra, D. T. (2013). On the conceptual foundations of psychological 
measurement. Journal of Physics: Conference Series, 459, 1-6. 
May, R. (1981). Freedom and destiny. New York: Basic Books. 
 171 
McCrae, R. R., & John, O. P. (1992). An introduction to the five-factor model and its applications. 
Journal of Personality, 60, 175-215. 
McCullough, M. E., Emmons, R. A., & Tsang, J. A. (2002). The grateful disposition: A 
conceptual and empirical topography. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 
112–127. 
McNair, D. M., Lorr, M., & Droppleman, L. F. (1971). Manual for the profile of mood states. San 
Diego, CA: Educational and Industrial Testing Services. 
Mendeley Ltd (2018). Mendeley Desktop Version 1.19.2 [Computer software]. Amsterdam, 
Netherlands: Elsevier. 
Michell, J. (2003). The quantitative imperative: Positivism, naïve realism and the place of 
qualitative methods in psychology. Theory & Psychology, 13(1), 5-31. 
Moher, D., Liberati, A., Tetzlaff, J., Altman, D. G., & Prisma Group. (2009). Preferred reporting 
items for systematic reviews and meta-analyses: the PRISMA statement. PLoS medicine, 6(7), 
e1000097. 
NatCen Social Research, University College London. Department of Epidemiology and Public 
Health. (2018). Health Survey for England, 2016. [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 8334, 
http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-8334-1 
Nezlek, J. B. (2007). A multilevel framework for understanding relationships among traits, 
states, situations and behaviours. European Journal of Personality, 21, 789–810.  
Fat, L. N., Scholes, S., Boniface, S., Mindell, J., & Stewart-Brown, S. (2017). Evaluating and 
establishing national norms for mental wellbeing using the short Warwick–Edinburgh mental 
 172 
well-being scale (SWEMWBS): findings from the health survey for England. Quality of Life 
Research, 26(5), 1129-1144. 
NHS Digitial (2016). Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT): Executive Summary 
May 2016. Retrieved from: 
https://files.digital.nhs.uk/publicationimport/pub23xxx/pub23389/iapt-month-nov-2016%20-
exec-sum.pdf (27th March, 2018). 
NHS Digital (2019, February 13). Improving access to psychological therapies data set. 
Retrieved from: https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/data-collections-and-data-
sets/data-sets/improving-access-to-psychological-therapies-data-set 
Nunally, J. C. & Bernstein, I. H. (1994). Psychometric theory (3rd ed.). New York: McGraw-
Hill. 
Ogles, B. M., Lambert, M. J., & Fields, S. A. (2002). Essentials of outcome assessment. John 
Wiley & Sons Inc. 
O'Keefe, D. J. (2007) Brief Report: Post Hoc Power, Observed Power, A Priori Power, 
Retrospective Power, Prospective Power, Achieved Power: Sorting Out Appropriate Uses of 
Statistical Power Analyses. Communication Methods and Measures, 1(4), 291-299  
O'Reilly, A., Peiper, N., O'Keeffe, L., Illback, R., & Clayton, R. (2016). Performance of the 
CORE‐10 and YP‐CORE measures in a sample of youth engaging with a community mental 
health service. International Journal of Methods in Psychiatric Research, 25(4), 324-332. 
Patterson, T. G., & Joseph, S. (2006). Development of a measure of unconditional positive self-
regard. Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice, 79, 557-570. 
Patterson, T. G., & Joseph, S. (2007). Outcome measurement in person-centred practice. In R. 
Worsley & S. Joseph (Eds.), Person-centred practice: Case studies in positive psychology (pp. 
200-217). Ross-on-Wye, England: PCCS Books.  
 173 
Paulhus, D. L. (1984). Two-component models of socially desirable responding. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 46, 598–609.  
Payne, G. & Payne, J. (2004). Positivism and realism. In Key Concepts in Social Research (pp. 
171-174). London: Sage Publications.  
Perls, F. (1969). Gestalt therapy verbatim. Boulder, CO: Real People Press. 
Peterson, C. & Seligman, M. E .P (2004). Integrity [Authenticity, Honesty]. In Character Strengths 
and Virtues: A Handbook and Classification (pp. 227-247). Oxford, England: Oxford 
University Press. 
Phelps, R., Eisman, E. J., & Kohout, J. (1998). Psychological practice and managed care: Results 
of the CAPP practitioner survey. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 29, 31–36. 
Piaget, J. (1969). Judgement and reasoning in the child. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Pillow, D. R., Hale Jr, W. J., Crabtree, M. A., & Hinojosa, T. L. (2017). Exploring the relations 
between self-monitoring, authenticity, and well-being. Personality and Individual Differences, 
116, 393-398. 
Pinheiro J, Bates D, DebRoy S, Sarkar D, R Core Team (2018). nlme: Linear and Nonlinear Mixed 
Effects Models [Computer software]. R package version 3.1-137. URL: https://CRAN.R-
project.org/package=nlme>. 
Pinto, D. G., Maltby, J., & Wood, A. M. (2011). Exploring the tripartite model of authenticity 
within Gray’s approach and inhibition systems and Cloninger’s bio-social model of 
personality. Personality and Individual Differences, 51(2), 194-197. 
Pinto, D. G., Maltby, J., Wood, A. M., & Day, L. (2012). A behavioral test of Horney’s linkage 
between authenticity and aggression: People living authentically are less-likely to respond 
aggressively in unfair situations. Personality and Individual Differences, 52(1), 41–44. 
 174 
Pitchforth, J., Fahy, K., Ford, T., Wolpert, M., Viner, R. M., & Hargreaves, D. S. (2018). Mental 
health and well-being trends among children and young people in the UK, 1995–2014: analysis 
of repeated cross-sectional national health surveys. Psychological Medicine, 1-11. 
Platten, M. J., Newman, E., & Quayle, E. (2013). Self-esteem and its relationship to mental health 
and quality of life in adults with cystic fibrosis. Journal of Clinical Psychology in Medical 
Settings, 20(3), 392-399. 
Proctor, C., Tweed, R., & Morris, D. (2016). The Rogerian Fully Functioning Person: A Positive 
Psychology Perspective. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 56(5), 503–529. 
R Core Team (2018). R: A language and environment for statistical computing Version 3.5.2 
[Computer software]. R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. URL 
http://www.R-project.org/. 
Radloff, L. S. (1977). The CES-D scale: a self-report depression scale for research in the general 
population. Applied Psychological Measurement, 1(3), 385-401. 
Reis, G. G., Braga, B. M., & Trullen, J. (2017). Workplace authenticity as an attribute of employer 
attractiveness. Personnel Review, 46(8), 1962–1976. 
Reis, G. G., Trullen, J., & Story, J. (2016). Perceived organizational culture and engagement: the 
mediating role of authenticity. Journal of Managerial Psychology, 31(6), 1091-1105.  
Reynolds, C. R., & Richmond, B. O. (1997). What I think and feel: A revised measure of children’s 
manifest anxiety. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 25, 15–20. 
Riley, R. D., Higgins, J. P., & Deeks, J. J. (2011). Interpretation of random effects meta-analyses. 
Bmj, 342, 964-967. 
 175 
Rise, M. B., Eriksen, L., Grimstad, H., & Steinsbekk, A. (2016). The long-term effect on mental 
health symptoms and patient activation of using patient feedback scales in mental health out-
patient treatment. A randomised controlled trial. Patient Education and Counseling, 99(1),164-
168. 
Robinson, O. C., Lopez, F. G., Ramos, K., & Nartova-Bochaver, S. (2013). Authenticity, Social 
Context, and Well-Being in the United States, England, and Russia: A Three Country 
Comparative Analysis. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 44(5), 719–737. 
Rodriguez, M. C., & Maeda, Y. (2006). Meta-analysis of coefficient alpha. Psychological 
Methods, 11(3), 306. 
Rogers, C. R. (1951). Client-centered psychotherapy. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.  
Rogers, C.R. (1957). The necessary and sufficient conditions of therapeutic personality change. 
Journal of Consulting Psychology, 21, 95-103. 
Rogers, C.R. (1959). A theory of therapy, personality and interpersonal relationships as developed 
in the client-centered framework. In S. Koch (Ed.), Psychology: A study of science (pp. 184-
256). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Rogers, C.R. (1961a). On Becoming a Person: A Therapist’s View of Psychotherapy. Boston, MA: 
Houghton Mifflin.  
Rogers, C.R. (1961b). The process-equation of psychotherapy. American Journal of 
Psychotherapy, 15, 27-45. 
Rogers, C. R. (1963). Actualizing tendency in relation to "Motives" and to consciousness. In M. 
R. Jones (Ed.), Nebraska symposium on motivation (pp. 1-24). Oxford, England: U. Nebraska 
Press. 
Rogers, C. R. (1966). Client-centered therapy. In S. Arieti (ed.), American Handbook of 
Psychiatry, Vol.3. (pp.183-200). New York: Basic Books. 
 176 
Rogers, C.R. (1980). A Way of Being. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. 
Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self-image. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
Roszkowski, M. J., & Soven, M. (2010). Shifting gears: Consequences of including two negatively 
worded items in the middle of a positively worded questionnaire. Assessment & Evaluation in 
Higher Education, 35(1), 113-130. 
Ryff, C. D. (1989). Happiness is everything, or is it – Explorations on the meaning of psychological 
well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 1069–1081. 
Ryff, C.D. & Keyes, C.L.M. (1995). The structure of psychological well-being revisited. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 719-727.  
Ryff, C. D., & Singer, B. (2008). Know thyself and become what you are: A eudaimonic approach 
to psychological well-being. Journal of Happiness Studies, 9, 13-39.  
Salovey, P., & Mayer, J. D.. (1990). Emotional intelligence. Imagination, Cognition and 
Personality, 9, 185–211. 
Sariçam, H. (2015). Life satisfaction: Testing a structural equation model based on authenticity 
and subjective happiness. Polish Psychological Bulletin, 46(2), 278-284. 
Sartre, J-P. (1944). Anti-Semite and Jew (G.J. Becker, Trans.). New York: Schocken Books. 
Schmid, P. (2001). Authenticity: The person as his or her own author. In G. Wyatt (Ed.), Rogers’ 
Therapeutic Conditions: Evolution, Theory and Practice Volume 1: Congruence. (pp. 213-
228). Ross-on-Wye: PCCS Books. 
Schmid, P.F. (2005). Authenticity and alienation: Towards an understanding of the person beyond 
the categories of order and disorder. In S. Joseph & R. Worsley (Eds.), Person-centred 
psychopathology: A positive psychology of mental health (pp. 74-89). Ross-on-Wye: PCCS 
Books. 
 177 
Schneider, K. (2011). Toward a humanistic positive psychology: Why can’t we just get along? Self 
& Society, 38, 18-25. 
Schwarz, G. (1978). Estimating the dimension of a model. The Annals of Statistics, 6(2), 461-464.  
Sedikides, C., & Skowronski, J. J. (1997). The symbolic self in evolutionary context. Personality 
and Social Psychology Review, 1, 80-102. 
Sedikides, C., Slabu, L., Lenton, A.P., & Thomaes, S. (2017). State Authenticity. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 26(6), 521-525. 
Seligman, M.E.P. (1999). The president's address. American Psychologist, 54, 559–562.  
Seligman, M.E.P., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2000). Positive psychology: An introduction. 
American Psychologist, 55, 5–14. 
Seligman, M. E., Steen, T. A., Park, N., & Peterson, C. (2005). Positive psychology progress: 
empirical validation of interventions. American psychologist, 60(5), 410. 
Seto, E., Hicks, J. A., Vess, M., & Geraci, L. (2016). The association between vivid thoughts of 
death and authenticity. Motivation and Emotion, 40(4), 520–540. 
Shamsi, A., Ghamarani, A., Samadi, M., & Ahmadzadeh M. (2012). The Study Of The Validity 
And Reliability Of The Authentic Personality Scale. Journal Of Psychological Models And 
Methods, 2(8), 87–99. 
Shapiro, S. S. & Wilk, M. B. (1965). An analysis of variance test for normality (complete samples). 
Biometrika, 52(3–4), 591–611.  
Sheldon, K. M. (2004). Integrity (honesty/authenticity). In C. Peterson & M. E. P. Seligman (Eds.), 
Character strengths and virtues (pp. 249– 272). New York: Oxford University Press.  
 178 
Sheldon, K. M., Ryan, R. M., Rawsthorne, L. A. I. R. D., & Ilardi, B. (1997). Trait self and true 
self: Cross-role variation in the Big Five traits and its relations with authenticity and subjective 
well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73(6), 1380-1393. 
Sherman, G. L. (2009). Martin Heidegger's Concept of Authenticity: A Philosophical Contribution 
to Student Affairs Theory. Journal of College and Character, 10(7), 1-8. 
Sijtsma, K. (2012). Future of psychometrics: Ask what psychometrics can do for psychology. 
Psychometrika, 77(1), 4-20. 
Slabu, L., Lenton, A. P., Sedikides, C., & Bruder, M. (2014). Trait and state authenticity across 
cultures. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 45(9), 1347-1373. 
Smith, M. L., Glass, G. V., & Miller, T. I. (1980) Benefits of psychotherapy. Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
Sousa, V. D., & Rojjanasrirat, W. (2011). Translation, adaptation and validation of instruments or 
scales for use in cross-cultural research: A clear and user-friendly guideline. Journal of 
Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 17(2), 268–274. 
Spitzer, R.L., Kroenke, K., Williams, J.B., & Löwe, B. (2006). A brief measure for assessing 
generalized anxiety disorder: The GAD-7. Archives of Internal Medicine, 166, 1092-1097. 
Steger, M. F., Frazier, P., Oishi, S., & Kaler, M. (2006). The meaning in life questionnaire: 
Assessing the presence of and search for meaning in life. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 
53, 80–93. 
Steinmetz, G. (1998). Critical realism and historical sociology. A review article. Comparative 
studies in society and history, 40(01), 170-186.  
Stephen, S. & Elliott, R. (2017). The Strathclyde Inventory: Measuring congruence as an outcome 
for therapy. Paper presented at BACP Research Conference, Chester, UK. 
 179 
Sterne, J. A., & Harbord, R. M. (2004). Funnel plots in meta-analysis. The Stata Journal, 4(2), 
127-141. 
Stevens, F. L. (2017). Authenticity: a mediator in the relationship between attachment style and 
affective functioning. Counselling Psychology Quarterly, 30(4), 392–414. 
Stratford, P. W. & Riddle, D. L. (2005). Assessing sensitivity to change: choosing the appropriate 
change coefficient. Health and Quality of Life Outcomes, 3, 23-30. 
Streiner, D. L. (2003). Being inconsistent about consistency: When coefficient alpha does and 
doesn't matter. Journal of Personality Assessment, 80(3), 217-222. 
Tarescavage, A. M., & Ben‐Porath, Y. S. (2014). Psychotherapeutic outcomes measures: a critical 
review for practitioners. Journal of clinical psychology, 70(9), 808-830. 
Tasca, G. A., & Gallop, R. (2009). Multilevel modeling of longitudinal data for psychotherapy 
researchers: I. The basics. Psychotherapy Research, 19(4-5), 429-437. 
Tavakol, M., & Dennick, R. (2011). Making sense of Cronbach's alpha. International journal of 
medical education, 2, 53. 
Tennant, R., Hillier, L., Fishwick, R., Platt, S., Joseph, S., Weich, S., Parkinson, J., Secker, J., & 
Stewart-Brown, S. (2007). The Warwick–Edinburgh Mental Well Being Scale (WEMWBS): 
Development and UK validation. Health and Quality of Life Outcomes, 5, 63. 
Thomaes, S., Sedikides, C., van den Bos, N., Hutteman, R., & Reijntjes, A. (2017). Happy To Be 
“Me?” Authenticity, Psychological Need Satisfaction, and Subjective Well-Being in 
Adolescence. Child Development, 88(4), 1045–1056. 
Triandis, H. C. (1995). Individualism and collectivism. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
 180 
Vacha-Haase, T. (1998). Reliability generalization: Exploring variance in measurement error 
affecting score reliability across studies. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 58(1), 
6-20. 
Vainio, M. M. & Daukantaite, D. (2016). Grit and Different Aspects of Well-Being: Direct and 
Indirect Relationships via Sense of Coherence and Authenticity. Journal of Happiness 
Studies, 17, 2119-2147. 
Van Dam, N. T., Hobkirk, A. L., Danoff-Burg, S., & Earleywine, M. (2012). Mind Your Words: 
Positive and Negative Items Create Method Effects on the Five Facet Mindfulness 
Questionnaire. Assessment, 19(2), 198–204. 
van den Bosch, R., & Taris, T. W. (2014). Authenticity at work: Development and validation of 
an individual authenticity measure at work. Journal of Happiness Studies, 15(1), 1-18. 
Vess, M., Leal, S. A., Hoeldtke, R. T., Schlegel, R. J., & Hicks, J. A. (2016). True self-alienation 
positively predicts reports of mindwandering. Consciousness and Cognition, 45, 89–99. 
Viechtbauer, W. (2010). Conducting meta-analyses in R with the metafor package. Journal of 
Statistical Software, 36(3), 1-48. URL: http://www.jstatsoft.org/v36/i03/. 
Viera, A. J. & Garrett, J. M. (2005). Understanding interobserver agreement: The kappa statistic. 
Family Medicine, 37(5), 360-363. 
Vogt, W. P. (2005). Discriminant validity. In W. P. Vogt (Ed.) Dictionary of Statistic & 
Methodology (3rd edn). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.   
von Glaserfield, E. (1993). Learning and adaptation in the theory of constructivism. 
Communication and Cognition, 26, 393–402.  
 181 
Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind in society: The development of higher psychological processes. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Wampold, B. E. (2015). Routine outcome monitoring: Coming of age—With the usual 
developmental challenges. Psychotherapy, 52(4), 458-462.  
Wampold, B. E., & Brown, G. S. J. (2005). Estimating variability in outcomes attributable to 
therapists: a naturalistic study of outcomes in managed care. Journal of Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology, 73(5), 914-923. 
Wampold, B. E. & Imel, Z. E. (2015) The great psychotherapy debate. The evidence for what make 
psychotherapy work (2nd edn). New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.  
Wang, Y. N. (2015). Authenticity and relationship satisfaction: Two distinct ways of directing 
power to self-esteem. PLoS One, 10(12), e0146050. 
Warwick Medical School (2018). WEMWBS in other languages. Retrieved March 9, 2019, from 
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/sci/med/research/platform/wemwbs/researchers/languages 
Waterman, A. S. (2013). The humanistic psychology–positive psychology divide: Contrasts in 
philosophical foundations. American Psychologist, 68(3), 124. 
Watson, D., Clark, L.A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures of 
positive and negative affect: the PANAS scales. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 
6(54),1063-70.  
Weir, K.F. & Jose, P. E. (2010). The perception of false self scale for adolescents: Reliability, 
validity, and longitudinal relationships with depressive and anxious symptoms. British Journal 
of Developmental Psychology, 28, 393-411. 
 182 
White, N. (2011). An examination of dispositional authenticity (Doctoral dissertation, Arizona 
State University). 
Winnicott, D. (1965). The Maturational Process and the Facilitating Environment, London: 
Hogarth Press. 
Wolpert, M., Jacob, J., Napoleone, E., Whale, A., Calderon, A., & Edbrooke-Childs, J. (2016). 
Child- and Parent-reported Outcomes and Experience from Child and Young People’s Mental 
Health Services 2011–2015. London: CAMHS Press. 
Wood, A. M., Linley, P. A., Maltby, J., Baliousis, M., & Joseph, S. (2008). The authentic 
personality: A theoretical and empirical conceptualization and the development of the 
authenticity scale. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 55(3), 385–399.  
Wyatt, G. (2001). Rogers’ Therapeutic Conditions: Evolution, Theory and Practice Volume 1: 
Congruence. Ross-on-Wye: PCCS Books. 
Yalom, I. D. (1980). Existential psychotherapy. New York: Basic Books. 
Young, R & Collin, A. (2004). Introduction: constructivism and social constructionism in the 
career field. Journal of Vocational Behaviour 64(3), 373-388. 
Zhang, C., Hirschi, A., Dik, B. J., Wei, J., & You, X. (2018). Reciprocal relation between 
authenticity and calling among Chinese university students: A latent change score approach. 
Journal of Vocational Behavior, 107, 222-232. 
Zimmerman, M., & McGlinchey, J. B. (2008). Why don’t psychiatrists use scales to measure 
outcome when treating depressed patients? Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 69, 1916-1919.  
Zung, W. W. (1971). A rating instrument for anxiety disorders. Psychosomatics: Journal of 





















Appendix A: The Authenticity Scale 
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THE AUTHENTICITY SCALE 
 
 
Directions: Below are a series of statements. Respond to each statement by writing the number from the 
scale below that you feel most accurately represents your response to the statement.  There are no right or 
wrong responses, so please answer as honestly as you can.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Does not 
describe 
me at all 




























1. “I think it is better to be yourself, than to be popular.”   
2. “I don’t know how I really feel inside.”  
3. “I am strongly influenced by the opinions of others.”  
4. “I usually do what other people tell me to do.”  
5. “I always feel I need to do what others expect me to do.”  
6. “Other people influence me greatly.”  
7. “I feel as if I don’t know myself very well.”  
8. “I always stand by what I believe in.”  
9. “I am true to myself in most situations.”  
10. “I feel out of touch with the ‘real me.’”  
11. “I live in accordance with my values and beliefs.”  
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Appendix C: CORE-10 
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Y Y Y YMMDD
Date form given 









F First Therapy Session
P Pre-therapy (unspecified)
D During Therapy
L Last Therapy Session
X Follow up 1
Y Follow up 2
IMPORTANT – PLEASE READ THIS FIRST
This form has 10 statements about how you have been OVER THE LAST WEEK. 
Please read each statement and think how often you felt that way last week.
Then tick the box which is closest to this.
Please use a dark pen (not pencil) and tick clearly within the boxes.

































1  I have felt tense, anxious or nervous 0 1 2 3 4
3  I have felt able to cope when things go wrong
5  I have felt panic or terror 0 1 2 3 4
7  I have had difficulty getting to sleep or staying asleep 0 1 2 3 4
9  I have felt unhappy 0 1 2 3 4
2 I have felt I have someone to turn to for support when needed 01234
4  Talking to people has felt too much for me 0 1 2 3 4
6  I made plans to end my life 0 1 2 3 4
8  I have felt despairing or hopeless 0 1 2 3 4
10 Unwanted images or memories have been distressing me 0 1 2 3 4
01234
Total (Clinical Score*)
* Procedure: Add together the item scores, then divide by the number of questions completed to get the mean score, 
then multiply by 10 to get the Clinical Score.
Quick method for the CORE-10 (if all items completed): Add together the item scores to get the Clinical Score.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME IN COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE
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University of Roehampton | London | SW15 5PJ 
jan.harrison@roehampton.ac.uk| www.roehampton.ac.uk 
Tel: +44 (0) 20 8392 5785 








My name is Daniel Morken, I’m a trainee counselling psychologist at the University of Roehampton. 
 
My doctoral thesis, supervised by Prof. Mick Cooper, is on validating a person-centered measure of authenticity, 
based on Rogers’ writings on congruence, as an outcome measure for counselling and psychotherapy. We’re writing 
this email to ask if you might be interested in participating in our research.  
 
Participating would involve asking your clients who are 18 years and above to complete ‘the Authenticity Scale’ along 
with the CORE-10, at the beginning of therapy, at the end of their therapy and on every 6th session. If you are already 
using an outcome measure, we could likely use that as the second measure, reducing how many forms participating 
clients would need to complete. On the final session, participants would also be asked to complete the Therapy 
Questionnaire Helpfulness Survey, a short questionnaire asking clients about how they found the questionnaires they 
completed. 
Our study is in collaboration with Prof. Stephen Joseph, one of the original developers of the Authenticity Scale. The 
scale is a 12-item measure, based closely on the person-centred definition of congruence. Our rationale behind this 
study is that person-centred theory holds increased authenticity to be the ultimate aim of psychotherapy. Thus, it 
would make sense to also measure the effectiveness of therapy with a measure of authenticity. In addition, the 
current emphasis on evidence-based practice in much of the therapy world, brings an increasing pressure to use 
outcome measures to document effectiveness. However, as the most widely used outcome measures tend to be 
symptom and distress focused, measuring the extent to which the client is suffering. With this research we’re aiming 
to help answer the call for outcome measures that instead focus on wellbeing, measuring the effectiveness of therapy 
through the increase in authenticity. 
If you would be interested in participating in our study, or would like more info, please do not hesitate to contact me 
on:  
morkend@roehampton.ac.uk 


























COUNSELLING SERVICE INFORMATION SHEET 
The Authenticity Scale as an outcome measure for therapy 
 
Thank you for reading this information sheet. This document will explain why we are doing this research, and 
set out what will be involved for counselling services who choose to take part. We appreciate you taking the 
time to read it, and hope you will be interested in participating in this research. 
 
The Research Project 
This research aims to explore whether the ‘Authenticity Scale’, an outcome measure based on person-
centred theory and positive psychology, would be a useful measure for evaluating the effectiveness of 
counselling and psychotherapy. Considering the current emphasis on evidence-based practice in much of 
the therapy world, there is increasing pressure to use outcome measures to document effectiveness. 
However, the most widely used outcome measures tend to be symptom and distress focused, that is, they 
measure the extent to which the client is suffering. This research is aiming to help answer the call for outcome 
measures that instead focus on wellbeing, measuring the effectiveness of therapy through the increase in 
authenticity, as is key to several psychological therapies, including humanistic and psychodynamic.  
 
Research procedure 
This research is looking to have adults (18+) who are receiving therapy complete two short questionnaires, 
the Authenticity Scale and the CORE-10 (though if your service already use a different outcome measures 
to the CORE-10, we can use that as the second measure). These two questionnaires have 22 questions 
altogether, and would need to be completed on the first session, on the final session and on every 6th session. 
On the 12th session (or the final session, if you are doing less than 12) there would be an additional short 
questionnaire (10 questions) asking clients how helpful they found the two questionnaires they have 
completed. In addition, clients will also be asked to complete a basic demographics sheet.  
 
Questionnaire packs will be given to the client’s counsellor who will give them to the client to complete. 
Completed questionnaires can be discussed in-session. 
 
Counselling services’ involvement 
Counselling services interested in supporting this research will be asked to give their therapists interested in 
participating the Therapist Information Sheet and Consent Form. Therapists can then give their adult clients 
about to start counselling the Client Information Sheet and the Client Consent Form, either at point of contact 
with the service, or during an initial assessment session. Clients can take the Client Information Sheet away 
with them to read, and can sign the consent form before their first session if they wish to participate. 
 
Consent 
Consent to participate in this research will first be obtained from the counselling service, then from the 
individual therapists and finally from participating clients. 
 
Potential disadvantages/ risks to participants 
A potential disadvantage of participating in this research is that clients will have to spend 5 minutes 
completing questionnaires and might find that boring. There are no expected risks for clients who take part 
in the study. For the therapist, participating would involve giving their clients the questionnaire pack on the 










Potential benefits to participating 
There is no direct benefit to taking part in this study, although the questionnaires can provide useful 
information concerning how the client is doing. The information gathered from this project will contribute to 
the research regarding the use of outcome measures that are not distress or symptom focused, hopefully 
providing therapists with an alternative approach to evaluating the effectiveness of therapy.  
 
Confidentiality, anonymity and data storage 
All information provided will be kept confidential, and only accessible to members of the research team. All 
collection, storage and processing of data will comply with the principles of the Data Protection Act 1998, and 
has been approved under the procedures of the University of Roehampton Ethics Committee. All the 
information provided will be stored securely and, where possible, anonymized. All data included in the 
publication or presentation of this research, and any subsequent research publications, will be fully 
anonymised to ensure that no individual is identifiable.  
 
Completed questionnaires will be stored physically separate from signed consent forms, and there will be no 
way to match consent forms to completed questionnaires. Anonymised data will be stored for an indefinite 
period of time following the study (for at least 10 years), and may be used for publication, presentation, or for 
subsequent research projects or data analyses. Consent forms will be destroyed after ten years.  
 
Withdrawal 
If clients wish to withdraw from the study, they can at any point message the Chief Investigator with their 
unique ID code. However, data may still be used in aggregate form.  
 
Dissemination of findings 
The results of this research study will be written up in fulfilment of the requirements for the Doctorate in 
Counselling Psychology from the University of Roehampton. The results of this research may be published 
in academic journals, or presented at conferences. 
  
Who is organising the research?  
This research is being undertaken by the Department of Psychology at the University of Roehampton. This 
project has been approved under the procedures of the University of Roehampton’s Ethics Committee.  
 
What happens now?  
If you have decided you would like to participate in this research, and you have signed the Counselling 
Service Consent Form, the next thing to do is to give your therapists the Therapist Information Sheet and 
Therapist Consent Form. Participating therapists will then give any adult clients (18+) the Client Information 




If you have any further questions about any aspect of your participation, please contact 
Daniel Morken (chief investigator) for more details. However, if you would like to contact an 





Department of Psychology 
University of Roehampton 
London SW15 4JD 
morkend@roehampton.ac.uk 
 
Director of Studies:   
Prof. Mick Cooper 
Holybourne Avenue 
Department of Psychology 
University of Roehampton 
London SW15 4JD 
mick.cooper@roehampton.ac.uk 
0208 392 3741 
Head of Department: 
Dr. Diane Bray 
Holybourne Avenue 
Department of Psychology 
University of Roehampton 
London SW15 4JD 
d.bray@roehampton.ac.uk 
0208 392 3741 
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Appendix G: Counselling service consent form 
 
 
    
   
   
	
COUNSELLING SERVICE CONSENT FORM 
The Authenticity Scale as an outcome measure for therapy 
 
Consent Statement: 
I have read the Counselling Service Information Sheet and understand the purpose and procedure of this 
research. I understand that I may request further details and information should I wish. On behalf of the 
counselling service I agree to take part in this research, and I am aware that our participation is entirely 
voluntary. I understand that I am free to withdraw any client receiving counselling at our service at any 
stage in the proceedings and also to withdraw from the project altogether without giving a reason, though 
collected data may still be used in aggregate form. I consent to participating clients completing outcome 
measures, and for the data collected to be used in the preparation of a thesis and accompanying papers 
and presentations. I understand that anonymised data will be stored indefinitely (for at least 10 years) and 
that this data may be used for other research projects and data analyses (at the discretion of the 
investigator). I understand that the information participants provide will be treated confidentially by the 
investigator and research team. I understand that data cannot be traced back to participants’ identities, and 
the identity of the counselling service will be removed in the publication or presentation of any findings. I 
understand that data will be collected and processed in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and 













Department of Psychology 
University of Roehampton 




Please note: if you have a concern about any aspect of your participation or any other queries please raise this with 
the investigator. However, if you would like to contact an independent party please contact the Head of Department.  
Director of Studies Contact Details:    Head of Department Contact Details: 
Prof. Mick Cooper       Dr. Diane Bray 
Holybourne Avenue      Holybourne Avenue 
Department of Psychology     Department of Psychology 
University of Roehampton     University of Roehampton 
London SW15 4JD      London SW15 4JD 
mick.cooper@roehampton.ac.uk    d.bray@roehampton.ac.uk 
0208 392 3741       0208 392 3741 
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THERAPIST INFORMATION SHEET 
The Authenticity Scale as an outcome measure for therapy 
 
Thank you for reading this information sheet. This document will explain why we are doing this research 
and set out what will be involved for therapists who choose to take part. We appreciate you taking the time 
to read it and hope you will be interested in participating in this research. 
 
The Research Project 
This research aims to explore whether the Authenticity Scale, an outcome measure based on person-centred 
theory and positive psychology, would be a useful measure for evaluating the effectiveness of counselling 
and psychotherapy. Considering the current emphasis on evidence-based practice in much of the therapy 
world, there is increasing pressure to use outcome measures to document effectiveness, which in turn can 
help with funding. However, the most widely used outcome measures tend to be symptom and distress 
focused, that is, they measure the extent to which the client is suffering. This research is aiming to help 
answer the call for outcome measures that instead focus on wellbeing, measuring the effectiveness of therapy 




This research is looking to have adults (18+) who are receiving therapy complete two short questionnaires, 
the Authenticity Scale and the CORE-10 (though if your service already use a different outcome measures 
to the CORE-10, we can use that as the second measure). These two questionnaires have 22 questions 
altogether, and would need to be completed on the first session, on the final session and on every 6th session. 
On the 12th session (or the final session, if you are doing less than 12) there would be an additional short 
questionnaire (10 questions) asking clients how helpful they found the two questionnaires they have 
completed. In addition, clients will also be asked to complete a basic demographics sheet.  
 
Therapists’ involvement 
For therapists interested in supporting this research, you will be provided with Client Consent forms and 
information sheets by the Chief Investigator, as well as questionnaire packs. You will be asked to give clients 
meeting the inclusion criteria the Client Information Sheet and Consent Form prior to their starting therapy, 
either at point of contact with the service, or during the initial assessment session. Clients can than take the 
Client Information Sheet away with them to read, and can sign the consent form before their first session if 
they wish to participate. 
Therapists will be asked to give participating clients the questionnaire packs on the first session, the 
and on the final session, as well as on every 6th session (6th, 12th, 18th etc). Questionnaires will preferably be 
completed before the start of the session.  
Therapists willing to participate will also be asked to complete a Therapist Questionnaire Form, asking 
about basic demographics, how long you have been practicing, your level of training and your therapeutic 
approach. This form will be anonymous and confidential.  
It is important to be aware that question 6 on the CORE-10 (‘I have made plans to end my life.’) can 
be an important indicator of risk for the client, and as such relevant for safeguarding. The Information Sheet 
given to clients makes it clear that therapists may see the completed questionnaires. 
 
Consent 
Consent to participate in this research will first be obtained from the counselling service, then from the 










Potential disadvantages/ risks to participants 
A potential disadvantage of participating in this research is that clients will have to spend 5 minutes to 
complete questionnaires and might find that boring. There are no expected risks for clients who take part in 
the study. For the therapist, participating would involve giving your clients the questionnaire pack on the first, 
and final sessions, as well as on every 6th session, but otherwise there would be no disadvantages.  
 
Potential benefits to participating therapists 
There is no direct benefit to taking part in this study, although the questionnaires can provide useful 
information concerning how the client is doing. The information gathered from this project will contribute to 
the research regarding the use of outcome measures that are not distress or symptom focused, hopefully 
providing therapists with an alternative approach to evaluating the effectiveness of therapy.  
 
Confidentiality, anonymity and data storage 
All data generated from this study will be stored securely to the highest possible standard of confidentiality. 
All collection, storage and processing of data will comply with the principles of the Data Protection Act 1998, 
and has been approved under the procedures of the University of Roehampton Ethics Committee. Completed 
questionnaires will be stored physically separate from signed consent forms, and there will be no way to 
match consent forms to completed questionnaires. If participants wish to withdraw from the study, they can 
at any point message the Chief Investigator with their unique ID code. However, data may still be used in 
aggregate form. Anonymised data generated from this study will be stored for an indefinite period of time 
following the study (for at least 10 years), and may be used for publication, presentation, or for subsequent 
research projects or data analyses. Consent forms will be destroyed after ten years. All data included in the 
publication or presentation of this research, and any subsequent research publications, will be fully 
anonymised to ensure that no individual is identifiable. 
 
Dissemination of findings 
The results of this research study will be written up in fulfilment of the requirements for the Doctorate in 
Counselling Psychology from the University of Roehampton. The results of this research may be published 
in academic journals, or presented at conferences. 
  
Who is organising the research?  
This research is being undertaken by the Department of Psychology at the University of Roehampton. This 
project has been approved under the procedures of the University of Roehampton’s Ethics Committee.  
 
What happens now?  
If you have decided you would like to participate in this research, the next thing to do is to sign the Therapist 
Consent Form and give it to your service manager. Then, when you are to start working with a client who is 
18 or older, please give them the Client Information Sheet and the Client Consent Form so they can decide 
if they wish to participate. Ideally give them these forms on an assessment session so that they can decide 
whether they wish to participate before their first session. Clients can then return the signed consent form on 
their first session and complete the first questionnaires. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
If you have any further questions about any aspect of your participation, please contact Daniel Morken (chief 
investigator) for more details. However, if you would like to contact an independent party please contact the 





Department of Psychology 
University of Roehampton 
London SW15 4JD 
morkend@roehampton.ac.uk 
Director of Studies:   
Prof. Mick Cooper 
Holybourne Avenue 
Department of Psychology 
University of Roehampton 
London SW15 4JD 
mick.cooper@roehampton.ac.uk 
0208 392 3741 
Head of Department: 
Dr. Diane Bray 
Holybourne Avenue 
Department of Psychology 
University of Roehampton 
London SW15 4JD 
d.bray@roehampton.ac.uk 
0208 392 3741 
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THERAPIST CONSENT FORM 
The Authenticity Scale as an outcome measure for therapy 
 
Consent Statement: 
I have read the Therapist Information Sheet and understand the purpose and procedure of this research. I 
understand that I may request further details and information should I wish. I agree to take part in this 
research, and I am aware that my participation is entirely voluntary. I understand that I am free to withdraw 
from the project at any stage in the proceedings, without giving a reason. I consent to completing the 
Therapist Questionnaire Form, and for the data collected to be used in the preparation of a doctoral thesis 
and accompanying papers and presentations. I understand that anonymised data will be stored indefinitely 
(for at least 10 years) and that this data may be used for other research projects and data analyses (at the 
discretion of the investigator). I understand that the information participants and therapists provide will be 
treated confidentially by the investigator and research team. I understand that data cannot be traced back 
to participants’ identities, and the identity of the counselling service will be removed in the publication or 
presentation of any findings. I understand that data will be collected and processed in accordance with the 













Department of Psychology 
University of Roehampton 




Please note: if you have a concern about any aspect of your participation or any other queries please raise this with 
the investigator. However, if you would like to contact an independent party please contact the Head of Department.  
 
Director of Studies Contact Details:    Head of Department Contact Details: 
Prof. Mick Cooper       Dr. Diane Bray 
Holybourne Avenue      Holybourne Avenue 
Department of Psychology     Department of Psychology 
University of Roehampton     University of Roehampton 
London SW15 4JD      London SW15 4JD 
mick.cooper@roehampton.ac.uk    d.bray@roehampton.ac.uk 
0208 392 3741       0208 392 3741 
 195 






Please answer all questions you feel comfortable answering.
Therapist Demographics
Date of completion   
DD           MM             YYYY
What is your age? _________________________
What is your gender? _________________________
What is your sexuality? _________________________





Gypsy or Irish Traveller
Irish Any other white background, describe ____________
Mixed/Multiple ethnic groups
White and Black Caribbean White and Asian





Any other Asian background, describe ____________
Black/African/Caribbean/Black British
African Any other Black/African/
Caribbean background describe ____________
Caribbean
Other ethnic group
Arab Any other ethnic group describe ____________
Do you have a 
disability? 
No Yes





Your Training and Practice
When did you qualify as a professional therapist?

   MM                 YYYY
If you are not yet qualified, when do you expect to qualify?

  MM                  YYYY
At what level was your counsellor/psychotherapy training programme?
Level 5 (Diploma, Foundation, 
HE/FE etc.)
Level 7 (Master’s degree, PGDip 
etc.)
Level 6 (Bachelor’s degree) Level 8 (Doctoral degree)
Other             describe ______________________________________




Transactional analysis Cognitive Pluralistic
Psychodynamic/analytic
Other  specify_____________________________________________













Appendix K: Client information sheet 
 
 




CLIENT INFORMATION SHEET 
(please retain this form for your personal records) 
 
The Authenticity Scale as an outcome measure for therapy 
 
Thanks for reading this information sheet about our research. 
 
We would like to invite you to take part in our research project. We are exploring whether the ‘Authenticity 
Scale’ is a useful questionnaire with which to evaluate how effective therapy is. Having good ways of 
evaluating how useful therapy is to people is important in making therapy even more beneficial and 
accessible, and so we would love your help.  
 
Before you decide if you want to join in, it’s important to understand why we are doing this research and what 
taking part involves. If you have any questions, feel free to contact the Chief Investigator whose details are 
at the bottom of this form.  
 
Why are we doing this?  
To provide the best possible therapy service to people who need it, it’s important to understand how therapy 
works and what sorts of therapy are most helpful. One of the ways we can do this is by asking people who 
have therapy to complete a questionnaire that tries to measure how they are feeling before and after therapy 
and see if there has been any change. There are many questionnaires like this, but most of them focus on 
how much people are struggling. This research is investigating whether a questionnaire that focuses on 
wellbeing, might be a good way of seeing how useful therapy is. The Authenticity Scale is such a wellbeing 
focused questionnaire. It has 12 questions, all related to how ‘in-touch’ with yourself you feel.    
 
Do I have to take part? 
No, participation in this research is voluntary. If you consent to taking part, but later change your mind, you 
can still leave the study at any point without providing a reason (though questionnaires you’ve completed 
may still be used in compiled form) by contacting your counselling service. Taking part or choosing not to do 
so will in no way affect the therapy service you receive.  
 
Why have I been asked to take part? 
You have been asked to take part in this study because you are over 18, and you are about to start therapy 
at a therapy service that is participating in this research. 
 
What would taking part mean? 
Taking part in this study would mean completing two short questionnaires on your first therapy session, and 
on your final session, as well as on every 6th session. So, if you have 12 sessions, it would mean completing 
two questionnaires three times (Session 1, session 6 and session 12). These questionnaires have 10 and 12 
questions, and should together take less than 5 minutes to do. There will be one additional short questionnaire 
to complete on your 12th session (or final session, if you are doing less than 12) (10 questions) asking you 
how helpful you found the other two questionnaires. There would also be a short, anonymous demographics 
sheet to complete on your first session. 
 
Consent 
To take part you would have to sign a Consent Form saying you have read and understood this information 
sheet and that you agree to participate in this project.  
 
What are the advantages and disadvantages to taking part? 
You would have to give up about 5 minutes to complete the questionnaires before your therapy session, and 
the questions might be boring, but other than that there are no disadvantages to taking part. On the other 










Can people trace my questionnaires back to me? 
No, the questionnaires are completely anonymous and are only marked by a unique participant code to 
ensure this. However, your therapist and their supervisor might see your questionnaires and use this to make 
the therapy better for you. If you indicate on one of the questionnaires that you might be in danger or at risk, 
your therapist might have to break confidentiality according to the safeguarding procedures of the service 
where you are getting therapy.  
 
The completed anonymous questionnaires will be stored securely and confidentially, only accessible to the 
research team. All collection, storage and processing of data will comply with the principles of the Data 
Protection Act 1998, and has been approved under the procedures of the University of Roehampton’s Ethics 
Committee. Signed consent forms will be stored for 10 years, and the destroyed. Anonymised data generated 
from this project will be stored indefinitely (for at least 10 years). 
 
What will happen to the results of the questionnaires? 
The questionnaires will all be compiled, analysed and written up in a research report that might be published, 
in fulfilment for the doctorate in Counselling Psychology from the University of Roehampton. The results of 
this research may be published in academic journals, presented at conferences or used for teaching 
purposes. Results may also be used for other research studies, publications, presentations or subsequent 
projects (if the investigator gives permission for this).  
 
Who is organising the research?  
This research is being undertaken by the Department of Psychology at the University of Roehampton. This 
project has been approved under the procedures of the University of Roehampton’s Ethics Committee. 
 
What happens next?  
If you have read this information sheet and decided you would like to participate in this research, then the 
next thing to do is to read and sign the Client Consent Form and bring it to your next therapy session. At this 
session your therapist will give you the two questionnaires to complete as well as an anonymous 
demographics sheet (asking about your age, gender and background).  
  










Department of Psychology 
University of Roehampton 




Please note: if you have a concern about any aspect of your participation or any other queries please raise this with 
the investigator. However, if you would like to contact an independent party please contact the Head of Department.  
 
Director of Studies Contact Details:    Head of Department Contact Details: 
Prof. Mick Cooper       Dr. Diane Bray 
Holybourne Avenue      Holybourne Avenue 
Department of Psychology     Department of Psychology 
University of Roehampton     University of Roehampton 
London SW15 4JD      London SW15 4JD 
mick.cooper@roehampton.ac.uk    d.bray@roehampton.ac.uk 
0208 392 3741       0208 392 3741 
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CLIENT CONSENT FORM 
The Authenticity Scale as an outcome measure for therapy 
 
Consent statement (please tick if you agree) 
1. I have read and understood the Information Sheet about the study o 
2. I know I can contact the Chief Investigator with any questions about the study if I need to. o 
3. I am 18 years old or older o 
4. I agree to take part in the project. I understand that I am a volunteer. o 
5. 
I understand I can leave the study at any time without giving a reason. I understand that 
leaving the study will not affect any therapy I receive. I understand that data may still be 
used in collated form. 
o 
6. I have read and understood the part of the Information sheet about the use of the data in research, publications, presentations, sharing and storage.  o 
7. I understand that data will be collected and processed in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and with the University of Roehampton’s Data Protection Policy. o 
8. I understand that my identity will be protected in any write-ups or articles of this study o 
9. 
I understand that anonymised completed questionnaires will be store indefinitely (for at 
least 10 years). I understand that other researchers may be able to use the data if they 
agree to treat it confidentially (and with the permission of the researcher). 
o 










Please complete and return this form to your therapist. 
 
Chief Investigator Contact Details: 
Daniel Morken 
Holybourne Avenue 
Department of Psychology 
University of Roehampton 
London SW15 4JD 
morkend@roehampton.ac.uk 
 
Please note: if you are worried about any aspect of your participation or any other queries please raise this with the 
investigator (or if the researcher is a student you can also contact the Director of Studies.) However, if you would like 
to contact an independent party please contact the Head of Department.  
 
Director of Studies Contact Details:    Head of Department Contact Details: 
Prof. Mick Cooper       Dr. Diane Bray 
Holybourne Avenue      Holybourne Avenue 
Department of Psychology     Department of Psychology 
University of Roehampton     University of Roehampton 
London SW15 4JD      London SW15 4JD 
mick.cooper@roehampton.ac.uk    d.bray@roehampton.ac.uk 
0208 392 3741       0208 392 3741 
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Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research. Please answer all questions you feel comfortable answering.
1) What is your gender?
_____________________
2) What is your 
sexuality? _______________
3) What is your age? _______________
4) What is your ethnic 
group? White
English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish/British Gypsy or Irish Traveller
Irish Any other white 
background, describe:
Mixed/Multiple ethnic groups
White and Black Caribbean White and Asian





Any other Asian 
background, describe:
Black/African/Caribbean/Black British




Arab Any other ethnic group, 
describe:
5) What is your highest 
educational 
qualification? 
Secondary School (GSCE/O-Levels) Undergraduate Degree (BA, BSc or similar.)
Post-Secondary School (College, A-Levels, 
NVQ3 or below, etc.)
Post-graduate Degree (MA, MSc, PGDip or similar.)
Vocational Qualification (Diploma, 
Certificate, Foundation, BTEC, NVQ4 and above, 
or similar)
Doctorate (PhD, MD, PsychD or similar.)





Appendix N: Forest and funnel plots of the coefficient alphas for the AS subscales 
Authentic living subscale: 
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Appendix O: Forest and funnel plots of the mean scores for the AS subscales 
Authentic living subscale:  
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Accepting external influences subscale: 
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Self-alienation subscale:  
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Appendix P: Study 2 - Effects of client demographics 
Gender 
 Baseline. An independent samples t-test revealed baseline AS scores did not differ 
significantly between males (M = 47.9, SD = 11.3) and females (M = 48.7, SD = 10.7): t(56) = 
0.22, p = .83. The mean difference was .72, 95% CI [-5.8, 7.2]. Baseline CORE-10 scores did not 
differ significantly between males (M = 18.9, SD = 3.9) and females (M = 15.8, SD = 8.4): t(25) = 
-0.99, p =.33. The mean difference was -3.1, 95% CI [-9.5, 3.3]. 
 
 Post-therapy. An independent samples t-test revealed post-therapy AS scores did not differ 
significantly between males (M = 56.1, SD = 11.8) and females (M = 54.7, SD = 12.4): t(42) = -
0.34, p = .72. The mean difference was -1.4, 95% CI [-9.8, 7.0]. Post-therapy CORE-10 scores did 
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not differ significantly between males (M = 13.0, SD = 8.3) and females (M = 10.1, SD = 8.1): 
t(18) = -0.76, p =.46. The mean difference was -2.9, 95% CI [-11.0, 5.1]. 
 
 Change. An independent samples t-test revealed AS change scores did not differ 
significantly between males (M = 7.2, SD = 15.3) and females (M = 6.7, SD = 9.3): t(38) = -0.12, 
p = .90. The mean difference was -0.49, 95% CI [-8.5, 7.5]. CORE-10 change scores did not differ 
significantly between males (M = -6.1, SD = 8.1) and females (M = -6.2, SD = 8.6): t(18) = -0.003, 
p =.99. The mean difference was -0.01, 95% CI [-8.3, 8.3]. 
 
Age 
 Baseline. At baseline, age was not significantly correlated with AS scores: r(45) = -.11, p 
= .23, 95% CI [-.38, .18]. Nor was age significantly correlated with baseline CORE-10 scores: 
r(22) = -.18, p = .20, 95% CI [-.54, .24]. 
  
 Post-therapy. At post-therapy, age was not significantly correlated with AS scores: r(36) 
= -.12, p = .25, 95% CI [-.42, .20]. Nor was age significantly correlated with post-therapy CORE-
10 scores: r(15) = -.08, p = .38, 95% CI [-.54, .42]. 
 
 Change. Age did not significantly correlate with either change on the AS, r(32) =  -.15, p 




 Baseline. A one-way ANOVA revealed there was a non-significant effect of ethnicity on 
baseline AS scores: F(2, 48) = 1.55, p = .22, 𝜂%& = .061. There was also a non-significant effect 
of ethnicity on baseline CORE-10 scores: F(2, 21) = 0.24, p = .79, 𝜂%& = .022. 
 
 Post-therapy. A one-way ANOVA revealed there was a non-significant effect of ethnicity 
on post-therapy AS scores: F(2, 36) = 0.88 p = .42, , 𝜂%& = .047. There was also a non-significant 
effect of ethnicity on post-therapy CORE-10 scores: F(2, 14) = 0.67, p = .53, , 𝜂%& = .087. 
 
 Change. A one-way ANOVA revealed there was a non-significant effect of ethnicity on 
AS change scores: F(2, 33) = 1.09 p = .35, 𝜂%& = .062. There was also a non-significant effect of 
ethnicity on CORE-10 change scores: F(2, 14) = 0.03, p = .97, 𝜂%& = .004. 
 
Education 
 Baseline. At baseline, education level shared a significant, moderate positive correlation 
with AS scores: rs(22) = .47, p = .010, 95% CI [.08, .73]. Education was non-significantly 
correlated with the AL (rs[22] = .15, p = .25, 95% CI [-.27, .52].) and SA (rs[22] = -.24, p = .13, 
95% CI [-.59, .18].) subscales at baseline, but shared a significant, large negative correlation with 
the AEI subscale, rs(22) = -.62, p = .001, 95% CI [-.82, -.29]. Participants who were more educated 
scored higher on the AS overall, and lower on the AEI subscale.  
 Education level was non-significantly correlated with CORE-10 scores at baseline: rs(22) 
= .33, p = .06, 95% CI [-.65, .08]. 
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 Post-therapy. At post-therapy, education level shared a significant, large positive 
correlation with AS scores: rs(18) = .58, p = .004, 95% CI [.19, .81]. Education was non-
significantly correlated with the AL subscale post-therapy, rs(19) = .31, p = .083, 95% CI [-.14, 
.65], but shared significant, large negative correlations with the AEI subscale, r(19) = -.63, p = 
.001, 95% CI [-.83, -.27], and the SA subscale, rs(18) = -.54, p = .007, 95% CI [-.79, .13]. Post-
therapy, more educated participants scored higher on the AS overall, and lower on the AEI and 
SA subscales. 
 At post-therapy, education level shared a significant, large negative correlation with 
CORE-10 scores: rs(15) = -.46, p = .032, 95% CI [-.77, .03]. More educated participants scored 
lower on the CORE-10 post-therapy.  
  
 Change. Education level did not share significant correlations with change on either the 
AS, rs(18) =  .15, p = .27, 95% CI [-.31, .56], or the CORE-10, rs(15) =  -.14, p = .30, 95% CI [--
.58, .37]. 
 
Appendix Q: Study 2 - Effects of therapist demographics 
Gender 
 An independent samples t-test revealed client AS change scores did not differ significantly 
between male therapists (M = 9.4, SD = 13.5) and female therapists (M = 4.6, SD = 9.0): t(34) = -
1.26, p = .22. The mean difference was -4.7, 95% CI [-12.3, 2.9]. CORE-10 change scores did not 
differ significantly between male therapists (M = -9.6, SD = 6.0) and female therapists (M = -4.1, 




 Therapist age shared a significant, large negative correlation with CORE-10 change, r(15) 
= -.57, p = .008, 95% CI [-.82, -.12]. Clients of older therapists changed more on the CORE-10 
over the course of therapy. Therapist age did not significantly correlate with AS change, r(33) = 
.16, p = .17, 95% CI [-.18, .47]. 
 
Ethnicity 
 A one-way ANOVA revealed the effect of therapist ethnicity on AS change was non-
significant, F(2, 32) = 0.04, p = .96, 𝜂%& = .003. There was insufficient data to test the effect of 
therapist ethnicity on CORE-10 change. 
 
Qualification 
 Number of years therapists were qualified did not correlate significantly with either AS 
change (r[32] = .02, p = .45, 95% CI [-.32, .36]) or CORE-10 change (r[13] = -.19, p = .25, 95% 
CI [-.64, .36]).  
 Therapist level of training did not correlate significantly with either AS change (rs[32] = -
.14, p = .22, 95% CI [-.21, .46]) or CORE-10 change (rs[13] = .37, p = .09, 95% CI [-.18, .74]).  
  
Professional identity 
 A one-way ANOVA revealed the effect of therapist professional identity on AS change 
was non-significant, F(1, 32) = 0.55, p = .46, 𝜂%& = .017. The effect of therapist professional 
identity on CORE-10 change was also non-significant, F(1, 13) = 0.11, p = .75, 𝜂%& = .008. 
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 An independent samples t-test revealed that there was no significant difference in AS 
scores whether the therapist was currently a trainee (M = 8.0, SD = 9.5) or not (M = 2.2, SD = 6.3): 
t(17) = -1.26. The mean difference was -5.8, 95% CI [-15.5, 3.9]. There was insufficient data to 
test the effect of therapist trainee status on CORE-10 change. 
 
Therapeutic primary orientation 
 A one-way ANOVA revealed the effect of therapist primary therapeutic orientation on AS 
change was non-significant, F(5, 27) = 0.68, p = .64, 𝜂%& = .112. The effect of therapist orientation 
on CORE-10 change was also non-significant, F(1, 13) = 0.03, p = .87, 𝜂%& = .002. 
 
 
 
 
